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I. INTRODUCTION
For over a decade, the problem of effectively
controlling water pollution from agricultural
drainage on the west side of California's San
Joaquin Valley has challenged and frustrated regu-
lators, farmers, and environmentalists alike.
Drainage discharges have caused, and continue to
cause, significant environmental damage to one of
California's major river systems, as well as to exten-
sive portions of the Central Valley wetlands that are
the backbone of the Pacific Flyway. Although there
exists a broad consensus that the solution to this
problem lies in improved irrigation efficiency at the
individual farm level, an effective method to accom-
plish this goal has not been identified.
In several important respects, problems associ-
ated with agricultural pollution in the San Joaquin
Valley are representative of a nationwide challenge.
Agricultural drainage is, in regulatory language, a
"nonpoint source" of water pollution. In contrast to
"point source" pollution-the readily identified and
monitored discharges from individual factories and
water treatment plants-"nonpoint source" pollu-
tion includes runoff from agriculture, logging, con-
struction, urban development, and mining. Even
though pollution from these sources-particularly
agricultural pollution-is now known to be the prin-
cipal cause of contamination in lakes, rivers, and
streams nationwide, little progress has been made
in creating effective programs to control it, This is
due in large part to the perceived enormity and inef-
ficiency of the regulatory task. Characteristic of
many nonpoint source pollution problems, agricul-
tural runoff is comprised of countless independent
sources, each of which must be addressed if an
overall program of pollution control is to be suc-
cessful.
Indeed, traditional methods of regulation have
seemed inappropriate to industries such as agricul-
ture because of the sheer number and diversity of
sources. Issuance of individual permits that limit
the amount of pollutants that each farm may dis-
charge has been considered too cumbersome a pro-
gram to administer, and this approach thus far has
been rejected by federal, state, and local legisla-
tures and regulatory agencies. On the other hand,
requiring farmers to adopt "Best Management
Practices," a regulatory approach that avoids the
need for individual permits by requiring all sources
to use a specified pollution-control technology,
would present its own set of shortcomings when
applied to a highly diverse group of individual
farms. This combination of factors-a significant,
uncontrolled source of environmental pollution and
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imperfect tools for regulating it-has led policy-
makers to seek to identify new, more workable
strategies to control agricultural pollution.
At the same time, private sector concerns over
regulatory costs and intervention in business deci-
sions have generated a growing interest in incen-
tive-based pollution control programs. The theoret-
ical advantages of these programs-cost-effective
pollution control, maximum flexibility to the regu-
lated community, and reduced informational and
bureaucratic requirements for regulators-have
been widely discussed in the policy literature. Yet
incentives have rarely, if ever, been given more than
cursory consideration as the primary means of pol-
lution control where pollution problems are attrib-
utable solely to nonpoint sources.
The agricultural drainage crisis in the
Grasslands region of California's Central Valley pro-
vides an excellent case study for testing the advan-
tages and disadvantages of both incentive-based
programs and traditional regulatory programs. The
crux of the problem in the Grasslands is representa-
tive of agricultural pollution problems generally.
Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of sources must be
made accountable for the pollution they generate.
Yet, these sources traditionally have resisted regu-
lation out of concern that they will lose control of
their farming operations to state or federal regula-
tors and that mandates to reduce drainage would
be unduly expensive. Thus, decentralized decision-
making and cost-effectiveness are key elements to
any reform effort. Indeed, cost is particularly impor-
tant in the Grasslands region, where over 50 percent
of employment in the affected counties is farm-
related.'
The Grasslands region is particularly suited to
this type of approach to pollution control because
the foundation for analysis has already been laid.
The nature of the pollution problem is understood;
the pollution sources, while numerous, have been
identified; and options for controlling drainage dis-
charges at the farm level are available and general-
ly affordable. In addition, many of the legal and
institutional mechanisms necessary for implement-
ing a regulatory solution already exist.
Above all, the crisis in the Grasslands demands
attention. Agricultural pollution in the Grasslands
region has continued unabated for years, threaten-
ing ecosystems that provide critical remnant habi-
tats for the many fish and wildlife species in the
region.
This study examines the feasibility of using
economic incentives to control pollution from irri-
gated agriculture in the Grasslands. In the process.
it presents a model for moving from theoretical dis-
cussion of new regulatory strategies to practical
applications. While the primary result of the study
is a specific proposal for a regulatory system in the
Grasslands, the analytic model itself is just as
important. Parts or all of it may be useful in any
region where agncultural or other nonpoint source
pollution problems persist.
11. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF NON-
POINT SOURCE POLLUTION
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The National
Context
Two decades ago, the nation embarked on an
ambitious agenda to restore the quality of water in
our rivers, lakes, and estuaries. The primary objec-
tive of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972--which form the basis of the
modem CWA-was "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."3 Although considerable improve-
ments in water quality have been achieved to date,
many surface waters in the United States still do not
support designated uses. The primary cause of
these continuing water quality problems is pollu-
tion from nonpoint sources.4
Agricultural runoff is the single largest contrib-
utor to nonpoint source pollution and is the prima-
ry source of all vater pollution in quality-impaired
rivers, lakes, and streams.5 In the West, where
1. 5. AxRactiiB. ECONO.MIC PROFiLE O AGRiCULTu iN THE \'ET..E
OFTHE SAN JOAQUIN VAUEY (1990).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C
1251-1387 (1986) (hereinafter 'Clean Water Acr or'-VcA7).
3. Id. § 101(a).
4. According to a recent Environmental Protection Agency
report to Congress:
Nonpoint source pollution problems exist in every state
and extend to every type of waterbody.
* Each category of nonpoint sources generates a broad
range of pollutants in varying concentrations.
* Nonpoint sources have caused severe damage to aquat-
Ic communities nationrutde and also pose risks for
human health where fish, shellfish, or dnnking water are
contaminated
U.S. ENRmawate=. Ppomcozn AcOENYI. 07,:c:- VI ATER f.WLtk:G
NONPOUT SOM~E FouL=m:1i FInA. REpcor Tro Cc.--:RFss cu Sscnoni
319 CFm O. .r; WATm Acr (i992) (hereinafter'EPA RFucmq.
5 I In a sun'ey of nonpoint source assessment data provid-
ed by states, the EPA found agricultural runoff to be the largest
source of pollution In rivers and streams nation-ide (accounting
for the pollution in 41% of river mileage reported as quality-
Impaired). in the western states, rangeland and imgated cropland
cause pollution In 97 5% and 89-%. respectively, of impaired river
mileage In the %Vest. agriculture is also the largest source of pollu-
SDrina 1995 Ecruz-''Mc art;s cd llnacllt Raw WlIffon
Chelsea H. Con~don. Teny F. Yaonn, and B~an E. Gray Volume 2, Number 3
approximately 50 million acres of land are devoted
to irrigated agriculture,6 low river flows can exacer-
bate the problem. In these relatively and environ-
ments, agricultural runoff and drainage often pro-
vide a significant proportion of river flows and may
dominate flows during periods of drought and sea-
sonal low flows.
Agricultural drainage poses a direct threat to
fish and wildlife habitats and the species that
depend on them. In a recent study, the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter "FWS")
documented extensive damage to aquatic habitats
due to toxic concentrations of pollutants in surface
and subsurface drainage discharges from irrigated
lands. 7 Significantly, agricultural return flows are
the most common source of pollution of national
wildlife refuges.8 Many refuges depend on agricul-
tural drainage flows for some portion of their water
supplies, and many areas that receive contaminated
drainage water serve as habitat to one or more fed-
erally listed endangered or threatened species.
Adverse effects on waterfowl populations include
reduced reprodUctive success and survival of young
birds.9 While less information is available about the
effects of agricultural drainage on species other
than waterfowl, a National Fishery Survey conduct-
ed by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (hereinafter "EPA") and FWS found that agri-
cultural runoff adversely affected fish populations
in 29 percent of the waters studied. 10
One reason that nonpoint sources, including
irrigated agriculture, are such a prominent cause of
continuing pollution is that the Clean Water Act has
focused regulatory efforts and expenditures almost
exclusively on municipal and industrial point
sources. Until the Act was amended in 1987, the pri-
mary program for addressing nonpoint source pol-
tion in lakes, with irrigated agriculture accounting for more than
40% of the lake acreage reported as impaired.
6. IRRIGATION JOURNAL (1993).
7. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVIcE, AN OVERVIEW OF IRRIGATION
DRMANWATER ECHNIQUES, IMPACTS ON FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES, AND
MANAGEMENT OPTIONS (1992) (hereinafter "USFWS OVERVIEW'). The
primary constituents of concern include naturally occurring trace
elements (e.g., selenium, boron, molybdenum, and salts) as well as
pesticides, herbicides, and other chemicals.
8. The EPA attributes 81% of the pollution in California wet-
lands to agriculture, with indications that most of the wetland
acreage in California is contaminated by agricultural drainage, EPA
REPORT, supra note 4.
9. See. e.g,. J.P Skorupa & H.M. Ohlendorf, Contaminants in
Drainage Water and Avian Risk Thresholds, in THE ECONOMiICS AND
MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN AGRICULTURE (A. Dinar et al.
eds., 1991).
10. Survey cited in USFWS OVERVIEW. supra note 7.
11. Clean Water Act § 208.
lution was the requirement in section 208 that the
states develop comprehensive water quality man-
agement plans." The "208 Plans" were largely inef-
fective, however, because federal law does not
require that they be implemented.
Another, less obvious reason that nonpoint
sources have been overlooked is the regulatory bias
embodied in the CWA. Since 1972, technology-dri-
ven effluent standards have been the principal tool
for controlling pollution. In 1987, Congress amend-
ed the Act to emphasize pollution control require-
ments based on water quality,' 2 thereby increasing
the pressure on states and localities to regulate the
dischargers responsible for most of the pollution-
including nonpoint sources.
The CWA now requires states to identify waters
that, "without additional action to control nonpoint
sources of pollution, cannot reasonably be expect-
ed to attain or maintain applicable water quality
standards or the goals and requirements of this
Act."13 It also directs each State to identify specific
categories and subcategories of nonpoint sources
as part of this process and, for each such source, to
develop a detailed management plan to address the
pollution problem, including both regulatory and
non-regulatory programs.' 4 In addition, nonpoint
sources must be factored into the calculations that
allocate pollution reduction responsibilities among
dischargers for each water body that does not meet
water quality standards.S
Although this emphasis on water quality-based
regulation has turned the spotlight on nonpoint
source pollution, the CWA still does not require
states to implement nonpoint source regulatory
programs. Nor does it authorize the EPA to promul-
gate a federal program in the absence of an ade-
quate state program. 6 In sum, while Congress has
12. d § 302(a)
13. Id. § 319(a)(1).
14 Id.
15. Section 303(d)( i)(c) of the CWA requires that, for each pol-
lutant criterion violated, states calculate a "total maximum daily
load* (hereinafter 'TMDL") of pollutants -at a level necessary to
implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal
variations and a margin of safety which takes into account any lack
of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limita-
tions and water quality." Id. 4' 303(d)(1)(c) States must incorporate
these allocations into their "continuing planning process- under
section 303(e) of the CWA The EPA is required to review state
TMDLs and to promulgate a federal TMDL where a state TMDL Is
inadequate. Id. § 303(d)(2),
16. See E. Bartfeld. Point-Nonpoint Source Trading Lookina Bcyond
Potential Cost Savings. 23 ENvrI. L. 43 (1993), P THo.isoN, RUNOFF. A
GUIDE TO STATE AND LocAL CONTROL OF NONPOINr SOURCE WATER
POLLUTION (1989). The CWA, even as amended in 1987, also lacks
adequate incentives to encourage states to implement nonpoint
source programs. Prior to 1987, EPA did not provide grants to state
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expressed the clear intent to address nonpoint
source pollution. 17 the language of the CWA fails to
ensure effective nonpoint source pollution con-
trol.' 8
The need to improve the federal legal and poli-
cy structure for controlling nonpoint source pollu-
tion. particularly agricultural pollution, is now wide-
ly recognized. In some watersheds, nonpoint source
dischargers produce most of the pollution. Yet,
these sources have not invested in pollution control
and are not required to take even the most afford-
able steps to decrease discharges. At the same
time, point source dischargers in the same water-
shed generate significantly less pollution, have sub-
stantially reduced their discharges and are now
being required to invest in pollution control mea-
sures with relatively high marginal costs. Because of
this imbalance, point source dischargers are seek-
ing relief from these requirements and are urging
the states and the federal government to begin to
regulate nonpoint sources.
Environmental interests, as well as state and
local agencies responsible for water pollution con-
trol, also recognize the importance of controlling
nonpoint sources of pollution, agricultural
sources.19
The 103rd Congress debated significant amend-
ments to the nonpoint source provisions of the
CWA_2 0 Recent changes in other federal laws also
demonstrate the growing interest in nonpoint
source regulation. For example, the Coastal Zone
Management Act was amended in 1990 to require
certain states to develop a Coastal Nonpoint
Pollution Control Program. 2' The Central Valley
Project Improvement Act, enacted in 1992. contains
a number of significant reform measures for federal
water management in California. These include
requirements that water districts and individuals
who use federally supplied water assume responsi-
bility for control and management of drainage dis-
charges generated within their respective bound-
aries in order to comply with all state and federal
water quality standards.22
B. The Grasslands: A Test Case For Nonpoint
Source Pollution Control
On the west side of the San loaquin Valley, in a
93,000-acre region known as the Grasslands region
(Figure 1). subsurface drainage from irrigated agri-
culture contains high concentrations of trace ele-
ments and salts.23 These elements occur naturally
in the area's soils but pose problems when they are
mobilized and transported by irrigation water.
Several contaminants (notably selenium, boron.
arsenic, and molybdenum) are of particular concern
because of their potential harm to fish and wildlife,
or because of their adverse effects on agricultural
productivity in areas downstream. Toxic concentra-
tions of trace elements in drainage discharges also
pose a threat to public health by contaminating
game species.
Widespread irrigation of the west side San
Joaquin Valley's saline soils requires importation of
water into the region on a large scale and a program
to "leach" the salts out of the soils and to drain the
lands of excess water following the irrigation of
or local nonpoint source management programs; in 1987 Congress
authorized $400 million in nonpoint source funding for a five-year
penod. See also EPA REPoRT. supra note 4. Sanctions for noncompli-
ance with nonpoint source requirements also appear in'adequate.
while EPA may disapprove a state management plan. the only con-
sequence to the state is ineligibility for section 319 funds. Clean
Water Act § 319[h).
17. 'It is the national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an
expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this Act to be met
through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion.' Cean Water Act § 101(a)(7).
18. Starting in the 1970"s. EPA sought to redefine "polnt
source" to exclude non-industrial dischargers such as farm and log-
ging ditches, arguing that it was impractical and unrealistic to set
technology-based requirements on those sources. In 1977.
Congress categorically exempted imrgation return flows from the
definition of point sources. In 1987. Congress extended the agricul-
tural exemption to include agricultural storm water discharges. Se
lohn H. Davidson, Utile Waters: The Relationship Between Water Poffluhn
and Agncufturat Drainage. 17 Evn. L. Rep. 89 (1987). Other areas of
federal policy also provide special exemptions and subsidies to Irri-
gated agriculture, which make the task of effectively regulating agri-
cultural water pollution more difficult. Subsidized water prices and
commodity price support programs give farmers little Incentive to
use resources more efficiently.
19, As one expert recently stated. 'Although urban dT;elop-
merit, marinas, dam building, and the like contribute to nonpomt
source pollution, agriculture is seen by many people as the most
significant source; so it is not a question of whether agriculture will
be singled out-but how ' Susan Offutt. Executive Director of the
Board on Agriculture. National Academy of Scien:es. Remarks at
the Conference on Rural Nonpoint Snurce Pollution in the Upper
Midwest (March 17. 1993). cited in No:;o:r SzuF.: Nas.Nm-S-s.
IuneJiuly 1993. at 23
20 Eg. S 1i14 (Sen. Baucuo. D-MT. Sea Chafee. RPRI) and
HL 3948 (Rep Mineta. D-CA)
21. Coastal Zone Act Reauthonzation Amendments of 1990,
16 USC § 1455b (1993 Supp)
22, Central Valley Prolect Impro.ement Act. Pub L No, 102-
575. Tide XXXIV. § 3405(c). 106 Stat. 4706 (1992) (hereinafter
-CVPWAo)
23 Saline soils occur naturally as a result of the and climate.
For centuries, ephemeral and intermittent streams originating in
the Coast Range have caned dissolved salts, trae elements. and
sediments out across the plain, often spreading out. drying up. and
depositing their loads of dissolved solids in the soils of the alluvial
fans. In addition, sediment transport and deposition havoe caused
substantial movement of trace element loads to loer elevations.
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Figure 1.
Water, Irrigation, and Drainage Districts in
the Grasslands Region
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ORIGINS OF CONTAMINATED DRAINAGE:
RECLAMATION OF ARID SOILS
The west side of the San Joaquin Valley--from the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in the north, to the Tehachapi
Mountains near Bakersfield in the south-has attracted agn-
cultural development since the late 1800's because of its
temperate dimate. Near the San Joaquin River in the trough
of the valley, the natural ecology included aquatic wetland.
riparian forest, and valley oaksavannah habitats. This region.
once cleared and drained, was especially conducive to agri-
culture because access to the river provided a water supply in
the otherwise long, dry summers.
Farther from the river, large upland areas of praine and
saltbush sloped gradually up to the Coast Range inthe west,
Here. the soils are derived from the uplifted marine sedi-
ments in the mountains. The natural streams from the moun-
tains flowed intermittently, primarily during the winter and
spring rains. These streams carned salts and trace elements
(as well as suspended sediments) from the mountains
towards the valley, often fanning out and depositing these
loads before reaching the river in the valley trough. This
process created soils that contain naturally high concentra-
tions of salts and potentially toxic trace elements such as
arsenic, boron, cadmium, chromium, copper, manganese.
mercury, molybdenum, nickel, selenium, and zinc. To make
farmlands in this region productive, the soils had to be
-reclaimed' by using irrigation water to leach the salts and
trace elements from the soils. Farmers in the upland areas
initially pumped groundwater to reclaim the soils and grow
crops, but severe overdraft and land subsidence began to
force lands out of production. This natural limitation on
water use was circumvented in the 1960s. when the San Luis
Unit of the federal Central Valley Prolect began to bring water
to the region from the San Francisco Bay-Delta in a large
aqueduct.
One significant natural limitation to widespread agri-
cultural production remained, however. Much of the west
side contains clayey soils which make percolation of irnga-
tion water very slow. Once in the shallow groundwater, down-
ward percolation is further limited by the Corcoran Clay
Member of the Tulare Formation, which divides the upper.
semi-confined aquifer from the confined aquifer beneath It.
As a result of these restrictions to downward percolation, the
semi-confined aquifer operates much like a bathtub, if water
flows in faster than it drains out the bottom--an average of
about 0.3 acre-feet/per acre per year through the Corcoran
Clay--then the water level rises. In this respect, farming on
the saline soils on the west side is restricted in much the
same way as in other western regions which do not have a
convenient outlet to the sea. such as Stillwater. Nevada and
the Salton Sea region of California. While the details of these
geological limitations were not fully understood at the time.
the drainage problem was widely recognized by the 1960"s.
The irrgation water from the aqueduct (particularly when
used in abundance to leach excess salts) was expected to
build up in the shallow groundwater table, encroach on the
root zone of the crops, and decrease yields.
In anticipation of this problem, the San Luis Unit
authorization included plans for a drainage system to remove
the excess subsurface water from nearly 300.000 imgated
acres. The plan envisioned a system of subsurface drains In
the affected farmlands, which would collect the contaminat-
ed drainage water and eventually convey it to a natural water-
course flowing to the ocean.
Unanticipated in this irgation and reclamation plan
was the environmental damage that would result from dis-
posing of drainage in the wetlands, the river. and the estuary
due to selenium and other trace elements. The discovery of
deformed birds at Kesterson Reservoir in 1983 inaugurated
the search for environmentally acceptable imgation and
drainage disposal practices.
crops. Without drainage facilities to carry away
excess water and salt. irrigation would lead to wide-
spread 'waterlogging" of clay soils, trapping dis-
solved salts and trace elements within the root
zone.
In the 1960s, farmers on the west side of the
San loaquin Valley began to install subsurface
drains and drainage canals to collect, transport, and
dispose of saline drainage water. The long-term
plan, conceived as a partnership among state, fed-
eral, and farming interests, was to construct a 188-
mile concrete drain in the trough of the San Joaquin
Valley to carry drainage water to the Sacramento-
San Joaquin River Delta.24 Construction of a seg-
ment of this San Luis Drain began in 1968 and
included a regulating reservoir in the Kesterson
National Wildlife Refuge. When construction of the
San Luis Drain was halted in the mid-1970s because
of financial and political problems. Kesterson
Reservoir became its terminus.
By 1983, approximately 7,000 acre-feet 25 of
drainage, primarily from subsurface drains in the
Westlands Water District, was being delivered to
Kesterson each year. Shortly thereafter, biologists
from the WS discovered unusually high rates of
embryonic deaths and deformities among birds in
the area. Of the nests under study at Kesterson,
almost 20 percent contained deformed birds, and
over 40 percent contained at least one dead
embryo.2 6 Only one species of fish. the hardy gam-
busla (mosquito fish), could be found. The biolo-
gists attributed these shocking findings to elevated
concentrations of selenium27 present in subsurface
agricultural drainage water in the San Luis Drain.
Selenium had accumulated in invertebrates and
plants in the food chain, leading to severe effects on
the birds that fed on them.
The discovery of the effects of selenium in agri-
24 Congress decided that the federal irrnation project planned
for the region would be contingent upon the installation of drainage
facilities The San Luis Unit of the Central Val; Pro;ect (hereinafter
"CVP-). which seives the Grass!ands, ,as authonzed in 1960. San
LuisActof 19 9, Pub L No 86-48,. 74 Slat, 156(1960).
25. An ace-foat of ater. approximately 326,000 gallons. is
enough water to cover one acre of land one foot deep and to meet
the average annual (domestic) water needs of a family of fie.
26 HM OhlendorfetaL.Emryn:n!-MStyariAbnzrrtaiticf
Aqualit Birds- ,,,",?.rt lin.,Ls 6y Selfniurt From lrni.tn:rt Drainratr. 52
THE S . cc c7iHET TOT. E .m ;oi.'r49 (1935) For additional infor-
mation. s Ho Ohlendorf et a. Si_,eruum Toasc.s fnrild Aqua±:
Birds, 24 llc tjicrTo:w,.Ao .,. HEAT 67 (1938h
D.l Hoffman & G Heinz. Er.bry:!,-: arA Terarg.zz EFfts .fSeenur n
in IFe. D It ci ta1 rs, 24 l owr,.. oF Tc:ciL co Am) Er;,, -ai.
HE.tm 477 (1933). Skorupa & Ohlendorf. supra note 9,
27, Selenium is essential to human and animal health in
small quantities, but it can be toxic when it is mested in large
quantities, leading to reduced reproduction. reduced survival.
reduced growth and deformities in fish and wildlife species.
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cultural drainage at Kesterson was serendipitous.
Several factors converged to allow researchers to
detect its adverse effects. Kesterson was a federally
protected national wildlife refuge, and biologists
were frequently working in the field. Documentation
of actual deaths and deformities might not have
occurred in an unprotected area. Moreover, the
effects of selenium toxicity were clearly observable
in young birds, while sublethal effects in adult birds
would have been more difficult to identify. In addi-
tion, Kesterson was located in a closed basin with
no other water source, which accelerated the rate of
accumulation of selenium and other elements to
harmful levels. Where drainage is disposed of in
open, flowing water bodies, the effects of selenium
are far more difficult to detect.
In 1986, the California State Water Resources
Control Board ordered the United States to close
the San Luis Drain and Kesterson Reservoir.
Closure of these facilities did not resolve the prob-
lems of managing and disposing of contaminated
agricultural drainage, however, and selenium in
drainage water continues to threaten biological
resources in the San Joaquin Valley. Much of the
agricultural drainage in the region now flows direct-
ly into the San Joaquin River. Elsewhere in the San
Joaquin Valley, evaporation ponds are still widely
used for drainage disposal. The ponds are known to
attract migratory waterfowl and other aquatic birds,
posing a significant risk to these populations.
Currently, there are approximately 7,000 acres of
evaporation ponds in the San Joaquin Valley; plans
have been made to build between 10,000 and 20,000
additional acres of ponds.2 8
Before the closure of Kesterson, private wet-
lands in the Grassland Water District had been
receiving as much as 29,000 acre-feet of similarly
contaminated drainage as a water supply for duck
habitat. 29 Because the drainage water was mixed
with relatively clean water in the Grasslands wet-
lands, contamination was not as severe as at
28. SAN JOAaUIN VALLEY DRAINAGE PROGRAM, FISH AND WILDLIFE
RESOURCES AND AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY,
CALIFORNIA (1990).
29, During the 1970s and 1980s until the disaster at Kesterson
Reservoir. up to 50% of the water used in wildlife areas in the
Grasslands region consisted of agricultural drainage and other "sur-
plus" waters. Id
30. M K. Saiki et al.. Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of Selenum
In Agncultural Drainage on Fish in the San Joaquin Valley, in EcONOMICS AND
MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN AGRrCULTURE (A. Dinar et al.
eds 1991). For additional information on elevated concentrations
of trace elements in fish tissues from the area. see M.K. Saiki.
Selenium and Other Trace Elements in Fish From the San Joqauin Valley and
Suisun Bay. in SYMPOsIUM IV: SELENIUM AND AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE
(1985); M.K. Saiki & T.W. May. Trace Element Residues in Bluegills and
Common Carp From the Lower San Joaquin River. California. and its
Kesterson. In 1985, following the discoveries at
Kesterson, the Grasslands Water District stopped
using the drainage water and, through a series of
temporary conveyances, it was routed to the San
Joaquin River. Since that time, the river consistently
has exceeded selenium standards. Resulting dam-
age to fish populations has been difficult to detect,
however, due to a lack of baseline information,30
In response to the sudden degradation of the
San Joaquin River and the continuing risk to the
wetlands, the California State Water Resources
Control Board sponsored a two-year study of the
agricultural drainage problem in the Grasslands
region.31 Searching for practical solutions, state and
regional officials found that most of the drainage
problem could be solved affordably by using readi-
ly available, more efficient irrigation methods to
reduce the amount of drainage produced,
The findings of the state report were confirmed
and supplemented in 1990 by the conclusions of a
$50 million study undertaken by the joint federal-
state San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program (here-
inafter "SJVDP"). The SJVDP also produced a
detailed management plan 32 based on the same
fundamental recommendations put forward by the
state study: First, to decrease the amount of
drainage generated, growers in the region must
improve irrigation efficiency and selectively retire
(i.e., permanently fallow) highly contaminated farm-
land. Second, they must recycle and dispose of
strictly limited quantities of drainage. Third, farm-
ers must employ technological "fixes," as necessary,
to ameliorate the remaining problem.
While the SJVDP's management plan was wide-
ly accepted by government agencies, the agricultur-
al community, and the public, its recommendations
have not yet been implemented. For example, the
RWOCB neither has set specific limits on drainage
discharges to the San Joaquin River nor has
enforced any other requirements for drainage
reduction or land retirement. Instead, it has relied
Tributanes. 74 THE SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT 199 (1988)
In December of 1994, Judge Oliver W Wanger of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled that
the Bureau of Reclamation is required by the San Luis Act to com-
plete the San Luis Drain Judge Wanger issued a permanent injunc-
tion that compels the United States to 'take all reasonable and nec-
essary actions to apply for a discharge permit for the drain"
Summer Peck Ranch. Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation. Nos CV-F-91-
048 OWW & CV-F-88-634 Oww. slip op at 47 (E D Cal 1994)
31. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, REGULATION or
AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE TO THE SAN JOAoUIN RIVER (1987) (hereinafter
"SWRCB REioWf').
32. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY DRAINAGE PROGPAM, A MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR AGRICULTURAL SUBSURFACE DRAINAGE AND RELATED PROBLEMS ON THE
WESTSIDE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY: FINAL REPORT (1990) (hereinafter
"DRAINAGE PROGRA.M FINAL REPORT').
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AGRICULTURAL PROFILE OF THE GRASSLANDS
REGION
Agriculture is the principal economic activity in the
Grasslands region and accounts for over 50 percent of the
employment in the three counties that encompass the
Grasslands region (Fresno. Madera. and Merced). Other land
uses in the area include private. state, and federal wildlife
areas, and municipal and industrial uses associated with the
towns of Los Banos, Gustine. and Firebaugh. The malority of
the irrigated agricultural lands in the region is divided among
20 irrgation. water, and drainage districts.
In the Grasslands, nearly 70 percent of the farms are
owned by individuals and the average farm size is 400 acres.
The land owners are not necessarily the farm 'operators: how-
ever. Approximately 50 percent of the farms are operated by
full owners, with part owners accounting for about 30 percent
of the farms. and tenant operators accounting for the remain-
der. Nor are the boundaries of the farms and the farm opera-
tions necessarily the same. For example, farm operators may
lease land on more than one farm. The mix of owners and
operators, combined with'the fact that farm operation bound-
anes may change from year-to-year as a result of changes in
leasing arrangements, underscores the importance of piggy-
backing the reporting system for a pollution control program
onto existing district recordkeeping activities.
The principal crops grown in the region are cotton: field
crops (e.g.. feed grains, hay. wheat, sugar beets, dry beans,
oilseeds). and tomatoes. Cotton accounts for approximately
40 percent of the acreage in the region. Cotton and grains
(which are grown in rotation with cotton) together account
for approximately 60 percent of the total farmed acreage.
Other crops include cantaloupes, dry onions, lettuce, carrots,
ard garlic. Fruit and nut trees are grown in those portions of
the region where salinity is not limiting,
Neither this mix of crops nor the scale of farming in the
region would be possible without a reliable supply of imga-
tion water, because rainfall is insufficient to meet crop water
requirements, even during wet years. Irrgation water sources
include surface water deliveries from the Central Valley
Project, groundwater, and recirculated tailwater. Although
the proportion of total irrigation water supplied by each of
these sources vanes among water districts (because of water
contract provisions) and vanes from year-to-year (due to
hydrologic conditions), by far the largest share is supplied by
the federal aqueduct. Overall. more than 80 percent of the
imgated acreage in the region is supplied by these surface
water deliveries. Surface water is delivered to districts under
'take-or-pay" contracts (i.e., districts must pay for the full
amount of water covered by the contract whether or not it is
delivered to the district). Districts in turn sell water to indi-
vidual farmers. A single farm or farm operation may be locat-
ed in more than one district. In addition, farmers may obtain
surface water from other districts.
The average water allotment from surface water sup-
plies is 2.68 affac. This allotment is sufficient to supply the
amount of water required by a cotton crop (approximately
2.25 af/ac) and about 1.5 times the amount of water actually
consumed by a tomato crop in this region. The average price
paid by farmers in the Grasslands region for delivered surface
water in 1990 was $13.25 to $14.25 per acre-foot The range of
prices for surface water is far greater ($5.00/af to $90.00!afj.
depending on district pricing policies and surcharges. The
average cost of water also vanes for individual farmers based
on the degree of reliance on groundwater, which may cost
$60.00/af or more to pump. Retail water prices for surface
water have increased since 1990 as a result of water shortages
caused by drought and other supply reductions,
Water prices and availability influence farm-level dei-
sions regarding the type of crop grown, area under cultiva-
tion. and the installation and management of irrigation sys-
tems. Indeed, water price and supply are likely the dominant
factors influencing farm operations, and, by extension, the
economic profile of the region.
solely upon voluntary cooperation by water districts
and farmers to limit drainage discharges, even
though California law provides ample authority to
regulate agricultural pollution.3 To date, this vol-
untary approach has failed to ensure that water
quality objectives are met in the river and appears
unlikely to do so in the future.
C. A New Look At Agricultural Nonpoint Source
Pollution Control
An important first step in controlling nonpoint
sources is to dispel the misperception that non-
point source pollution is necessarily diffuse and
therefore difficult or impossible to manage or regu-
late. This perception is dmbodied in the language of
the CVA3 4 and has resulted in an approach to non-
point source control, both by EPA and the states.
that is limited to planning and voluntary implemen-
tation of pollution abatement measures.
In fact, many categories of nonpoint source pol-
lution are comprised of numerous individual
sources that can be identified and monitored. This
is particularly true in the case of irrigated agricul-
ture where many engineered ditches, canals, and
drains convey drainage waters to an ultimate point
of discharge. These conveyances make the sources
of pollution identifiable. Moreover, the quantity of
drainage generated is a direct function of water
application and water use efficiency, both of which
can be measured and controlled.
The real challenge of controlling agricultural
nonpoint source pollution is to design an approach
that is sufficiently flexible to address myriad indi-
vidual sources, yet still achieves the environmental
goals. Flexibility is best achieved through a decen-
tralized decisionmaking process so that farmers can
adapt control technologies to site-specific condi-
tions. In this way, farmers also will be able to mini-
mize the costs of pollution control. The desire for
flexibility, however, cannot override the need to
ensure that the program achieves water quality
goals. Accordingly, institutional mechanisms must
be established to shift responsibility for pollution
control to the farmers, just as point source dis-
chargers are accountable for their discharges.
Finding a method to provide this accountability in a
practical way has been the missing link in nonpoint
source pollution control.
33, Sz discussion frta Part V.
34, &e Clen Water Act . 402(11ti1 & 502(14) (categorical
exemptions for discharges of irrgation return fR"v from the NPDES
permit system and from the definition of point source, respectk;eiy).
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1. Best Management Practices
To date, direct regulation of agricultural sources
generally has been based on Best Management
Practices (hereinafter "BMPs").35 BMPs usually pre-
scribe the use of specific technologies or manage-
ment measures designed to decrease pollution from
runoff. In irrigated agriculture, for example, BMPs
may consist of particular irrigation technologies and
land management practices, such as land leveling.
In rarer cases, BMPs have specified the goal to be
achieved-for example, reduced erosion-rather
than the practices to be used. In these cases, BMPs
have established general goals instead of quantita-
tive effluent limits.3 6
While BMPs are the cugtomary tool, there are
two reasons why establishment of BMPs is not nec-
essarily the optimal method for controlling agricul-
tural pollution. First, BMPs tend to be general.
Therefore, while they may be relevant to a broad
range of conditions, they do not impose sufficient
accountability on the discharger. Moreover, the
amount of pollution reduction that will be achieved
is difficult to predict. This undermines the potential
for effective and enforceable environmental
improvements. Even in cases where relatively fine-
tuned BMPs can be px scribed, variations in site-
specific physical conditions (e.g., soil type, soil uni-
formity, depth to groundwater) will result in differ-
ent levels of performance at different locations for a
given BMP
Second, BMPs do not account for differences in
pollution-control costs among farms. Thus, while a
given irrigation technology or management practice
may be well-suited for one farm, it might not be the
most cost-effective approach for another, with the
result-that total pollutio n-control costs for the reg-
ulated farm community are higher than necessary.
As with the physical differences among farms, this
economic heterogeneity makes the process of
defining appropriate BMPs time-consuming and
expensive.
2. Incentive-Based Programs
Awareness of the potential shortcomings of
BMPs, coupled with growing concerns over the
costs of environmental regulation, have fueled a
strong interest in alternative approaches to pollu-
tion control such as economic incentives.37 The
chief appeal of economic incentives over traditional
regulatory approaches is the potential cost savings
to the regulated agricultural community and to
society as a whole.3 8 Economic incentives commu-
nicate a "price" of pollution, which reflects the cost
of environmental damage (or, alternatively, the
value of the environmental resources at risk). In this
way, incentive programs shift the costs of polluting
to the polluters. As a result, each farmer is encour-
aged to seek out technologies or practices to reduce
pollution and thereby to minimize the costs of
doing business.
Among economic incentives, market-based
programs provide the greatest potential for cost
savings, because they provide the greatest flexibili-
ty for farmers to take advantage of differences in
pollution-control costs among different farming
operations. As a result, the ultimate distribution of
pollution-control activities within the industry as a
whole is more cost-effective, because those who
can least expensively reduce pollution assume
more of the abatement responsibility, and those
with higher costs assume less.
The burden on regulators to determine the
available pollution-control technologies and asso-
ciated costs also can be minimized under incentive-
based programs. While some information is
required to design the proper incentives, once the
program is in place, the choice of control strategies
rests with the farmers. Regulators are left with the
35. This also is true for voluntary pollution control programs
for agriculture. California's Nonpoint Source Management Plan, for
example, encourages the use of BMPs. STATE WATER RESOURcES
CONTROL BOARD (DIVISION OF WATER QUALITY, NONPOINT SOURCE
PROGRAM), NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN (t988).
36. The EPA's Guidance for implementation of the Coastal Zone Act
Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 distinguishes between 'manage-
ment measures,: which state 4 performance goal in non-quantita-
tive terms, and "management practices.' which may be used to
achieve these goals. The guidance does not preclude states from
identifying alternative management measures, including market-
based approaches such as trading of pollution credits. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
COASTAL NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM-PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL GUIDANCE (1991).
37. The EPA has been investigating opportunities to use eco-
nomic Incentives to solve water quality problems. See, e.g.. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER AND OFFICE OF
POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATOCR, BENEFITS AND FEASIBILInY OF EFFLUENT
TRADING BETWEEN POINT SOURCES: AN ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF CLEAN
WATER ACT REAUTHORIZATION (1992); APOGEE RESEARCH, INC, INCENTIVE
ANALYSIS FOR WA REAUTHORIZATION: POINT SoURCe/NoNPOINT SOURCE
TRADING FOR NUTRIENT DISCHARGE REDuCTIONS (1991), CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE. DECREASING THE DISCHARGE OF BIOACCUMULATIVE TOXIC
WATER POLLUTANTS: A POLICY ANALYSIS (1992).
38. There is an extensive body of literature on Incentive-based
mechanisms and their role in pollution control For general discus-
sions, see R.N. Stavins & B W. Whitehead. Dealing with Pollution
Market-Based Incentives for Environmental Protection. 34 ENVIRONMENT 7
(1992); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, USING INCENTIVES POP
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AN OVERVIEW (1989), SEN TMOTHY E
WIRTH & SEN. JOHN HEINZ, PROIECT 88 HARNESSING MARKET FORCES TO
PROTECT OU ENVIRONMENT. INITIATIVES FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT (1988),
SEN. TIMOTHY E. WIRTH & SEN. JOHN HEINZ, PROJECT 88-ROUND II
INCENTIVES FOR ACTION: DESIGNING MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES (1988); R.W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental
Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctors Orders, 3 JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 95 (1989).
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more appropriate task of monitoring and enforcing
compliance with the pollution limits.
At least two additional factors make incentive
programs attractive. First, they encourage innova-
tion by providing direct financial rewards for creat-
ing better and cheaper pollution control methods.
Second, because incentive programs are based on
decentralized decisionmaking, they can conform to
the characteristics of the farm industry and preserve
the flexibility desired by farmers for responding to
changes in economic, environmental, and techno-
logical conditions. Therefore, incentive-based
approaches also increase the likelihood of compli-
ance on the part of the regulated community.
While there is a substantial body of literature
on incentive-based programs, including tradable
discharge permits, 39 opportunities for employing
incentives have only just begun to be tapped. A
prominent example is the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, which established an emis-
sions trading program for stationary air pollution
sources and encouraged states to adopt flexible,
incentive-based options in other areas.40
In the area of water quality, incentive-based
programs have primarily relied on water pricing
strategies, the reduction of water subsidies, and the
creation of water markets in several western
states.4 ' In addition, pollution trading programs
between regulated point sources and nonpoint
sources that are subject to BMPs have been initiat-
ed at Dillon Reservoir, Cherry Creek Reservoir, Fox
River Wisconsin, and the Tar-Pamlico River Basin. 4 2
The potential for relying solely on economic incen-
tives (in lieu of BMPs) to control agricultural pollu-
tion has received little attention, however.4 3
39. See T.H. TMETNBERO. EmissiO NS TRADiNG: AN E.'cm iN
REFORMING POUmON Pouc" (1985): R.W. Hahn & R.G. Noll, Dr.gnr.g
a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits,. in REnoRm OF ENviRONENrAL
RFGULATION (W. Maget ed.. 1982) (hereinafter 'H" HN & NOLL. MARM
DSIGN'. R.W. Hahn & R.G. Noll. Ennronmental hiarkesin tfeY 2000,
JOUPAl. OF RiS AND UNcrmNT. june 22, 1990. at 112. (1990) (here-
inafter "HAHN & NOU., YEAR 2000" B. YANDLE., PEmse TRAD IN FOa
AGRICULTURAL NoNPoINr-SoURcE PoLLUTIoN CONTROL: BUILDING
iNSMTUTIONS FoR VATFR OuALny imPRovvME (1992); Bartfeld. supra
note 16.
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-549.
i04 Stat. 2399 (i990). See U.S. EVIRONMENTuAL PR-oEcT-o AcENcy.
TECHNICAL GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR PERPFOIING WASTELO ALLCATION.
ch.i. Stream Design Flou for Steady-State Moelirg (1986); 1.Goffman.
Testimony on Title IV of the Clean Air Act Before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on
Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation (Oct. 2i. 1993). Other trading pro-
grams in the area of air quality include the EPAs Emissions Trading
Program for criteria air pollutants; EPA's trading program for lead-
ed gasoline; the South Coast Air Quality Management Distrct's
RECLAIM program; and the Montreal Protocol for
Chloroflorocarbons. See Hahn. supra note 38; HAHN & NOIL, YEAR
2000, supra note 39; J.P. Dw=yE. CAuFORNIAS TRAEABLE u SO.NS
D. Economic Incentives In the Grasslands
The Grasslands problem is well-suited to the
use of economic incentives, because incentives
offer a means for addressing economic difference
among farmers and for providing flexibility for farm-
level decisionmaking to an industry that is tradi-
tionally independent-minded and diverse. Among
incentive systems, a system of tradable discharge
permits is particularly attractive because:
" The nature of the pollution problem
requires a pollution cap or ceiling;
* The characteristics of the regulated com-
munity are conducive to a flexible system
of cost-sharing; and
* Monitoring and enforcement of discharges
are possible.
The principal obstacle to using tradable per-
mits (or any other economic incentives) to regulate
agricultural pollution seems to be based on the fol-
lowing assumptions:
* Farmers Cannot be made individually
accountable for pollution control because
individual farms and drains are too numer-
ous;
• Agricultural pollution cannot be controlled
or monitored, which precludes the use of
trades or fees;
* Incentives provide less environmental pro-
tection than BMPs;
POLIV AND ns AFucrz o m co-ewm= w- G~r.obou G.asss. A
CAEm SrUD (1991); Lily Whiteman. Tras to Pe-om er Tke Leal
Pfkasch-;n. US, P~O'~'ALRDTo:x; Azz ni owr (1992);
U.S. Environmental Protection Agenry 1992a; Scum Co.Asr Am
Ounuri t .&cF.r D.-=sr, REG: =w_ CI.EA AR-- b.= erlVs M4.=~
(RECLAM)z Sti.!&wRY REcco " .OATr:. (1992)
4L Su. eg,. Reclamation Reform Act of 1932. 43 US.C §§
390aa-zz-l; CVPlA § 3404 (limitation on contracting and contract
reform) & § 3405 ( ater transfers. impro;ed watWr mana-ement.
and consenation)
42. See ApoGEE RnszAsm. l:;c. Nerm; =-r Tnsn.,; IN THs DamOn
REtERVR (1991) (hereinafter "oc.D;LLO:i*, AP-c=s PsmAncii.
INc. Nui mn Tnjmns Li ma- TA.L.-Pmu:o Rr.'m B.,"- (1991) (here-
Inafter 'Apo TcVa.-Pc.o; Co!;-.- o.AL BuzGPr OmcE. supra
note 37; Bartfeid. supri note 16
43, The use of incentive-based approaches for controlling
agricultural nonpoint source pollution has been addressed in; ML
Taylor et aL, Farm-Lral ReVse bc Ayru aural Effluent Ccnrrl Stra teg .:
Tke Case of (Fe Wd!ntie val!nj, 17 lu ,ia 1OF Am cutTu.AIr A.o3
RESOU;=c Eco.::oxcs 1 (1992). YAmcp.s sugra note 39,
Eccz.,ift ari 1:, 10 crd. llorp6it So ace PCIffmSonna 1995
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" Trading of toxic substances in river basins
will cause pollutants to become concen-
trated in one location;
* Tradable permits will not be cost-effective
when the marginal costs of pollution con-
trol do not differ dramatically among regu-
lated sources; and
" The calculation of a pollution cap (a pre-
requisite for a trading program) is exces-
sively complicated for rivers with highly
variable flows.
Many of these assumptions do not pertain to
the Grasslands region. Moreover, several of these
beliefs must be addressed if any agricultural non-
point source program is to be successful. A demon-
stration of how tradable discharge permits (and
other economic incentives) can be used to address
agricultural pollution problems in the Grasslands
may provide a model for analyzing the usefulness of
these tools in other regions where agricultural or
other nonpoint source pollution problems persist.
Ill. ESTABLISHING POLLUTION REDUCTION
GOALS
The first step in designing a water pollution
control program is to identify specific environmen-
tal oblectives and the reductions in pollution loads
necessary to meet them. After these reductions are
defined, the optimum program for achieving them
can be determined.
Establishment of pollution reduction goals
generally involves three tasks:
* defining "safe" levels of pollution in the
water body;
* calculating the amounts of pollutants the
region can discharge without exceeding
these "safe" levels; and
* allocating the allowable pollution loads (or
load reductions necessary to achieve them)
among the region's responsible parties.
A. Defining "Safe" Levels of Pollution
Agricultural drainage in the Grasslands region
threatens the local wetlands, the San Joaquin River,
and the river's tributaries. Current drainage dis-
charge practices have concentrated this threat on
the river itself, however, and on two upstream trib-
utaries-Salt Slough and Mud Slough. These tribu-
taries flow through and provide water supplies
(when uncontaminated) for state, federal, and pri-
vate wildlife refuges. As a result, the primary pollu-
tion control efforts in the region are focused on
these water bodies.
The California State Water Resources Control
Board (hereinafter "SWRCB"), the Central Valley
Regional Water Quality Control Board (hereinafter
"RWQCB"), and the EPA have adopted numeric
water quality standards that define "safe" concen-
trations of major agricultural pollutants in the river
and the two tributaries. 44 Of these pollutants, the
RWOCB has identified selenium-the trace element
responsible for the bird deformities which plagued
Kesterson Reservoir-as the primary pollutant of
concern. The RWQCB reached this conclusion
because of the severe adverse effects of selenium
on fish and wildlife and because the reductions in
subsurface farm drainage necessary to meet the
selenium standard also will reduce the loads of
other high-priority pollutants. Currently applicable
selenium standards are shown in Table 1.
Concentrations of selenium often exceed applicable
selenium standards for the San Joaquin River. In
some tributaries-particularly Salt and Mud
Sloughs-the standards are consistently exceeded
during the pre-irrigation and irrigation seasons
(Figure 2). Subsurface drainage discharges from irri-
gated agriculture in the Grasslands region account
for over 80 percent of the selenium load in the San
Joaquin River and sloughs. 45
The water quality monitoring and compliance
point chosen by the RWQCB to represent San
Joaquin River quality downstream of the agricultur-
al drainage discharges is Crows Landing (Figure 3).
The Crows Landing station is located 22 miles
downstream from the area where drainage actually
is discharged to the river, and is below the San
Joaquin's confluence with the Merced River, a
source of substantial dilution flows. The specific
44, See 57 Fed. Reg. 60848 (Dec. 22. 1992); STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, ORDER 91-12: WATER OUALITY CONTROL PLAN
FOR INLAND SURFACE WATERS OF CALIFORNIA (1991) (hereinafter "INLAND
SURFACE WATERS PLAN'), See also STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL
BOARD. RESOLUTION 90-28: APPROVAL OF CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL
WATER QUALrm' CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN (1989)
(1990) (hereinafter "RESOLUTION 90-28') (stating boron and molyb-
denum objectives, as well as selenium 'maximum- objectives for
the San Joaquin River (mouth of the Merced River to Vernalls)) The
EPA is currently developing a selenium water quality criterion for
wildlife, which may become limiting in the future
45 C.R. Kratzer et al., Achieving Selenium and Boron Objectiv's In
the San loaquin River ihrouah Drainage Reduaion, in PROCEEDIN:GS OF' TH
SECOND PAN-AMERICAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE ON IRRIGATION AND
DRAINAGE 319 (1989)
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Table I
Water Quality Standards for the Protection of Aquatic Life in the San Joaquin River and its Tributaries
Selenium (Wg)
Location CCCa  CMCb
San Joaquin River 5c 121
From the mourth of the Merced Ricer to Vemalis I I
San Joaquin River 5c 20c
From Sack Dam to the mouth of the Merced River
Mud Slough; Salt Slough 5c 2Gc
Wildlife Refuge Supplies 2e
a "Criterion continuous concentration" is the four day average concentration not to exceeded
more than once every three years on average, unless otherwise noted.
b "Criterion maxtum concentration" is the one-hour average concentration not to be exceeded
more than once every three years on average, unless otherwise noted.
c Promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1992b.
d "Maximum" concentration adopted in the applicable Basin Plan (see State Water Resources
Control Board 1990); this objective was not superseded by the Inland Water Plan (State Water
Resources 'Control Board 1991a) or the federal rulemaking (U.S. EPA 1992b).
e Monthly mean concentration, applicable to water divrted from Mud Slough. Salt Slough, and
smaller channels for use in the Grasslands Water Dlstnct, San Luis Walkflife Refuge, and Los Banos
State Wildlife Area (measured in any water used by subject area for waterfowl habitat); this objective
was not superseded by the Inland Waters Plan (State Water Resource Control Board 1991a) or the
federal rulemaking (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1992b).
agricultural discharge points are approximately 20
to 30 miles away from the river and reach the river
via Mud Slough and Salt Slough. Because of this
configuration, Crows Landing readings underesti-
mate the pollution levels farther upstream. Since
the selenium concentration standard applies to the
entire length of the San Joaquin River and its tribu-
taries, even if the standard at Crows Landing is met,
water quality in upstream reaches may still exceed
the standard.
Accordingly, this study assesses the pollution
load limits necessary to achieve the established
selenium standard: 5 micrograms per liter (pg/l) as
a four-day average concentration, not to be exceed-
ed more than once every three years in the San
Joaquin River, measured at Crows Landing. 6
Because drainage discharges convey significant
loads of other high-priority pollutants (e.g., boron
and salt), efforts to reduce selenium loading from
this region also will help to achieve compliance
with standards for these pollutants. The pollution
loading requirements calculated in this study do
not reflect the additional decreases that may be
required to comply with antidegradation require-
ments.47
B. Translating "Safe" Levels into Allovable
Pollution Loads
The standard method for determining allow-
able pollution loads for water bodies that do not
meet water quality standards is dictated by the
CWA. which requires that water quality standards
(expressed as the acceptable concentration of pol-
lutants in a water body) be translated into "Total
Maximum Daily Loads" (hereinafter"TMDLs). 43 The
TMDL first establishes the allowable pollution load
from all of the pollution sources in the region,
based on the capacity of the "receiving water'-in
46. The regional load allocation derived in this study is based
on a direct conversion of a water concentration standard. In the
future, load allowances (or mass emissions limits) may be derived
independent of water concentration standards, based on the capac-
ity of an ecosystem to safely absorb pollutants as measured in sed-
iments or plant and animal tissues. If so. the methods for denving
the TMDL will be different, but the implementation issues will be
much the same as discussed here.
47. Federal antidegradation policy (se 40 CFR 131.12 (1994))
was reinforced by section 303(d) of the 1937 Clean Water Act
Amendments Califomria has ad pted similar requirements.
48 Clean Water Act § 303(dj The CVA uses a two-pronged
approach to improving water quality It requires technology-based
pollution controls for specified t4pes of industries or other "point
sources," and it requires additional pollution control efforts in
cases where. even after techno!z*es are installed, water quality
standards still will be violated The IrMDL calculation determines
which sources vall be the focus of these additional efforts.
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Figure 2.
Selenium Contamination of the San Joaquin River
and Tributaries, 1988-93.
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Figure 3.
Location of Water Quality Monitoring Points for the
San Joaquin River and Tributaries.
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this case the San Joaquin River-to dilute the pol-
lution to a safe concentration. The TMDL procedure
then allocates the total load among all of the rele-
vant point sources, nonpoint sources, background
loads, and a margin of safety (Figure 4). This alloca-
tion allows each category of discharger to be held
Water Qudil Stondord
Determine diltn capacty
Amount of Pollution
That Con Be Safely
Discharged From All Sources
i Apporfion (ilion capoaiS........................ ........ ..
Amounts of Pollution That Con Be Discharged
From Each Regulted Source
Figure 4.
The TMDL Process
accountable for its own contribution to excess pol-
lution loads. California has identified the San
Joaquin River as a quality-impaired water body for
which a TMDL calculation is required.49
The first step in the Grasslands TMDL-which
defines the pollution load that can be discharged
into the river without violating the 5 pg/I water qual-
ity oblective for selenium-is determined by the
dilution capacity of the river, which in turn is a func-
49. The 1991 Water Quality Assessment prepared by the
RWOCB catalogs the quality of water bodies pursuant to section
304(l) of the CWA. Water bodies listed under this section, including
a 130-mile stretch of the San Joaquin River, are those affected by
both point and nonpoint pollution sources and which are not
expected to meet water quality standards even with effective point
source controls. CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER OUAITY CONTROL
BOARD, WATER QUALrIY ASSESSMENT (1991 ).
50. TERRY F. YOUNG & CHELSEA H. CONGDON. PLOWING NEW
GROUND (1994).
5 i. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER
REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, GUIDANCE FOR WATER OUALry-BASED
DECISIONS: THE TMDL PRocEss (1991). The EPA generally accepts a
phased approach to TMDLs involving nonpoint sources and/or
where there is considerable uncertainty about the characteristics of
the pollutant (e.g.. its persistence, pathways, interaction with other
pollutants). A screening-level TMDL is the first step of a phased
TMDL. A phased approach also includes a monitoring program and
pre-determined schedule for reassessing the TMDL and allocation.
This option allows a state to implement water quality-based control
measures where beneficial uses are known to be impaired but the
resource is not being regulated for lack of adequate data.
52. See Karkoski et al.. Development of a Selenium TMDL for the San
tion of the flow regime in the river. In other words,
the concentration-based standard is converted to
an allowable load (measured in pounds) according
to the standard formula:
Dilution Capacity (or TMDL) = Water Quality
Standard x River Flow
Prediction of the flow regime is difficult for
western rivers, such as the San Joaquin, because
flows may vary by orders of magnitude across sea-
sons and years. Also, flow data often are limited or
are not representative of current conditions. To
address this problem, a simple method was devel-
oped to account for the varying river flows that are
typical in developed river basins in the irrigated
West. This generic method was then used to derive
a TMDL for selenium for the middle reach of the San
Joaquin River.5 0 This screening-level TMDL5' was
developed in conlunction with the RWOCB.52
The next step of the TMDL procedure allocates
the allowable regional pollution load among
responsible parties according to the standard for-
mula:
TMDL = wasteload allocation + load allocation +
margin of safety"3
The resulting monthly load allocations for the
agricultural community in the Grasslands region as
a whole are shown in Tables 2a-c, column 12. 4
Corresponding final daily load allocations are
shown in column 13.
Joaquin River. In MANAGEMENT OF IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE: Sr5TEM3
(1993). Substantial assistance was also provided by EPA Region IX
and EPA Headquarters. See YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50, at
Appendix B (detailing the calculations).
53. The wasteload allocation Is the portion of the TMDL
attributable to point sources, and the load allocation Is the portion
of the TMDL attributable to nonpoint sources and natural back-
ground sources. The margin of safety Is provided to account for
uncertainties in the data or analysis, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR WATER
OUALITY-BASED Toxics CONTROL (1991) (hereinafter 'TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOCUMENT). In the case of the San loaquin River, there are no con-
tributions from point sources, so the wasteload allocation is zero,
The load allocation is comprised of background loads (from the
main stem of the San Joaquin River, the Merced River, and addi-
tional selenium loads from the managed wetlands In the region)
and drainage discharges from agricultural operations In the
Grasslands region. The margin of safety was allotted ten percent of
the total load, which is considered minimal given the uncertainty in
the input data and the bloaccumulative and other exposure charac-
teristics of selenium.
54. The load was not subdivided among Irrigation districts or
farmers at this stage. Options for district and farmer allocations are
discussed in the next section,
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Table 2a
Screening-Level TMDL for the San Joaquin River at Crows Landing
Water Quality Standard
Critically Dry Years
Merced San Jo: L%*n Wellands
Mnth WQS Crows TMDL Flow Ccnc Flow Cczc Now Conx E kA mos Led Lc
Flow tclA~n AIMo
1.g/1 af/mo lbs/mo cf/mo Pi/I d/m pog/ cf/r 'pM llsl/ W/cr3 Wimo L/i
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Sep 5 8,371 114 3,351 0.2 55 03 1,000 1 5 11 93 3
Oct 5 8,371 114 3,351 0.2 55 0.5 1,000 1 7 11 96 3
Nov 5 8,371 114 3,351 0.2 55 0.5 1,700 1 7 11 96 3
Dec 5 13,983 190 4,999 0.2 15 0.5 1,'0 1 7 19 164 5
Jan 5 13,983 190 4,999 0.2 15 0.5 1,700 1 7 19 164 5
Feb 5 9,041 123 2,519 0.2 85 0.5 7,200 1 21 12 87 3
Mar 5 9,041 123 2,519 0.2 85 0.5 7,300 1 21 12 87 3
Apr 5 9,041 123 2,519 0.2 85 0.5 4,000 1 12 12 93 3
May 5 9,041 123 2,519 02 85 0.5 2,700 1 9 12 102 3
Jun 5 4,929 67 870 0.2 50 0.5 2,400 1 7 7 53 2
Jul 5 4,929 67 870 0.2 50 0.5 2,000 1 6 7 54 2
Aug 5 4,929 67 870 0.2 50 0 .5 0 1 1 7 1 0 2
TtHl 1.163
Column 1: Water quality standard for selenium, as a four-day average concentration not to be exceeded more
than once in three years. on average.
Column 2: Design flow of the San Joaquin River at Crows Landing
Column 3: Monthly sum of total maximum daily loads=Col.l x Col.2 x .00272 lb-14g-af.
Column 4: Flow of the Merced River (U.S. Geological Survey 1992) which corresponds to the month and year
represented by the design flow.
Column 5: Concentration of selenium in the Merced River (Central Valley R\WOCB 1990c).
Column 6: Flow of the San Joaquin River at Lander Avenue (California Department of Water Resources.
unpublished) which corresponds to the month and year represented by the design flow.
Column 7: Concentration of selenium in the San Joaquin River at Lander Avenue (Central Valley RWQCB 1993b)
Column 8: Flow from the area wetlands (Swain 1991)
Column 9: Selenium concentration of wetland discharged in 1992 (Central Valley RWOCB 1993b)
Column 10: Background selenium load on the San Joaquin rnver at Crows Landing =[( Col. 4 x Col. 5) = (Col. 6 x
Col. 7) + (Col. 8 x Col. 9)1 x .00272 lb-1l/g-af.
Column 11: Margin of safety = 0.1 x Col. 3.
Column 12: Monthly load allocation for agncultural dischargers - Col.3 - Col. 10 - Col. II.
Column 13: Daily load allocation for agricultural dischargers = Col. 12 + 28. 30. or 31 days/month.
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Table 2b
Screening-Level TMDL for the San Joaquin River at Crows Landing
Water Quality Standard
Dry and .Below Normal Years
Merced San Joaqun Wetlands
___ 
____ _ 
____alane ___ Wetlands_at ner
Mnth WQS Crows TMOL Flow Conc How Con Fow Cmx Bkgrd MOS Lod Load
Flow Load Alkn AlkR
jig/I of/mo lbs/mo of/mo ig/I of/mo jig/ cf/mo jigA lbs/mo lbs/mo lbs/mo lbs/day
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Sep 5 20,202 274 15,909 0.2 1,328 0.5 1,900 1 16 27 231 8
Oct 5 20,202 274 15,909 0.2 1,328 0.5 3,300 1 19 27 228 7
Nov 5 20,202 274 15,909 0.2 1,328 0.5 3,300 1 19 27 228 8
Dec 5 25,822 351 14,398 0.2 1,704 0.5 3,200 1 19 35 297 10
Jan 5 25,822 "351 14,398 0.2 1,704 0.5 3,300 1 19 35 297 10
Feb 5 18,555 252 7,595 0.2 869 0.5 14,400 1 44 25 182 7
Mar 5 18,555 252 7,595 0.2 869 0.5 14,400 1 44 25 182 6
Apr 5 18,555 252 7,595 0.2 869 0.5 7,800 1 26 25 200 7
May 5 18,555 252 7,595 0.2 869 0.5 5,300 1 20 25 207 7
Jun 5 13,175 179 4,414 0.2 293 0.5 4,600 1 15 18 146 5
Jul 5 13,175 179 4,414 0.2 293 0.5 3,900 1 13 18 148 5
Aug 5 175 179 1 41 0.2 293 0.5 0 1 3 18 158 5
Total 2,504
Column 1: Water quality standard for selenium, as a four-day average concentration not to be exceeded more
than once in three years, on average.
Column 2: Design flow of the San Joaquin River at Crows Landing
Column 3: Monthly sum of total maximum daily loads=Col. I x Col.2 x .00272 lb-l/pg-af.
Column 4: Flow of the Merced River (U.S. Geological Survey 1992) which corresponds to the month and year
represented by the design flow.
Column 5: Concentration of selenium in the Merced River (Central Valley RWQCB 1990c).
Column 6: Flow of the San loaquin River at Lander Avenue (California Department of Water Resources,
unpublished) which corresponds to the month and year represented by the design flow.
Column 7. Concentration of selenium in the San Joaquin River at Lander Avenue (Central Valley RWOCB 1993b)
Column 8: Flow from the area wetlands (Swain 1991)
Column 9: Selenium concentration of wetland discharged in 1992 (Central Valley RWQCB 1993b)
Column 10: Background selenium load in the San Joaquin river at Crows Landing =[( Col. 4 x Col. 5) = (Col. 6 x
Col. 7) + (Col. 8 x Col. 9)1 x .00272 lb-lltg-af.
Column 11: Margin of safety = 0. 1 x Col. 3.
Column 12: Monthly load allocation for agricultural dischargers - Col.3 - Col. 10 - Col. 1I.
Column 13: Daily load allocation for agncultural dischargers = Col. 12 + 28, 30, or 31 days/month,
Vohurne 2, Nuffibe 3
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Table 2c
Screening-Level TMDL for the San Joaquin River at Crows Landing
Water Quality Standard
Above Normal and Wet Years
Merced San .c-:tn wetlarls
at LcEr
Mnth WQS Crows TMDL Flow Coac Fw Cca' fl CaX EkErd MOS lcd LCd
Flow :3 a Afm
IL/i of/mo lbs/ma of/mo a/l of/irr3 pg/ d/ra1'9 1  F p c= Wl/ l;, j L
1 2 3 41 5 761 8 9 10 11 12 13
Sep 5 8,371 114 3,351 0.2 55 0.5 1,90 1 7 11 95 3
Oct 5 .8,371 114 3,351 0.2 55 0.5 3,30 1 11 11 91 3
Nov 5 8,371 114 3,351 0.2 55 0.5 3,300 1 11 11 91 3
Dec 5 -13,983 190 4,999 0.2 15 0.5 3200 1 11 19 160 5
Jon 5 13,983. 190 4,999 0.2 15 0.5 3,300 1 12 19 159 5
Feb 5 30,869 419 9,571 0.2 4,457 0.5 14,400 1 so 42 327 12
Mar 5 30,869 419 9,571 0.2 4,457 0.5 14,400 1 50 42 327 11
Apr 5 30,869 419 9,571 0.2 4,457 0.5 7,800 1 32 42 345 11
May 5 30,869 419 9,571 0.2 4,457 0.5 5,300 1 26 42 352 11
Jun 5 18,877 256 7,347 0.2 1,324 0.5 4,60 1 18 26 212 7
Jul 5 18,877 256 7,347 0.2 1,324 0.5 3,900 1 16 26 214 7
Aug 5 118i77 256 7,347 0. 1324 0.5 0 1 6 26 225 7
-Told 2,598
*Total of Column 12 may vary slightly due to rounding of monthly figures
Column 1: Water quality standard for selenium, as a four-day average concentration not to be exceeded more than
once in three years, on average.
Column 2: Design flow of the San Joaquin River at Crows Landing
Column 3: Monthly sum of total maximum daily loads--Col. I x Col.2 x .00272 Ib-lb pg-af.
Column 4: Flow of the Merced River (U.S. Geological Survey 1992) which corresponds to the month and year
represented by the design flow.
Column 5: Concentration of selenium in the Merced River (Central Valley R\VOCB 1990c).
Column 6: Flow <of the San Joaquin River at Lander Avenue (California Department of \Water Resources.
unpublished) which corresponds to the month and year represented by the design flow.
Column 7: Concentration of selenium in the San Joaquln River at Lander Avenue (Central Valley R\VOCB 1993b)
Column 8: Flow from the area wetlands (Swain 1991)
Column 9: Selenium concentration of wetland discharged in 1992 (Central Valley RWOCB 1993b)
Column 10: Background selenium load in the San Joaquin nver at Crows Landing =1( Col. 4 x Col. 5) = (Col. 6 x
Col. 7) + (Col. 8 x Col. 9)1 x .00272 lb-141g-af.
Column 11: Margin of safety = 0.1 x Col. 3.
Column 12: Monthly load allocation for agncultural dischargers - Col.3 - Col. 10 - Col. 1I.
Column 13: Daily load allocation for agncultural dischargers = Col. 12 + 28, 30. or 31 dayslmonth.
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C. Allocating Allowable Loads Among
Responsible Parties
To be effective, a pollution control program
must assign responsibility for pollution load reduc-
tions to the appropriate parties. In the case of the
Grasslands region and other regions of irrigated
agriculture, opportunities for pollution reduction
stem from irrigation improvements at the farm level
and, to a more limited extent, from operational
changes at the water district level."5 Therefore, an
effective program to reduce agricultural drainage
must establish accountability and incentives for
pollution control at the farm level, by allocating the
regional pollution load (defined by the TMDL)
among contributing farmers.56 This farm-level allo-
cation may either be calculated directly from the
regional pollution load, or be calculated in a two-
step process which first allocates the regional pol-
lution load among districts and then allocates the
district load among farmers. The choice between a
one-step and a two-step process depends upon the
type of pollution control program desired.
For example, the allocation of the allowable
pollution load among water districts provides the
basis for regulatory programs that hold districts
accountable for pollution control. District alloca-
tions could define effluent limits for a traditional
discharge permit program at the district level-an
option that currently exists for regulating agricultur-
al dischargers under California law. 57 Alternatively,
with a system of tradable discharge permits, the ini-
tial district allocations would provide the basis for
subsequent market-based adjustments among dis-
tricts. Similarly, district-level effluent fees would be
based on district pollution targets.
Farm-level allocations provide the targets for
farm-level accountability and incentives. The
method for determining farm-level allocations may
be the same for the entire region or may vary from
district to district. Farm-level targets could serve as
the basis for prescribing BMPs or for assigning efflu-
ent fees or tiered water prices to farmers within the
region or within individual districts.
The precision with which the allocations must
be determined, as well as the implications of differ-
ent allocation options for "fairness" or equity
among the regulated parties, will vary under the dif-
ferent regulatory approaches. Estimates of both the
district-and farm-level allocations thus help to
inform decisions about the most appropriate regu-
latory program for a given area. Similarly, prelimi-
nary estimates of both district and farm-level allo-
cations provide an important basis for pollution
control planning and investments by the regulated
community.
I. Distnct-Level Allocation
Two of the most commonly used methods for
allocating pollution reductions are: (1) to require
each source to make equal progress towards reduc-
ing pollution through equal pollutant-removal effi-
ciencies or equal increments of removal; and (2) to
require each source to achieve a fixed level of pol-
lution control per unit of production through equal
final pollutant concentrations, regardless of the
necessary level of pollutant-removal efficiency.58
When applied to pollution load allocations among
the Grasslands districts, these approaches would
result respectively in: (1) allocations that are pro-
portional to historical drainage outputs, expressed
as either drainage volume or selenium load; and (2)
allocations that are proportional to irrigated
acreage, drained acreage, or selenium-contaminat-
ed acreage within the district.59
In the Grasslands region, the historical record
of district-level drainage discharges (Table 3) is
adequate to support a legitimate estimate of dis-
trict allocations using most of these methods,
Estimates of the district allocations that would
result from using historical drainage outputs, irri-
gated acreage, and drained acreage, as well as one
weighted combination of these three factors are
shown in Tables 4 through 7 60
Besides the choice of allocation method, dis-
trict allocations will depend on the number of dis-
tricts or other entities included in the overall distri-
bution. While it is generally assumed that the num-
ber of water districts that discharge to the San
Joaquin River will not increase in the future, the
allocation can be calculated to include other poten-
55. In this respect, agricultural drainage problems differ from
many other types of wastewater problems, such as municipal
wastewater discharges, which are more amenable to a single,
regional treatment facility.
56. This allocation step is often included as part of the stan-
dard TMDL calculation. It is presented as a separate procedure here
to emphasize the variety of options available.
57. See discussion infra Part V.
58. TEcHNICAL SUPPoRT DOCUMENT, supra note 53.
59. Initial allocations may also be determined by auction.
60. The purpose of this section is explore various allocation
methods rather than choose a particular method and assign efflu-
ent limits. With this in mind, several simplifying assumptions were
made. For example. EPA-recommended methods for translating a
wasteload allocation (or load allocation) Into maximum daily or
average monthly permit limits were not used Effluent variability
also was not taken into account In general, such calculations
would tend to reduce district load allocations relative to the allo-
cations presented in this section. Similarly, It Is assumed that all of
the selenium load discharged by each district actually reaches the
river without being used by farmers downstream, or taken up by
biota en route.
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Table 3
Baseline Data for Pollution Allocations
Disftict Historical Selenium Discharge a Irrigated Areab Drained Areac
llx/yr % Of %of G= % of f % a9s %Of %o
subtotal total subto1ta total
Panoche 4,698 43 39 45,000 48 44 22,000 45 40
Firebaugh 2,222 20 19 22,400 24 22 11,200 23 21
Charleston 945 9 8 4,300 5 4 3,600 7 7
Pacheco 1,016 9 8 5,900 6 6 3,550 7 7
Broadview 1,774 16 15 9,000 10 9 6,506 13 12
CCID-13 1958 2 2 6,000 6 6 2,000 4 4
Widren Of  0 0 790 1 1 4171 1 1
SUBTOTAL 10,850 100h 90h 93,390 100 92h 49,273 100h 91
h
Other 1,160g 10 10,000 8 5,2761
TOTAL 12,010 100 103,390 100 54,549 100
aAverage annual selenium discharge for water years 1986-1988.
bTotal irrigated area within each district (Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board 1989c).
cTotal drained area within each district (Broadview Water District 1989; Charleston Drainage District 1990; Panache
Water District 1989; State Water Resources Control Board 1987e; Chedester, S., Porter, M., personal communcaton).
dReserved for additional lands which are not incorporated within exi)sng dcistricts or for portions of West!ands Water
DistricL
8Average annual discharge for water years 1987 and 1988 from the Camp-13 area of the Central Califorfa rgation
District (Central California Irrgation District 1993).
1.ands within Widren Water District have been fallowed in recent years; baseline data are unava ab!e.
gAssumes the same average per-acre selenium discharge as the 93,390 acres included i the subtotal.
hPercentage adjusted to accommodate rounding errors.
'Drained acreage estimated as follows: (subtotal drained acres + subtotal irrigated acres) x (,,dren or subtotal irri-
gated acres).
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Table 4
Selenium Discharge Allocations for Districts
SCENARIO 1: HISTORICAL DISCHARGES
A: Current Dischargers Only
District Water Quality Standard Interim Goala
Critical Dry and Below Above Normal and Critical Dry and Below Above Normal and
Normal Wet Normal Wet
lb~ b lbsy I b lb 3r b lb/rI % lbsy I %
Panache 503 11 1,084 23 1,125 24 1,325 28 1,618 34 2,365 50
Firebaugh 238 11 513 23 532 24 627 28 765 34 1,119 50
Charleston 101 11 218 23 226 24 266 28 325 34 476 50
Pacheco 109 11 234 23 243 24 287 28 350 34 512 50
Broadview 190 11 409 23 425 24 500 28 611 34 893 50
CCID-13 21 11 45 23 47 24 55 28 67 34 98 50
Widrenc 0 11 0 23 0 24 0 28 0 34 0 50
TOTALd 1,163 11 2,504 23 2,598 24 3,060 28 3,737 34 5,463 50
B: Allowance Reserved for Additional Dischargers
Water Quality Standard Interim Goal:
District Critical Dry and Below Above Normal and Critical Dry and Below Above Normal andI Normal Wet Normal Wet
lbs/yr %b lbs/yr %b lbs/yr %b lbs/yr %b lbs/yr %b lbs/yr %b
Panache 455 10 980 21 1,016 22 1,197 25 1,462 31 2,137 45
Firebaugh 215 10 463 21 481 22 566 25 691 31 1,011 45
Charleston 91 10 197 21 204 22 241 25 294 31 430 45
Pacheco 98 10 212 21 220 22 259 25 316 31 462 45
Broadview 172 10 370 21 384 22 452 25 552 31 807 45
CCID-13 19 10 41 21 42 22 50 25 61 31 89 45
Widrenc 0 10 0 21 0 22 0 25 0 31 0 45
SUBTOTALd 1,050 10 2,262 21 2,347 22 2,765 25 3,377 31 4936 45
Other 112 10 242 21 251 22 296 25 361 31 528 45
TOTALd 1,163 10 2,504 21 2598 22 3,060 25 3,737 31 5,463 45
Note: Discharge allocation (lbs/yr) are calculated as follows: (total discharge allocation) x (district's drained acreage,
Table 3) + (subtotal or total drained acreage. Table 3).
a. The interim goal assumes a once-in-five month excursion rate.
b. Allocation as a percentage of historical discharge.
c. Baseline data on Widren's historical discharges were not available.
d. Sums may reflect rounding errors.
Chelsea H. Coflodon. Terry F. Young, and Brian E. Gray Volume 2, Number 3
Sn,nn 199..
Table 5
Selenium Discharge Allocations for Districts
SCENARIO 2: DRAINED ACREAGE
A: Current Dischargers Only
District I Water Quality Standot Interm G '
Critical Dry and Beov Abo'e 1ormral and Critical Uri and Vw koave Nr mo l al
INormal Wet Normal Wet
lb6~j lJbsy 6 . lbs/ b 13
Panoche 519 11 1,118 24 1,160 25 1,366 29 1,669 36 2,439 52
Firebough 264 12 569 26 591 27 696 31 849 33 1,242 56
Charleston 85 9 183 19 190 20 224 24 273 29 399 42
Pacheco 84 8 180 18 187 18 220 22 269 26 33 39
Broadview 154 9 331 19 343 19 404 23 493 28 721 41
CD-13 47 24 102 52 105 54 124 64 152 78 222 114
Widrenc 10 no 21 no 22 na 26 no 32 na 46 no
TOTALd 1,163 11 2.504 23 2598 24 3,060 28 3,737 34 5,463 50
B: Allowance Reserved for Additional Dischargers
Water Quality Stundord lnten GSo,'.
Disftict Critical Dry and Below Above lormal and Critical Dry a V! w A moe tlarml andlNormal \Wet I ormal Vet
lbs/yr 5b lbs/yr 1, lbs/yt 1, lbs/yr 5b lbs/wr %b lbs/yr %b
Panache 469 10 1,10 22 1,048 22 1,234 26 1,507 32 2,203 47
Firebough 239 11 514 23 533 24 628 28 767 35 1,122 50
Charleston 77 8 165 17 172 18 202 21 247 26 361 33
Pacheco 76 7 163 16 169 17 199 20 243 24 365 35
Broadview 139 8 299 17 310 18 365 21 446 25 652 37
C(I13 43 22 92 47 95 49 112 57 137 70 20 103
Widrenc 9 no 19 no 20 no 23 no 28 no 42 no
SUBTOTALd 1,050 10 2,262 21 2,347 22 2765 25 377 31 4,936 45
Other 1121 10 242 21 251 22 296 25 361 31 52 45
TOTALd 1,163 10 2,04 21 2598 22 3,060 25 3V37 31 5.463 45
Note: Discharge allocation (lbsfyr) are calculated as follows: (total discharge allocation) x (district's drained acreage.
Table 3) + (subtotal or total drained acreage. Table 3).
a. The lntenm goal assumes a once-In-five month excursion rate.
b. Allocation as a percentage of historical discharge.
c. Baseline data on Widren's historical discharges were not available.
d. Sums may reflect rounding errors.
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Table 6
Selenium. Discharge Allocations for Districts
SCENARIO 3: IRRIGATED ACREAGE
A: Current Dischargers Only
District Water Quality Standard Interim Goalo
Critical Dry and Below Above Normal and Critical Dry and Below Above Normal and
Normal Wet Normal Wetlbs/yr I b ,bs/yr I %b bs/r I %b bs/r I lbsvI ,bsVjf I
Panache 560 12 1,207 26 1,252 27 1,474 31 1,801 38 1,801 56
Firebaugh 279 13 601 27 623 28 734 33 896 40, 896 59
Charleston 54 6 115 12 120 13 141 15 172 18 172 27
Pocheco 73 7 158 16 164 16 193 19 236 23 236 34
Broadview 112 6 241 14 250 14 295 17 360 20 360 30
CCID13 75 38 161 82 167 86 197 101 240 123 240 180
Widrenc 10 no 21 no 22 no 26 no 32 no 32 no
TOTALd 1,163 11 2,504 23 2,598 24 3,060 28 3,737 34 5,463 50
B: Allowance Reserved for Additional Dischargers
Water Quality Standard Interim Goalo
Distict Critical F Dry and Below Above Normal and Critical Dry and Below Above Normal and
Normal Wet Normal Wet
lbs/yr %b lbs/yr b s/yr lbs/yr o/b lbs/yr %b bs/yr
Panache 506 11 1,090 23 1,131 24 1,332 28 1,462 35 2,378 51
Firebaugh 252 11 543 24 563 25 663 30 691 36 1,184 53
Charleston 48 5 104 11 108 11 127 13 294 16 227 24
Pacheco 66 7 143 14 148 15 175 17 316 21 312 31
Broadview 101 6 218 12 226 13 266 15 552 18 476 27
CCID-13 67 35 145 75 151 77 178 91 61 111 317 163
Widrenc 9 no 19 no 20 no 23 no 0 no 42 no
SUBTOTALd 1,050 10 2,262 21 2,347 22 2,765 25 337 31 4,936 45
Other 112 10 242 21 251 22 296 25 361 31 45
TOTALd 1,163 10 2,504 21 2598 22 3,060 25 3,737 31 5,463 45
Note: Discharge allocation (lbs/yr) are calculated as follows: (total discharge allocation) x (district's drained acreage,
Table 3) + (subtotal or total drained acreage, Table 3).
a. The interim goal assumes a once-m-five month excursion rate.
b. Allocation as a percentage of historical discharge.
c. Baseline data on Widren's historical discharges were not available.
d. Sums may reflect rounding errors.
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Table 7
Selenium Discharge Allocations for Districts
SCENARIO 4: WEIGHTED COMBINATION
A: Current Dischargers Only
District I Water Quality Standard Interin Grj D
Critical Dry and Below Above Nlormal and Citical Dr cr1 BETN, Abc'a Normal and
Normal Wet 11ormol Wet
Pan1che 522 11 1,123 24 1,165 25 1,373 29 1,676 3. 2,451 52
Firebough 255 11 549 25 569 26 670 30 819 37 1,197 54
Charleston 85 9 184 19 190 20 224 24 274 39 401 42
Pacheco 94 9 202 20 209 21 247 24 301 30 440 43
-Broadview 161 9 348 20 361 20 425 24 519 29 759 43
COD-13 41 21 88 45 91 47 103 55 132 67 192 99
Widrenc 5 no 11 no 11 no 13 no 16 no 23 no
TOTALd 1,163 11 2,504 23 2,598 24 3,060 28 3737 34 5,463 50
B: Allowance Reserved for Additional Dischargers
Water Quality Standard Intefn ftn,!
District Critical Dry and Below Above 11ormal and Critical Dry adi e.!ow, I A-Tie flaroml end
I I lormol Wet F 1irmal Wet
__s__ lb /yr b s/yr 5, lbs/yr ,b lbs/yr 5 lbs/yr %b lbs/yr %b
Panoche 471 10 1,015 22 1,1053 22 1,230 26 1,515 ,32 2214 47
Firebaugh 230 10 496 22 515 23 606 27 740 33 1,032 49
Charleston 77 8 166 18 172 18 203 21 248 26 362 33
Pacheco 85 8 183 18 189 19 223 22 272 27 398 37
Broadview 146 8 314 18 326 18 384 22 469 26 196 37
CCID-13 37 19 80 41 83 42 97 50 119 61 174 89
Widrenc 4 no 10 no 10 no 12 no 14 no 21 no
SUBTOTALd 1,050 10 2,262 21 2,347 22 2.165 25 3,377 31 49236 45
Other 112 10 242 21 251 22 1 26 1 2 361 31 52a 45
TOTALd 1,163 10 2,504 21 2598 22 3,060 25 3737 31 5,463 45
Note: Discharge allocation (lbsyr) are calculated as follows: (total discharge allocation) x (district's drained acreage.
Table 3) + (subtotal or total drained acreage. Table 3).
a. The intenm goal assumes a once-in-five month excursion rate.
b. Allocation as a percentage of histoncal discharge.
c. Baseline data on Widren's histoncal discharges were not available.
d. Sums may reflect rounding errors.
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tial discharging entities.61
Accordingly, two alternate calculations of dis-
trict load allocation have been made for each of the
scenarios described in Tables 4 through 7 These
two calculations appear in the tables as Alternative
A, which assumes that only known and monitored
discharging entities are included in the distribution,
and Alternative B, which assumes that a fraction of
the allowable pollution load is reserved for addi-
tional dischargers.
a. Scenano 1: Allocation Based on
Historical Discharge Levels
Under this method, each district is required to
reduce selenium discharges by the same percent-
age relative to its historical discharges. In other
words, if the regional agricultural load must be
reduced to eleven percent of the historical regional
load, then each individual district must reduce its
discharges to eleven percent of its historical dis-
charges.
The years 1986-89 represent the pollution load-
ing baseline. 62  According to this baseline
(expressed in the average annual number of pounds
of selenium discharged), the district-level drainage
reductions necessary to meet the selenium concen-
tration standard during critical, dry/below normal,
and above normal/wet water years are as shown in
Table 4. This table also shows the drainage reduc-
tions required to meet a possible interim goal in
each year type.
An allocation based on historical selenium
loads implicitly addresses inequities among dis-
tricts due to physical factors beyond the farmers'
control. Specifically, by relying on historic discharge
levels, the varying degrees of soil contamination
within the districts are accounted for along with the
quantities of drainage produced. Without detailed
maps of shallow groundwater quality or selenium
contamination of soils, this allocation method is
the best available approach for taking soil quality
into account when assigning pollution control
responsibility.
The historical discharge allocation method also
61. For example, including additional entities might be war-
ranted to address drainage load contributions from unincorporated
agricultural lands (e.g.. lands outside existing water and drainage
district boundanes) within the Grasslands region. Portions of the
Westlands Water District also lie within the hydrologic boundaries
of the Grasslands region. District allocations could include these
lands if the current prohibition against Westlands' disposal of sub-
surface drainage into the river were to be lifted in the future. U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION. MiD-PAoic REGION, DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT S ATEMENT. SAN Luis UNrr DRAINAGE PROGRAM (1991).
62. Despite the seven-year drought in California. districts con-
tinued to receive normal water supplies until 1990. Farmers gener-
takes into account physical limitations on irrigation
efficiency, because the quantity of drainage is a
function of both controllable factors such as irriga-
tion technologies and practices and uncontrollable
factors such as soil uniformity.63 Finally, the histor-
ically based allocations avoid penalizing those dis-
tricts and landowners who have significantly
reduced pollution since 1988.
b. Scenano 2: Allocation Based on
Drained Acreage
This method reflects a policy assumption that
only the acreage underlain with subsurface drains
should be included in the load distribution.
Selenium load allocations would be apportioned
without respect to the degree of soil selenium con-
tamination.64 Using this method, the district-level
allocations shown in Table 5 differ significantly from
those derived from the historical baseline,
c. Scenario 3: Allocation Based on
Imgated Acreage
A different policy assumption underlies this
approach-the notion that all irrigated land within
the Grasslands region contributes to the regional
selenium loading problem, since all irrigated land
contributes to the elevation of the region's shallow
groundwater table. As shown in Table 6, however,
an allocation based on total irrigated acreage has
the effect of granting districts with larger land areas
greater shares of the river's dilution capacity,
regardless of the distribution of subsurface drains
and soil selenium contamination.
d. Scenano 4: Allocation Based on a
Weighted Combination of Factors
Each of the first three scenarios has certain
advantages and disadvantages from a regulatory
perspective, and different distributional (i.e., equity)
implications for individual districts. The advantages
of the various options can be captured, and the dis-
advantages partly ameliorated, by allocating pollu-
tion loads according to a weighted combination of
factors. Table 7 shows the allocation that results
ally did not begin to change irrigation practices In response to the
drought until after 1990. Using a more recent baseline would penal-
ize those farmers and districts that responded most aggressively to
the existing voluntary drainage reduction program
63. Non-uniform soils can prevent farmers from achieving
high water use efficiency, especially where furrow technologies are
employed, because water cannot be distributed evenly along the
row and a highly efficient application of water could result in under-
irrigation of the distant portions of the field.
64. This allocation would account for land quality only to the
extent that contamination problems are in fact associated with the
drained acreage within the district.
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from assigning a 50 percent weight to historical
selenium discharges and a 25 percent weight each
to the amount of irngated and drained acreage.
o
Each of the four district allocation scenarios
presented here would satisfy the primary regulatory
goal of defining district-level pollution reduction
requirements sufficient to meet selenium water
quality standards in the San Joaquin River. Each
scenario also offers the additional benefits of
reducing the loads of other pollutants of concern
and increasing water conservation. Moreover, none
of the allocation options poses a significant admin-
istrative burden on local agency officials, because
each can be calculated using existing data and dis-
trict-level allocations (unlike farm-level allocations)
can be readily monitored and enforced under exist-
ing conditions. Each of the district-level allocation
methods therefore would be acceptable from the
perspective of the regulator.
The critical issue in selecting among the alloca-
tion methods is the fairness of the distribution of
pollution control responsibility as perceived by the
water districts and their farmers. Scenarios 1, 2, and
3 reflect different policy choices, result in substan-
tially different allocations among districts, and
therefore would result in differences in the distribu-
tion of compliance costs. Such equity concerns
could be addressed by allowing the agricultural
community (represented by the districts or a
regional entity) to identify a preferred allocation
method. If no consensus can be reached, the local
regulatory agency could adopt a weighted formula
similar to that presented as Scenario 4.65
2. Allocation Among Fanners
Any regulatory program designed to reduce
drainage discharges from irrigated agriculture ulti-
mately must address farm-level irrigation and water
management practices. This is true regardless of
whether the regulatory agency chooses to deal with
individual farms directly or with larger entities such
as water or drainage districts (which, in turn, would
deal with the individual farms). In either case, con-
version of the regional pollution load (or the district
load allocation) into a farm-level goal or allocation
allows farmers and regulators to assess the magni-
tude and affordability of pollution control require-
ments. The process of calculating farm-level pollu-
tion goals (i.e.. the ease or difficulty of the calcula-
tion due to data constraints) also affects the choice
of pollution control program, because different pro-
grams may require different levels of accuracy about
discharges at the farm and district levels.
The most direct method for establishing a farm-
level goal is to divide the allowable regional seleni-
um load among the subsurface drainage sumps,
weighted by acreageP This allocation can be prob-
lematic. however, because of the difficulty in estab-
lishing farm-specific contributions to each sump. In
recognition of this problem, previous drainage
management plans have recommended that
drainage reduction targets be applied to all irrigat-
ed lands rather than focusing solely on the drained
acreage.67
Under this allocation method, an average sele-
nium or drainage allowance per acre is determined.
regardless of existing drain systems. The results of
this calculation appear in Table 8.P3 As shown in
Table 8. compliance with existing water quality
standards and the corresponding regional load allo-
cations would require farmers to reduce drainage to
little more than the amount of excess imgation
water necessary to maintain the salt balance in the
soil. This is particularly true for critically dry years.
Farm-level drainage generation would be limited to
approximately 0.1 to 0.2 acre-feet of -adjusted deep
percolation 69 (hereinafter "ADP") per irrigated acre
per year (af/aclyr). The interim goal would allow
about 0.2 to 04 af/aclyr of ADP. In practice, these
farm-level goals may be adjusted upward if district
recycling of drainage water increases.70
The level of irrigation efficiency implied by the
calculations in Table 9 would require a high rate of
uniformity of water application. This, in turn, would
65. The district allocation options presented in Tables 4
through 7 show annual load allocations for the sake of simplicity.
The San Joaquin River TMDL defines allowable loads which differ.
however, for different months. See Tables 2a-c. Similarly, final dis-
trict-level pollution load allocations must specify allowable loads
for each month of each year type. These would be calculated by
applying the same formulas used to create the annual load alloca-
tions in Tables 4 through 7.
66. See YOUNG & CONGDON. supra note 50.
67. CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER OuAure Coo, BoARD.
WATER OUALITY CONTROL PLAN (1989); SWRCB REPORT. supra note 31;
DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPoRr. supra note 32.
68. See YOUNG & CONGDON. supra note 50.
69 For purpo.esof thtsArtice.,adusted deep percolation" is
equal to the amount of ater that moves do;wa,mrd past the root
zone (deep percolation) minus 03 af'aci'r (zhich is assumed nec-
essary to maintain a salt balance in the soil) Coincidentally, the
amount of water moving dwwam rd out of the sericonfined aquifer
(where farm drains are laatedi and through the Corcoran clay laier
is about 0.3 aflac-'r on average, D.'i .c P .a.aoa F F. OT.,
supra note 31
70 Most. if not all. distncts are able to recirculate drainage
water, mting it with incoming water deliveries or groundwater for
reuse within the district (or transfer to other districts), Therefore
the average efficiency of water uze in the re-ion is higher than the
efficiency of the average farm. and less drainage is discharged into
the river than is actually produced at the farm level
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Table 8
Farm-Level Selenium Discharge Allocation
Based on Drained Acreage
Regional Current Future Current Future
Load Farm-Level Farm-level Average Average
Allocation Load Load Farm-Level Farm-Level
Year type Allocation Allocation Drainage Drainage
(lbs Se/yr) (Ibs Se/oc/yi) (of/ac/yr) (of/ac/yr) (af/ac/yr)
1 2 3 4 5
Water Quality Standard
Critical 1,163 11 .75 .08 .05
Dry/Below Normal 2,504 23 .75 .17 .11
Above Normal/Wet 2,598 24 .75 .18 .12
Interim Goal
Crical 3,060 28 .75 .21 .14
Dry/Below Normal 3,737 34 .75 .26 .17
Above Normal/Wet 5,463 50 .75 .38 .25
Column 1: Regional load allocation necessary to meet the water quality standard or an interim goal that
corresponds to a once-in-five-month excursion rate.
Column 2: (Column 1) + (baseline drained acreage of 49,273 acres; Table 3).
Column 3: (Column 1) + (predicted future drained acreage of 54,000 acresa: San Joaquin Valley Drainage
Program 1990a).
Column 4: (Column 2) - (average selenium concentration of 150 Wi/1 or 0.408 lb Se/af, San Joaquin Valley
Drainage Program 1990a).
Column 5: (Column 3) + (average selenium concentration of 150 jig/l or 0.408 lb Se/af; San Joaquin Valley
Drainage Program 1990a).
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Table 9
Farm-Level Selenium Discharge Allocation
Based on Irrigated Acreage
Load Allocafion % Redcudion from Hislorical Drainage
Year type Historical Drainage Allocation
Discharges Discharges
(lbs Se!h) (of/c/V) (Mfac/)
12 3 4
Water Quality Standard
Crifical 1,163 11 .75 .03
Dry/Below Normal 2,504 23 75 .17
Above Normal/Wet 2.598 24 .75 .18
Interim Goal
Critical 3,060 28 .5 .21
Dry/Below Normal 3,737 34 J5 .26
Above Normal/Wet 5,463 so J5 .38
Column 1: Regional load allocation necessary to meet the water quality standard or an
intenm goal that corresponds to a once-in-five-month excursion rate.
Column 2: Percent selenium load reduction required to meet the regional load allocation.
calculated as (Column I) - (histoncal discharge,, water years 1986-1988) x 100.
Column 3: Histoncal drainage discharges (roughly equivalent to adjusted deep percolation)
during the same period, derived from the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program (1990a).
Column 4: Drainage allocation, calculated as (Column 2) x (Column 3) - 100.
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require farmers to install more efficient irrigation
equipment or use current equipment more effi-
ciently. For example, cotton farmers would have to
practice very effective management of quarter-mile
furrow systems with tailwater return or install more
advanced technologies such as surge systems and
linear-move sprinklers.
3. Implications for Program Design
The San Joaquin River TMDL has several impli-
cations for the choice of a regulatory program for
the Grasslands. First, the TMDL indicates that sele-
nium loads must be significantly decreased in order
to meet water quality standards. For example, com-
pliance with the existing 5 lig/l standard for seleni-
um in critical water years requires selenium load
reductions of more than 80 percent from 1991 levels
(a critical year with curtailed water deliveries), and
reductions of 89 percent from 1986-1988 levels.71
Since the required load reductions are substantial,
and because selenium is both toxic and bioaccu-
mulative, the pollution control program should be
designed to comply with the regional load alloca-
tion or pollution "cap" as closely as possible. Excess
discharges of selenium will have unacceptable envi-
ronmental impacts, but overly stringent load
restrictions could cause farmers to incur significant
and unnecessary costs.
The pollution load calculations for the San
Joaquin River also demonstrate that the perceived
difficulty of deriving a pollution cap can be over-
come. The required load reductions both for the
Grasslands region as a whole and for individual dis-
tricts can be estimated using minimal resources.
Yet, the estimates would be sufficiently reliable to
initiate effective water quality regulation and to
generate substantial environmental benefits.
In contrast, the task of allocating the regional
load among individual farmers is technically com-
plex. Although the regional average farm-level goals
presented here are accurate enough to design a pol-
lution abatement program, more precise farm-level
goals could be calculated within individual districts.
The relative difficulty of calculating farm-level allo-
cations within districts-combined with the fact
that district allocations are easier to calculate than
farm-level allocations-suggests that it may be
appropriate for a regional pollution abatement pro-
gram to combine specific load limits at the district
level with more flexible programs at the farm level.
IV. REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING
POLLUTION CONTROL OBJECTIVES
To meet the pollution-control oblective for the
Grasslands region, substantial decreases in agricul-
tural drainage are required. The key to accomplish-
ment of these reductions is improved irrigation
management at each individual farm. 72 Thus,
achievement of the regional load limits ultimately
depends on the creation of a program that holds
individual farmers responsible for pollution control.
A. Regulatory Options for the Grasslands
As discussed above, states that have attempted
to control agricultural pollution problems generally
have used programs based on the voluntary adop-
tion of BMPs. Continuing water quality problems
associated with agricultural pollution indicate that
these voluntary programs must be improved or
replaced with formal regulatory programs.
In theory, programs for regulating agricultural
drainage can be divided into two categories-tradi-
tional "command-and-control" programs 73 and
incentive-based programs. In practice, the distinc-
tions between the two categories often becomes
blurred. For example, an incettive-based tradable
permit program may be premised on discharge per-
mits (for point sources) and BMPs (for nonpoint
sources). By the same token, a traditional BMP pro-
gram may stipulate the use of an incentive program
such as tiered input pricing.
A pollution control program for the Grasslands
region could combine components of two or more
of the regulatory options described below. And,
71 Even assuming a more lenient excursion rate as an inter-
im goal (i.e once in five months rather than once in three years),
the actual 1991 discharge levels would exceed allowable loads in all
year types. Moreover, these annual load reduction figures do not
reflect the monthly variations in load limitations. Greater drainage
reductions would be required during. the months of the pre-irriga-
tion and irrigation seasons than during other times of the year.
Figure 2. Finally, the calculated drainage load allocation is derived
for the Crows Landing compliance point where readings, as
explained earlier, underestimate pollution farther upstream.
Stricter limits on drainage discharges would be necessary to meet
existing water quality standards in the tributaries and in the river
upstream from its confluence with the Merced River.
72. The focus on farm-level reductions has been recommend-
ed by several agencies, because the methods are well understood
and available and do not require substantial financial commit-
ments by the government. Where on-farm source reduction Is not
sufficient to attain environmental objectives, drainage recycling
and/or selective land retirement at the district level also may be
undertaken. See. e.g. DRAINAGE PRoRA,. FINAL REPORnT. supra note 32,
SWRCB REPoit, supra note 3 1.
73. The term "command-and-control" generally refers to regu-
latory programs that rely on technology-based effluent limits which
are enforced through site-specific permits The term also is used
more broadly to refer to any program where specific effluent limits
or pollution-control technologies are prescribed This more Cener-
al meaning is adopted here
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these programs could be applied at either the dis-
trict or the farm level. Indeed, because of the signif-
icant role of local districts in irrigation and drainage
management, 74 the optimal regulatory system may
well be two-tiered, using one type of program at the
distnct level and a different type of program within
each distnct to reach the farm level.7'
1. Best Management Practices
Under existing nonpomt source policy, states
are expected to develop comprehensive programs
that identify technology-based BMPs for a wide
range of land uses, including irrigated agriculture.
In most states, implementation of BMPs is volun-
tary. BMPs for irrigated agriculture generally pre-
scribe the use of irrigation scheduling, water meter-
ing, efficient water application systems, land con-
touring, tailwater (surface runoff) recovery, and
drainage control. 76 These BMPs are, of necessity,
'less specific than technology-based requirements
for point sources and are intended to allow for site-
specific adaptation. As the basis for a regulatory
program in the Grasslands, BMPs probably would
take the form of mandatory, uniform, technology-
based requirements for all farmers. 7
Under a mandatory BMP program, the respon-
sible regulatory agency translates the regional pol-
lution goal into a technology requirement for all of
the farmers within the region.78 Farmers are respon-
sible only for using the prescribed technology,
although the use of more efficient technologies is
allowed.
To select a BMP, the regulator must take into
account bwo critical factors: the ability of the BMP
to achieve farm-level pollution load oblectives and
the accuracy with which compliance can be verified.
Knowledge of these factors in turn requires a con-
siderable amount of information about farm-level
conditions and day-to-day management of irriga-
tion technologies. Moreover, the implementation of
a BMP often is difficult to verify. For example, the
manner in which an irrigation system is operated
cannot practicably be monitored or verified. How
often and how well a farmer performs maintenance
on equipment also is difficult to assess.
Consequently, a BMP usually specifies only physical
components. To estimate the actual resulting pollu-
tion output, the regulator must make some
assumption about the level of management.
Once a BMP is chosen, its verifiable compo-
nents can be monitored at the farm level by the reg-
ulatory entity or the water district. Fees or penalties
are used to enforce compliance. At the district level,
BMPs may stipulate certain practices including
installation of irrigation water recycling systems.
adoption of tiered water pricing, and development
of a land retirement program for farmers within the
district. Such programmatic requirements generally
do not specify performance, however, and therefore
do not ensure that the desired level of water con-
servation or participation will be achieved.
2. Traditional Permits
Permits are familiar in the context of point
source regulation. Effluent limitations set forth in
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(hereinafter "NPDES") permits generally set forth
the amount, the concentration, and the frequency
of pollutant discharges allowed for individual
sources.79 Under California law, the SWRCB has
authority to issue permits to various agricultural
sources: farmers engaged in irrigated agriculture;
existing water or drainage service districts; and
regional entities that represent larger groups of ser-
vice districts.0
Ultimately. a permit-based system for drainage
74. See discussion injra Part V.
75. A number of possible incentive-based options, including a
performance bond, are not evaluated here. The Environmental
Defense Fund proposed a performance bond for agricultural
sources in the Grasslands region dunng negotiations (1990-1991)
over the terms and conditions for the proposed reopening of the
San Luis Drain to collect and convey drainage for disposal in the
San Joaquin River. The RWQCB also proposed a performance bond
to help meet waste discharge requirements for Pima Gro Systems
in Fresno County. CENTRAL VALLEY REGION.AL WATER QUALITY CONTROL
BOARD. NoncE OF TENTATVE WAsTE DscHARGE RRou[RN.ENTs FOR RmA
GRo SysTEms. INC. Er AL. SLuDGE APpucAaiOrs To LANo (1993). In the
Grasslands case. the proposed performance bond shared essential
charactenstics with effluent fees. For this reason, performance
bonds are not evaluated separately here.
76. The EPA's Guidance for implmentation of Ie Coastal Zone Art
Reauthonzaion Amendments of 1990 provides the most recent and
comprehensive example of how national policy for nonpoint source
pollution control is evolving. See U.S. ENviONm.tENTAL PRoTa ioN
AGENcY. GuiDANcE SPECIFYING 16.AGWEENT MEASURES FOR SOURCES oF
NONPOINT POLLUTION IN COAsTAL WATERS (1993).
77, Alternatively, BMP programs can be performance-based
For example, a BMP pro.ram could be adopted requinng no more
than 0,2 aflaciyr of drainage (ADP) output Because the charactens-
tics of a performance-based BMP program are substantially the
same as a permit program ,hich assigns effluent limits, the perfor-
mance-based BMP is not discussed separatey here.
78, Theoretically. the mandated BMP might be different for
different crops, since the performance of each technologylmanage-
ment regime varies with different crops
79. These limitations are set forth In individual permits issued
and administered by state or federal agencies under the NPDES.
Other types of permits include general permits (e g., storm water
permits) that do not specify effluent limits,
80. Se discussion frfra Part V. In the early 19S0s. the State
Water Resources Control Board was preparing to Issue such a per-
mit for agricultural discharees at the terminus of the San Luis
Drain, The process was cut short when the disaster at Kesters-n
occurred. Srz STATE WATER REsouFcFs Co.rr.oL BoAr'o. fNumERIm
GumOm rc£ O; Pcmscrim WAsTE DzCH&NrGE RsoulumAENrs FOa ThE
Poom Sm Lx-s Dmuu (1931),
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regulation depends on the ability of regulators to
identify monitorable discharge points and to assign
responsibility for discharges from those points to
districts or individual farmers. Today, discharges
from districts in the Grasslands are monitored pur-
suant to requirements imposed by the RWQCB.
Monitoring discharges from individual farms is both
more expensive and more difficult.8' Irrigation water
inputs can be used as a surrogate for drainage out-
puts at the farm level, however, because irrigation
water deliveries are easily monitored, and selenium
loads in drainage water are a function of the
amount of irrigation water inputs. Thus, if the rela-
tionship between water inputs and selenium out-
puts can be predicted, water inputs can be used as
an alternate measure of pollution load.82
Because selenium loads are the product of
both the concentration of selenium in the drainage
water and the quantity of drainage water produced,
both parameters must be addressed in order to
derive the surrogate measurement. The relationship
between irrigation water inputs and the concentra-
tion of selenium in the drainage water has been
determined with sufficient accuracy to derive an
input surrogate. 83 Selenium concentrations in
drainage water vary significantly in different areas,
however. Much of this difference can be predicted
from location (for example, land on an ephemeral
fan or at the edge of an alluvial fan), depth of
groundwater, and from selenium concentrations in
shallow groundwater. Other variables that cause
differences in selenium concentrations on different
farms include the age of the drainage system, the
length of time the land has been irrigated, and
other factors.84 If field-to-field precision in selenium
concentrations is necessary, the easiest method to
establish the surrogate would be to survey the sele-
nium concentrations in drainage from various
fields. In some districts, these data are already
available. 85
The predicted selenium concentration in
drainage water is then used to calculate the amount
of drainage water that can be produced and still
comply with the allowable pollution load. To derive
the input surrogate, the remaining step is to relate
the amount of drainage produced to the amount of
irrigation water used. This relationship is conceptu-
ally straightforward: using less irrigation water cre-
ates less drainage water. Quantitatively, an average
relationship between the allowable quantity of
drainage water and the corresponding amount of
irrigation water that can be applied during the grow-
ing season can be derived for each crop.
Once calculated, the input surrogate is relative-
ly straightforward to use. Surface water deliveries to
farmers are already metered (or soon will be) at the
farm or field level. If groundwater prices become
competitive with those for surface water, groundwa-
ter use also should be accounted for. Although few
districts currently require formal reporting of
groundwater use, recent changes in state ground-
water policy 86 allow districts to adopt groundwater
management programs that may require such
reporting.
Although the input surrogate can be derived for
each farm or field, using the surrogate at the district
level in conjunction with traditional permits, efflu-
ent fees, or tradable discharge permits at the farm
level generally would not require such precision.
Rather, the average relationship within a district or
the region could be used as a basis for farm-level
limits. The use of a district-wide average consider-
ably simplifies the calculation of the surrogate,
because variations in drainage flows and selenium
81. Measuring the amount of drainage water that is collected
by the subsurface farm drains is relatively straightforward techni-
cally and can be accomplished by using flow meters at sumps, elec-
trical records of sump pump operation, flumes equipped with mea-
surement gauges in gravity-flow drains, and/or saddle meters on
pipelines. installation of these devices and periodic recording of
these measurements would, however, be a new and perhaps signif-
icant expense.
To determine the selenium loads exiting the drains, the con-
centration of selenium (which varies by at least two orders of mag-
nitude across the region) must also be measured. Although several
factors influence the concentration of selenium in drain water from
a particular field at a particular time, the average concentration of
selenium in drain water from a single field or farm would not be
expected to vary significantly over time and could be characterized
by relatively few concentration measurements.
82. See YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50. at Appendix A (dis-
cussing the methodology for calculating an input surrogate for
drainage outputs).
83. See DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, D
Wichelns & D. Nelson. An Empincal Model of the Relationship Between
Irrigation and the Volume of Water Collected in Subsurface Drains, 16
AGRICULTURAL WATER MANAGEMENT 293 (1989), R I Gilliom, Overviev of
Sources. Distribution. and Mobility of Selenium in the San Joaquin Valley,
California, in THE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE
IN AGRICULTURE (A. Dinar et al eds,, 1991), S 1, Deverel & S P Millard,
Distribution and Mobility of Selenium and Other Trace Elements In Shallow
Groundwater of the Western San Joaquin Valley, California, 22 ENVTL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 697 (1988), R Fulih et al., Distribution of
Selenium in Soils of Agricultural Fields, Western San Ioaquin Valley,
California. 52 SOIL SociEiy OF AmERICA IOURNAL I (1988),
84. See. e.g.. Gilliom, supra note 82, S.) Deverel et al , Selenium
in Tile Drain Water, in PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT Or SOURCES, DIsTRIBoUIN,
AND MOBIUTY OF SELENIUM IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA (R I
Gilliom et al eds., 1989).
85. BROADVIEW WATER Disrnicr. DRAINAGE OPERATION PLAN Or 1990
(1989); Personal Communication with M Hedrick, Water Master.
Panoche Water and Drainage District (1992),
86. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10767 (West 1984).
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concentrations are attenuated when all of the indi-
vidual sources are combined. 87
Finally, an 'input surrogate" provides a mecha-
nism for incorporating farms without drains into
the regulatory system. Accordingly, the RWQCB
presently could issue a waste discharge require-
ment (hereinafter 'WVDR")8s to districts or individual
farmers and establish an enforcement fine or
penalty.
3. Tradable Discharge Permits
Under a system of tradable discharge permits,
the regulatory agency establishes the total allow-
able pollution load, or "cap," and allocates this
"cap" among districts or farmers in individual per-
mits.89 For purposes of this study, the allocation is
assumed to be assigned, or "grandfathered," to dis-
tricts according to one of the allocation scenarios
presented in Part Ill. Farm-level allocations could
be assigned regionwide according to a similar
method or they could be assigned by the individual
districts.
After the initial allocation, districts and farmers
may buy and sell allocations (or portions thereof).
Water districts and farmers that face lower pollution
control costs or that choose to control pollution
beyond the level specified in the allocation may
reduce their own pollution more than initially
required and then sell excess allocations. Districts
and farmers with higher abatement costs have the
option of buying allocations rather than investing in
pollution control. The price and ultimate distribu-
tion of pollution permits (and therefore abatement
responsibility) is determined through these market
transactions. In essence, the market provides an
opportunity for cost-sharing 0 between districts (or
between farmers) that face different marginal pollu-
tion -control costs. Total permitted discharges may
not exceed the pollution cap, however, and any
expansion in imgated acreage would be accommo-
dated through purchases of existing allocations.
-To enable the trading system to function
smoothly, limitations on trades and regulatory
interference in trading transactions must be kept to
a minimum.91 In the Grasslands region, rules for
trading would primarily pertain to temporal restric-
tions to ensure compliance with yearly and season-
al load limits. For example, a wintertime allocation
could not be purchased for use in summertime. Nor
could an allocation for one year be purchased for
use in a different year.92
Regulatory oversight of district and farm pollu-
tion discharges is similar under tradable permit and
traditional permit systems, because the ability to
monitor and enforce pollution discharge limits is
central to each. This can be accomplished by moni-
toring pollution load outputs at the district level or
monitoring irrigation water inputs (as a surrogate)
at the farm level in the manner described above for
traditional permits.
4. Fees
The types of fee programs that could be used to
regulate drainage in the Grasslands include both
effluent and input fees, inasmuch as both drainage
outputs and irrigation inputs can be monitored and
enforced, and both are directly correlated with
drainage generation. Water pricing requires moni-
toring water supply or water use and establishing a
relationship between water inputs and drainage
outputs. Effluent fees require monitoring effluent
quantity and quality. Effluent fees also could be
based on an 'input surrogate, making them sub-
stantially equivalent to input fees, as well as
enforceable as a pollution control requirement.
Effluent fees would be levied on agricultural
drainage discharges at the farm or district level
based on measurements at an identified ditch.
sump, or other discharge point. As noted above,
measurements of district discharges already are
available and either could be instituted for individ-
ual farms or could be estimated based on a surro-
gate measurement. The fee could be imposed on
pollutant loads (e.g., pounds of selenium) or
drainage flows, although the latter requires the
determination of a relationship between flows and
loads. District-level fees would be set by the regula-
tory agency; farm-level fees would be set either by
87. Deverel et al.. supra note 84.
88. WDRs are the state equivalent of NPDES permits under
federal law pursuant to which the federal EPA or state agencies
assign pollution control responsibility to point sources. Sez discus-
sion m/ni Part V.
89. Alternatively. a regional entity such as a Regional
Drainage District could perform the allocations. See discussion Inka
Part V.
90. This use of the term "cost-sharng' occurs in the literature
on tradable permit systems. See TIEBER . supra note 39. It does
not refer to cost-shanng between the federal government and state
or local agencies.
91. A number of additional factors are important in determin-
ing the feasibility of using tradab!e discharge permits, including a
clear definition of the nature of permits to be traded, the "thick-
ness" of the market (ee.. the number of players), and market struc-
ture and operation. A dLcsion of these factors is presented later
in this chapter in relation to a proposed tradable permit system
among water districts In the Grasslands region.
92. These restrictions are required In the Grasslands as a
result of the vadable floas of the San Joaquin River, it is likely that
similar temporal restrictions would apply to other regions adopting
trading programs where the wasteload allocation vanes with river
flow,
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the regulatory agency or by the districts. 93
The level of the effluent fee initially would be
based on estimates of the additional cost necessary
to cause water districts and farmers to reduce pol-
lution loads enough to meet environmental goals.
The fee level could be adjusted if the load reduc-
tions affected by the initial fee was insufficient to
meet the pollution objective, if the number of irri-
gated acres in the region increases, or if changes in
other economic factors caused farmers to use more
or less water.
Input fees would be levied by the responsible
agency and correlated with the pollution limits to
be regulated.94 To make an input fee program most
effective, groundwater (which currently is not
metered) would have to be accounted for. Similarly,
because water transfers play an increasing role in
the distribution of agricultural water supplies in
California, this source of water inputs also would
have to be considered. To date, these water substi-
tutes have not been price-competitive with sched-
uled surface water deliveries.
Input and effluent fees may be imposed either
as a flat fee or as an block-rate (or "tiered" fee) that
increases with the size of the pollution load. In
effect, increasing block-rate fees are a graduated
tax, with higher end-rate surcharges compensating
for lower initial-block rates. Compared to a uniform,
across-the-board surcharge, tiered fees are a less
efficient incentive. With a uniform surcharge, the
marginal cost of pollution (or marginal benefit of
water conservation) is equal across all farms. With
tiered water rates, the marginal benefit varies
according to the level of use, with the result that
some farmers have less incentive than others to
adopt equally efficient conservation measures.
Another issue critical to the use of fees is the
ultimate disposition of the revenues collected
through the fee system. Fees collected by a govern-
ment agency typically do not remain within the
community. Alternatives for returning revenues
back to the community (according to a formula that
does not negate the incentive) might increase the
acceptance of a fee-based program. For example,
districts could use revenues to fund a "bank" that
guarantees loans for capital-intensive improve-
ments in irrigation systems, to finance land fallow-
ing, or to provide environmental enhancement or
mitigation. Some portion of the fees also could be
used to fund the operation of a Regional Drainage
District.95
B. Comparison of Regulatory Options
A successful pollution control program for the
Grasslands region must meet two goals, (1)
Pollution reduction targets must be achieved. (2)
The regulatory system should be easy to implement
and to administer. These goals, and by extension
the interests of each of the major stakeholders, can
be formalized into a set of criteria that provide a
framework for evaluating regulatory options:
* ability to meet the environmental goal;
• cost-effectiveness;
* compatibility with the regulated community;
• equity;
* verifiability; and
" ease of administration.
Evaluation of the regulatory options discussed
above on the basis of these criteria demonstrates
that a system of tradable discharge permits offers
the best means of addressing the drainage problem
in the Grasslands region.
I. Ability to Meet the Environmental Goal
In the Grasslands region, and in other areas
where water 'quality standards currently are not met,
the dominant regulatory objective is to comply with
a specific load allocation, or pollution "cap." Among
the options considered in this Article, only the tra-
ditional permit and tradable permit programs are
explicitly designed to meet a loading cap. BMPs and
fees enforce a cap indirectly by altering irrigation
practices. The ability of these programs to meet the
specific target depends, however, on the accuracy of
the program design. Unfortunately, such accuracy Is
difficult to achieve, because of the physical hetero-
geneity (in the case of BMPs) and economic hetero-
geneity (in the case of fees) of the farming industry.
Meeting the cap with BMPs or fees is rendered
even more difficult by the nature of the pollution
abatement options. Pollution is reduced by increas-
ing irrigation efficiency. The efficiency of irrigation
practices depends, however, both on the technolo-
gy (equipment that is verifiable) and on how the
technology is used and maintained (factors that are
not readily verifiable). The wide variation in
93. Again, assignment and collection of fees can also be per-
formed by a Regional Drainage District. See discussion infra Part V.
94. The importance of water pricing as a tool for correcting
drainage-related water quality problems is corroborated by several
studies and. to a lesser extent, by district practices. A study on im-
gation-induced water quality problems by the National Research
Council concluded that 'the most pervasive economic issue con-
tributing to irrigation-related water quality problems and affecting
the choice and success of solutions is the cost of water." NATIONAL
RESEARcH COUNCIL, IRRIGATION-NDUCED WATER OUALITY PROULEMNS WHAT
CAN BE LEARNED FROM TEH SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY EXPERIENCE (1989)
95. See discussion infra Part V.
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drainage output that results from using the same
equipment at different management levels (see
Figure 4) makes it difficult to choose a BMP or fee to
meet a specific target. For example, a regulator
might require a relatively affordable BMP or fee and
risk exceeding the pollution cap by a dramatic mar-
gin. Alternatively, the regulator might require a
more sophisticated technology to increase the
probability of .meeting the pollution cap, which
would significantly increase the costs of pollution
control. 96
In short, reliance on BMPs or fees to achieve
pollution goals poses an implicit trade-off between
affordability and effectiveness. This trade-off, which
is clear in the Grasslands, refutes the widespread
assertion that tradable discharge permits necessar-
ily compromise environmental protection and that
BMPs and fees are a preferable means to accom-
plish pollution reduction.
Under a system of tradable permits, meeting
the environmental goal would not be as problemat-
ic. Permit programs are explicitly designed to guar-
antee that the pollution cap is met (assuming the
program is enforced), so they do not depend on pre-
dictions of how a technology will be managed or on
estimates of the effects of fees. They also do not
require farmers to implement any specific technolo-
gy, but instead allow them to select among all of the
available irrigation technology and management
options. The farmer therefore has the flexibility to
choose the system best suited to site-specific con-
ditions and to operate it in accordance with chang-
96. More specifically. in the Grasslands a BMP program
designed to meet an average farm-level goal of 0.25 af/ac/yr of ADP
might require cotton farmers to use surge imgation with quarter-
mile furrows (Surge-4) and risk exceeding the pollution cap by as
much as 250%. Alternatively. a regulator might require linear-move
spnnklers (a more sophisticated and expensive technology), be fair-
ly sure of meeting the pollution cap. and nearly double the cost of
pollution control.
97. In the case of trading programs between point and non-
point sources. it has been argued that trades involving nonpoint
sources compromise pollution control because of the uncertainties
inherent In regulating these sources, This observation pertains only
to situations where specific effluent limits (for point sources) are
'traded' for BMP implementation (for nonpoint sources). however,
and the performance of DMPs vanes according to site-specific con-
ditions and Implementation. Ser Bartfeld. supra note 16.
Figure 4.
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ing wet and dry year pollution-reduction goals.
Individual dischargers also have the option to buy
and to sell pollution discharge allocations, provid-
ed that the sum of the allocations (and therefore
discharges) remains unchanged. 98 With this flexibil-
ity, a tradable permit program avoids the trade-off
between environmental effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness.
A common criticism of tradable permit systems
arises, however, where pollution discharges from
one source are more damaging to the environment
than are discharges from another source, because
of proximity to a sensitive receptor. Under these cir-
cumstances, a trading system might result in the
reallocation of pollution discharges to areas where
the pollution is more damaging. in river basins, this
often is referred to as the "upstream-downstream"
problem. Environmental harm and injury to public
health also could result from trades if pollutants
became concentrated at one location, or pollution
"hot spot."99
Under these conditions, tradable permits could
meet an overall pollution cap but would not provide
the same amount of environmental protection as a
traditional permit system.O Such problems could
be minimized by appropriately defining the geo-
graphical boundaries for trading, by assigning
weighting factors to account for upstream-down-
stream locations, and by restricting trades quantita-
tively to avoid hot spots. 101
In the Grasslands, these problems do not arise,
however, because all of the drainage from the
region is collected into one or two channels well
upstream of where they enter the San Joaquin River.
Thus, trading among agricultural dischargers
upstream of the points of discharge to the river
would not alter the effects of the discharge on the
river. 102
2. Cost-Effectiveness
The costs of a regulatory program can be mea-
,sured either in terms of the costs to the regulated
community or the total costs to society (which also
include the costs of administering the regulatory
program and the costs to other affected partles)i 03
In practice, however, the costs to the regulated
community are most often the principal determi-
nant of public acceptance of a given program.
Accordingly, the appropriate cost criterion for com-
paring regulatory options for the Grasslands region
is the cost to the regulated community of achieving
the pollution cap 04
Incentive programs such as tradable permits
and fees are cost-effective, because they encourage
each discharger to control pollution to the point at
which the marginal cost of abatement is equal to
the marginal benefit. Within the industry as a
whole, pollution control costs are distributed
according to the response of individual dischargers
to the market signals or fees.
With a tradable permit system, farmers with low
pollution control costs are encouraged to abate
more than the average amount required and benefit
from selling excess allowances; farmers with higher
pollution control costs are allowed to abate less
than the average amount required and to purchase
the necessary additional allowances. By allowing
farmers with the lowest costs to abate the most, the
tradable permit system, in effect, "buys" the desired
level of pollution control at the lowest possible
price.
Theoretically, fee-based systems also take
98. The advantage of this flexibility for responding to chang-
ing environmental goals can be captured explicitly in the design of
a permit trading program. For example, a trading system can be
devised to include two or more types of permits, corresponding to
the allocations available during different year types.
99. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT. supra note 53.
100. T.H. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS (1988). Indeed, in some situations, the heterogeneity of
marginal environmental costs of pollution loading may argue
against incentive-based programs.
101. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. supra note 37.
102. There is some scientific uncertainty over the biological
uptake of selenium dunng the transport of drainage discharges
through local ditches and canals to the ultimate point of discharge
to the river. if these load losses actually are occurring, however.
they most likely take place downstream from the last maior dis-
charger. As a result, trades would have little bearing on these loss-
es. in the absence of definitive information on this question, this
study assumes, conservatively, that there is no selenium uptake in
the channels, and that the ratio of selenium in agricultural dis-
charges to the selenium load discharged to the River is 1: 1. See also
P PI KETr & C. KRATZER. AN EVALUATION OF DRAINAGE REDUCTION AS A
METHOD FOR MEETING RECOMMENDED WATER OUALrIY OBJECWnVES FOR
SELENIUM. SALINn1Y AND BORON IN THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER (1988),
103. A cost-benefit analysis also can be used to determine the
desired level of pollution abatement under different regulatory
methods. Such an analysis does not presuppose that pollution con-
trol will be adopted. it is difficult, however, to quantify many of the
components of the costs and benefits of pollution abatement-e g.,
the non-pecuniary costs to the regulated community of reduced
flexibility; the amenity value of improved water quality or enhanced
fish and wildlife habitat. Moreover, subsidies and market barriers
often distort the value of the resource in question. For example,
state and federal water policy subsidizes water prices for agricultur-
al customers, thereby distorting the scarcity cost of water and the
capital, operations, and maintenance costs of developing and deliv-
ering irrigation supplies. Given the uncertainties Involved In envi-
ronmental valuation, a thorough cost-benefit analysis Is not possi-
ble for most regulatory actions.
104. An analysis of cost-effectiveness determines how to
achieve a specific obiective with the greatest economic efficiency, In
this case, a cost-effectiveness analysis determines how to allocate
responsibility for pollution control in a way that minimizes costs to
the regulated community.
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advantage of marginal cost differences. Here, farm-
ers with low pollution control costs are likely to
abate more in order to avoid paying fees, while
farmers with higher pollution control costs likely
will abate less and pay greater fees. Again, the
aggregate pollution control costs for the communi-
ty should be minimized.
In practice, however, tradable permit systems
are more likely to result in cost-effective regulation
than fee-based systems. This is true because pollu-
tion allowance trading allows the separation of
"who pollutes" and "who pays" in a regional system
of cost-sharing, which improves the chances that
the theoretical cost savings will be realized.
Moreover. under a fee-based system, farmers pay
both for pollution control and for pollution. Only if
revenues from pollution fees were rebated as a
lump sum to the community (without undermining
pollution control incentives) would the total cost to
the regulated community of fees and tradable per-
mits be comparable.10'
In contrast, uniform pollution abatement
requirements such as BMPs do not distinguish
among the costs to individual dischargers, nor do
they allow pollution control costs to be redistrib-
uted among dischargers. Consequently, BMPs cost
the regulated community more than a comparable
incentive-based program for achieving any pollu-
tion goal. 06
The differences in marginal pollution control
costs among dischargers are the source of cost sav-
ings under all incentive-based systems; the magni-
tude of potential cost savings is a function of the
magnitude of the marginal cost differences among
dischargers. Thus, significant cost savings have
been predicted in the point/nonpoint source permit
trading programs studied to date, where industries
facing very high control costs (the point sources)
are expected to trade with unregulated nonpoint
source industries that have not yet made any pollu-
tion control investments and, therefore, still face
relatively low marginal pollution control costs.O7 In
the Grasslands region, however, all of the sources to
be regulated are in a single industry. Therefore, sig-
nificant cost savings can be expected, not as a
result of dramatic cost differences among indus-
tries, but as a result of aggregating a large number
of relatively small cost differences within the regu-
lated community. es
To determine whether these cost savings would
be significant, it is necessary to compare the costs
of using tradable discharge permits and BMPs to
achieve a regional pollution control objective.
Because 'drainage abatement is accomplished by
improving irrigation efficiency, irrigation system
costs are used to compare pollution-control costs
under the programs. As a result, some of the costs
attributed to the two regulatory systems are actual-
ly routine costs of farming and do not represent the
costs due to environmental regulation.
The results indicate that use of tradable dis-
charge permits or fees among districts can yield
savings of up to twenty-three percent, depending
on the pollution-control target. Application of
these economic incentives both among districts
and within districts may yield even greater savings.
again depending upon the particular pollution tar-
get (Figure 5). Regardless of the pollution goal cho-
sen, however, BMPs always appear to be less cost-
effective than the economic incentive options.
(Figure Q109
3. Compatibility with tle Regulated Community
The tradition of independence in farming
argues for a regulatory approach that is flexible and
decentralized. Moreover. the agricultural industry is
diverse and is influenced by a number of external
and variable factors, including crop market condi-
tions (e.g., prices and contracts); climate; water sup-
ply, quality, and cost; energy prices; interest rates;
and regulatory requirements. From the farmers'
point of view, therefore, the optimum regulatory
program would allow decisions about pollution
control to be made in conjunction with other pro-
duction decisions related to these variables.
All of the incentive-based options discussed
above would allow farmers and water districts flexi-
bility to adjust pollution control decisions to
respond to changing conditions. This is because
economic incentives rely on price signals to deter-
mine when and how much to reduce discharges; yet
they also allow farmers to decide the optimal
method of compliance. Thus, the preservation of
flexibility under an incentive-based program does
not imply a compromise in effective pollution con-
trol. Pollution control can be achieved without
105. The indirect costs of the two systems might still differ,
depending upon. for example, the need to adjust the fee in
response to changes in economic conditions.
106. TiErTNBmz. supra note iO; Stavins & Vhitehead. supra
note 38; HAHN & NoLL. YEAR 2000. supra note 39.
i07, Bartfeld. supra note 16; YANoDi. supra note 39; APOGEE
RsmpxcH. INc. supra note 37; APoGEE. DILLON. supra note 42; ApoGee-
TAst-PAmuco, supra note 42.
10S The actual sa ,inps with trades maynbe limited by the cap-
Ital constraints on farmers in the short term. In the long term. how-
ever. actual saings will be greater as capital constraints are cer-
come. Ttra =., supra note 39.
109. For a more detailed analysis. sez Ycu!;o & Co%=o,. supra
note 50.
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"telling farmers how to farm."
In contrast, a centralized program of mandato-
ry BMPs is unlikely to satisfy the farmers' prefer-
ence for flexibility and independence and still be
effective in meeting the environmental goal. The
common perception that BMP programs are flexi-
ble is due mostly to the use of broadly-defined
BMPs. Where requirements are general enough to
be adaptable to a wide range of conditions, howev-
er, they also tend to undermine the ability of BMP
programs to meet pollution control objectives. If
more specific requirements are employed (e.g.,
mandated technological improvements), BMPs are
likely to be objectionable to farmers for two rea-
sons. First, they do not take into account the sig-
nificant physical and economic differences among
farms. Second, they may inhibit the ability of farm-
ers to respond to changing economic, environmen-
tal, or technological conditions because of "sunk7
capital costs.
Incentive-based programs also provide a direct
financial incentive (e.g., avoided costs of effluent or
input fees or supplemental income gained from the
sale of discharge permits) to reduce discharges
below the required level or to invest in improved
control technologies.i1 In contrast, technology-
based BMPs could discourage experimentation with
new technologies, because successful demonstra-
tion of more efficient controls might lead to a new,
more stringent standard.
4. Equity
The goal of an equitable regulatory program is
to ensure that each polluter is responsible for his or
her share of the required level of pollution abate-
ment.II In the Grasslands, disagreements over the
sources of subsurface drainage could lead to a per-
ception that pollution control assignments are
unfair. The problem arises from the common
assumption that unmeasured quantities of subsur-
face drainage water migrate downslope.112 Although
experts dispute the significance of this lateral
migration, the potential for perceived inequities
must be accounted for when allocating responsibil-
ity for drainage management among water districts
and individual farmers." 3
Programs that rely on direct measurement and
enforcement of farm-level drainage outputs will
appear inequitable if the quantities of subsurface
drainage collected from a given field or farm do not
correspond to the amount of drainage generated in
that location. Effluent fees and tradable discharge
permits can use water inputs as a surrogate for
drainage outputs, however, and thereby avoid this
problem. Similarly. either farm-level BMPs or
farm-level input fees can avoid penalizing farmers
who may be the recipients of others' pollution. Any
of the regulatory programs implemented at the dis-
trict level also can compensate for an "upslope-
downslope problem by using historical (unregulat-
ed) discharges as the basis for assigning pollution
control responsibility.'i 4
'Equity" also can be achieved by equalizing the
costs of pollution abatement for dischargers.
Uniform. technology-based BMPs appear to be
equitable, because all regulated parties must invest
in the same control measures. In practice, however,
a system of mandatory BMPs may have significant-
ly different economic effects on individual farmers
because of variations in other production factors, in
110. A frequently cited advantage of incentive programs is
that they encourage the discovery of more effective and less costly
abatement technologies and/or practices by the dischargers who
have the best knowledge of and experience with abatement
options, and who stand to gain from such innovations. See M.
Cropper & W.E. Oates. Enironrental Economirs: A Sunry. 30 JOURNaL
OF ECONOMIC LnmxtuRs 675 (1992); TiEr"NBERG. supra note 39. This
advantage was demonstrated when the recent drought and chang-
ing economic conditions caused some farmers in the Central Valley
to innovate. For example, in 1985. most farmers in the Grasslands
region used half-mile furrows at a low management level to Irrigate
row crops such as cotton. By 1992-after six years of drought, during
which water delivenes eventually were reduced by more than half
and districts adopted tiered water pncing and other conservation-
oriented programs-90% of the farmers growing cotton in Broadview
Water District had adopted quarter-mile furrows, 28% percent were
irmgating alternate furrows, and most had reduced pre-irrigation
Similar changes were observed for tomato and melon farmers in the
district. These innovations are similar to measures taken by farmers
in the other districts in response to the 1986-92 drought Other
responses included crop switching. improved Irrigation scheduling
at the farm level, and changes in district water delivery schedules.
N. MAcDouGALL ET AL. THE ECON MICS OF AORICULruRAL DRAiwt:
(1992); S. Archibald. An Econonrn Analysis of Water Avibfilfity In
Califorma Central Valley Agriculture. Testimony to the State Water
Resources Control Board During the Consideration of InLrin Water
P,1gits Artf:ns (lune 26. I992)
11i. The pnncpal concern about equity is the question of
'who pays' for pollution control. The issue can be defined broadIy
to Include potential impacts on consumers and farm-related indus-
tries as well as on the agricultural community To the extent that
changes In drainage management result in substitutions in irrga-
tion practices or otherwise increase the 'costs of doing business:
these costs may be passed on to consumers or related businesses.
112. Disputes over drainage generation between the upslope
lands within the %Vestlands Water Distnct and downslope lands
within the several lo,-lying districts of the Grasslands region have
been the subject of ,anous and ongoing legal proceedings.
. 113, To some extent, the "upslope-dzn,,slope" problem can
also be addressed through Institutional means, For example, the
downslope distncts in the Grasslands have organized themselves
Informally as the Grassland Basin Drainer for purposes of partic-
ipating In various drainage management projects. The institutional
capacity for addressing this and other perceived sources of inequity
among dischargers would be enhanced with the creation of a
regional drainage district comprised of all the contributing sources
In the region. Institutional considerations are the sublect of Part V.
114. Sez discussion supra Part IlL
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physical conditions, and in profit margins. 115
Incentive-based programs, by contrast, tend to
equalize marginal costs but enable dischargers to
adopt different levels of pollution control.
Among incentive-based programs, one of the
primary equity considerations involves the transfer
of wealth out of the community. For fee-based pro-
grams, the ultimate disposition of revenues collect-
ed is often at issue. Typically, effluent and input
fees result in a net transfer of wealth out of the com-
munity in the form of payments to the government.
If a program were designed in which the fees were
imposed on farmers by the water district, then the
revenues would remain within the regulated com-
munity.
Because pollution sources in the Grasslands
region currently are unregulated, the initial alloca-
tion of discharge permits represents a significant
assignment of wealth. Whether this wealth remains
within the regulated community or is transferred
out of the community to a regulatory agency would
depend on the program design. Allocation methods
that involve no net transfer of wealth to the govern-
ment include: (I) revenue-neutral auctions, in
which the proceeds collected from the initial auc-
tion of discharge permits are redistributed to the
community in one way or another; and (2) "grandfa-
thering"-a method of distributing allowances
according to acreage or historical patterns of dis-
charge. The latter option is more likely to be sup-
ported by the existing agricultural dischargers in
the Grasslands region.1i 6 Indeed, an initial alloca-
tion based on historical discharges would mean
that few, if any, of the dischargers would have to
assume costs for pollution abatement greater than
the costs they would face under a traditional permit
program or fee system.i7
Once the initial allocation is complete, the rev-
enues from a trading program automatically stay
within the community and are transferred among
participating farmers or districts as a form of
cost-sharing. Regionwide, all sources participate in
financing pollution control, but some are buyers
and some are sellers of permits.
5. Verifiability
An essential component of a successful regula-
tory program of any kind is the ability to verify that
farmers and districts are complying with pollution
control requirements. Verification of farm-level
BMPs is relatively simple, because BMPs usually
consist of prescribed technologies or farm manage-
ment techniques, In contrast, traditional permit
programs, tradable discharge permits,, and other
incentive-based programs must provide some col-
lateral means of measuring and verifying farm-level
pollution.
In the Grasslands region, verification of compli-
ance with a permit or fee program would require
direct measurement of drainage outputs or indirect
measurement using water inputs as a surrogate. In
this region, subsurface drainage is collected in
sumps that correspond to several fields or farms.
The drainage then flows to collector drains and is
subsequently discharged from the district at an
identifiable point. Most surface drainage (i.e., tall-
water) is collected and recycled at the farm level,U1
but some surface drainage (which contains little
selenium) is blended with the subsurface drainage
within the districts. District discharges then flow
through a labyrinth of ditches before they are con-
veyed to the San Joaquin River via Mud Slough and
Salt Slough.) 9
A monitoring and metering system is in place
to measure the combined surface and subsurface
drainage outputs, both at the district discharge
points and at the points of discharge to the two
sloughs and the San Joaquin River. The current
monitoring system makes it possible to verify
drainage outputs (including selenium loads) at the
district level. Indeed, monitoring data have been
collected on a monthly basis at district outlets since
1985.120
Drainage outputs are not measured at the indi-
vidual farm level in most districts. To determine
drainage outputs from farms, improved drainage
collection and monitoring could be installed, but
only at considerable expense.i21 A far easier and
115. Potential equity problems also may arise with perfor-
mance-based BMPs in the Grasslands where returns to farm-level
land and management vary because of high water table effects. See
D. Wichelns & M. Weinberg. Economics of Agncultural Drairnge Policies.
44 CAL, AGRICULTURE 8 (1990).
116. See discussion supra Part III (regarding equity effects of
allocation options).
117. See TiETENBERG, supranote 39 (discussing the distribution
of financial burdens).
118. Most if not all districts in the Grasslands require farmers
to employ taliwater return systems as a matter of district policy.
119. See discussion supra Part ii; see also YOUNG & CONGDON, supra
note 50.
120. GRASSLAND WATER TASK FORCE, GRASSLAND AREA MONITORING
REPORT (1989) (hereinafter "GRASSLAND 1989 REPoRT); GRASSLAND
WATER TASK FORCE. GRASSLAND AREA MONITORING REPORT (1990) (here-
inafter 'GRASSLAND 1990 REPORT).
121. Presently, approximately one half of the acreage In the
Grasslands region is underlain by subsurface tile collection systems
that convey drainage by gravity, to sumps serving several fields
and/or farms. Distinguishing the discharges of Individual farms
would require either reconfiguration of the collection systems with
sumps for each field (or farm) or drainage flow measurements at
each farm boundary.
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less expensive option for farm-level metering would
be to use water inputs as a surrogate for drainage
outputs.'2 , Many districts already meter water
inputs at the field level, and recent federal and state
policies for improved water management include
metering requirements. 23 Monitoring of surface
water deliveries would have to be combined with
monitoring of groundwater use to account for all
irrigation inputs. 2 4
In sum, the monitoring and enforcement
requirements of any program could be met at the
district level under existing conditions. BMPs and
input fees would be readily verifiable at the farm
level, as well. A tradable permit or effluent fee pro-
gram would be verifiable with improvements in
farm-level drainage metering capacity. If groundwa-
ter were metered, however, measurement of water
inputs as a surrogate for drainage discharges would
be preferable at the farm level.
6. Ease of Administration
Agricultural pollution cannot be regulated
effectively unless individual farmers become
responsible for pollution control. This requirement
gives rise to the most frequently cited obstacle to
any system of regulation of agricultural pollution-
viz. the administrative difficulty of tracking and
enforcing hundreds or thousands of individual dis-
charges. Just as an incentive-based program is more
compatible with the needs of the regulated commu-
nity, administrative burdens also would be mini-
mized under a regulatory program that provides
incentives to farmers to make independent deci-
sions that collectively meet the environmental
goal.' 25
Both tradable permits and fee-based systems
equate the farmer's economic self-interest with
environmental protection by providing financial
rewards for reducing pollution. By motivating farm-
ers to comply with pollution reduction require-
ments, incentive systems should minimize the
enforcement burden. 26 in contrast, BMP and tradi-
tional permit programs rely solely on threat of
enforcement to assure compliance.
Another key to reducing the administrative bur-
den is to build on existing institutions and existing
programs as much as possible. 27 Existing water
supply and drainage districts are a logical choice to
administer any of the proposed drainage regulatory
programs, because they already perform similar
administrative functions and have well-developed
relationships with individual farmers. 23 In addition,
much of the necessary legal authority for undertak-
ing these pollution control responsibilities is
already in place.ifl Districts also could implement
BMPs or input fees at the farm level with compara-
tive ease.
In contrast, effluent fees would require addi-
tional monitoring and perhaps the development of
an input surrogate. Tradable permits at the farm
level would be more cumbersome to administer
because of the additional reporting requirements
and the need to coordinate and oversee transac-
tions among farmers.
Implementation by the RWOCB of any of the
district-level regulatory programs discussed here
would be fairly simple given the limited number of
entities involved and the ease of monitoring both
drainage outputs and water inputs. 130 Admin-
istration of a system of tradable discharge permits.
122. The surrogate does not account for the relative selenium
contamination of drain water from different fields, unlike a direct
measurement of drainage flow and selenium concentration.
However. average shallow groundwater contaminant levels could
be used to weight the water input measurements. Sa discussion of
input surrogates earlier in this Part.
123. Section 3405(b) of the CVPIA requires measurement of
water deliveries for all surface water delivery systems within a con-
tracting district's boundaries. At the state level, agricultural districts
have been negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (here-
inafter MOU') for improved water management that Includes meter.
ing of water delivenes. CA vATER CODE § 10903 (West Supp. 1995).
124. Groundwater is used by farmers in every water district to
supplement surface water deliveries and can readily be monitored
based on direct flow measurements or electricity use at pumping
locations.
125. Other requirements for establishing accountability at the
farm level are discussed in Par V.
126. For the same reasons, incentive systems arguably speed
the initial compliance with the regulatory limits. See T"IWrB ,
supra note 39.
127. For example, the nce herbicide control program in the
Sacramento Valley of Califomria is 'piggybacked' on an existing
record-keeping and enforcement system run by another agency.
128 Existing drainage districts and water districts currently
have varying degrees of authority over and inholvement in drainage
management. Most of these public entities have some drainage
policies in place. Including mandatory tatiwater recycling at the
farm-le el. moratoria on district financing of additional subsurface
drainage systems. annual drainage management fees. and metering
of water Inputs- A number of districts are manaing drainage far
more Intensively than others For example. Broadview Water
District has developed a data management system to keep track of
farm-le,.el water use. drainage quantity and quality at individual
sumps. and crop production Bw -o.u WATEm Dsmcr. supra note
84. This system is compatible with the monitoring requirements of
the Incentive-based pollution control programs. Similarly. farmers
are required to submit annual crop plans to the district pror to the
pre-irrigation season. The plans currently are used to inform farm-
ers of the practices and efficiencies of their neighbors in order to
encourage greater efficiency districtwtde. This approach could be
broadened to include reporting of irrigation technologies, with a
schedule for district verification. under a BMP program.
129. See discussion frina Part V.
130. The drainage operation plans already required of each
water district could provide a framework for administerig district-
level programs. Drainage operation plans might have to be amend-
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however, could require additional regulatory
involvement, depending upon the program design.
The critical issues for designing an effective trad-
able permit program are discussed in the following
section.
C. A Tradable Discharge Permit System for the
Grasslands
As shown in Table 10, a district-level tradable
discharge permit program would best satisfy each of
the criteria described at the outset of this section:
,The allocation of tradable permits among
districts would be based on a predeter-
mined pollution cap to ensure that the
water quality objectives for selenium in the
San Joaquin River are met in different
water-year types and irrigation seasons.
* The cost-effectiveness of this program
stems from the reliance on incentives to
encourage a cost-minimizing allocation of
pollution control responsibility among dis-
tricts (using tradable permits) and farmers
(using input fees).
* The decisionmaking flexibility afforded by
this program, including the opportunity for
each district to determine the most appro-
priate system of tiered water prices, con-
forms to the characteristics and prefer-
ences of the regulated community.
* Equity issues related to the "upslope-
downslope" migration of subsurface
drainage and to differences in past invest-
ments in pollution control would be
addressed through the initial allocation of
Table 10
Comparison of Regulatory Options
REGULATORY OPTIONS
CRITERIA Tradable Effluent Input Mandatory Traditional
Discharge Fees Fees BMPs Permits
Permits
Ability to meet Pollution Goal + - - +
Cost-Effectiveness + + + -
Compatibility with Regulated + + + -
Community
Eouity -1+ farm level -/+ farm level + -1+ - farm level
+ district level + district level +district level
Verifiability -/+ farm level -/+ farm level + + -/+ farm level
+ district level + district level + district level
Ease of Administration - farm level -/ farm level + +- farm level
+ district level + district level + district level
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permits among districts and the opportuni-
ties for cost-sharing among districts and,
by extension, among their farmers.
" Compliance with the water quality stan-
dard in the river and with the district load
limits established through trades is verifi-
able with the existing monitoring system in
the Grasslands. At the farm level, monitor-
ing of water deliveries (which can be corre-
lated with drainage discharges) is widely
practiced and is likely to increase in
response to other legal requirements and
policies.
* While the introduction of any regulatory
program would create new responsibilities
for the regulatory agency, the incentive
structure of the proposed program, its
compatibility with existing agricultural pro-
grams and policies, and the familiarity of
regulators with permit systems and tiered
water pricing all work to minimize the bur-
den on regulators and districts. The cre-
ation of a regional drainage district to over-
see the program would further ease the
administrative burden.131
How the trading system would function in prac-
tice, or whether it would work at all, depends of
course on how the program is implemented and
administered. An extensive body of literature
describes the conditions required for an effective
tradable permit program 32 In terms relevant to the
Grasslands, they are:
1. a defined environmental goal;
2. a potential for cost savings based on differ-
ences in marginal pollution control costs
among farmers;
3. the capability to identify and quantify agri-
cultural pollution sources;
4. the ability accurately to monitor discharges
ed to include more specific and mandatory reporting guidelines.
From the distcrts perspective, many of the administrative require-
ments of a drainage management program could be integrated with
existing activities, such as water contract renewals and water con-
servation planning requirements for water districts served by the
CVPIA §§ 3403 & 3405(e). or they could be implemented as part of
the proposed MOU for agricultural water suppliers regarding the
implementation of Efficient Water Management Practices. CsL.
WATER CODE § 10903 (West Supp. 1995).
131. See discussion infra Part V.
132. See. e.g.. Cropper &Oates. supra note 110. TENEFzG. supra
note 39; HAHN & Nou., Mppc-r DEsim. supra note 39; 1982b; YANDLE.
supra note 39; 1. Tripp & D.J.Dudek. institutional Gudinn for Desfgnlr
Surcessful Transferable Rfihts Programs. 6 YALE 1. o; REG. 383 (1989).
to ensure compliance with permit transac-
tions and with the regional pollution cap;
5. knowledge of the relationship between
effluent discharges and water quality con-
sequences so that the problems of
"upstream-downstream" effects and "hot
spots" can be avoided;
6. market structure and market operation that
minimize transaction costs;
7. a sufficient number of participants for a
fluid market; and
8. a competitive market.
The first five requirements are met in the
Grasslands, as demonstrated by the analysis in the
preceding section. The remaining conditions for a
functioning market must be addressed in the design
of the proposed regulatory program.
I. Minimzing Transaction Costs133
In a trading program for the Grasslands region.
transaction costs would be voluntarily incurred. If
the initial allocation of discharge permits is gener-
ally equitable and acceptable to the regulated dis-
tncts, few transactions will occur, and market par-
ticipants will be no worse off under the tradable
permit system than they would have been under a
mandatory program to reduce drainage discharges.
If districts choose to undertake market transactions
to adjust their permit allocations, the magnitude of
the transaction costs will be a function of the avail-
ability of information and program administrative
requirements. Therefore. measures to streamline
the flow of information should be incorporated into
the design of the permit market.
There is a history of cooperation among water
district managers in the Grasslands region that
would facilitate dissemination of information about
permit trading. Search and negotiation costs could
be reduced further by relying on brokerage services
to identify potential trades and to facilitate transac-
tions.i34 In addition to private brokers, a regional
drainage district or similar entity could help to
133. The significance of transaction costs for the performance
of pollution markets is dscussed in the literature Analyses of the
Fox River pollutant trading program cite high transaction costs and
uncertainty over the future value of permits as the pnrmary reasons
for the programs failure Sa Hahn. supra note 38; Bartfeld. supra
note 16, By contrast, the combination of minimal administrative
requirements and general famlianty with trading partners is cited
as the reason for the high number of trad_s and overall success of
EPA's 'inter-refiney averaging* leaded gasoline trading program.
Sce Cropper & Oates. supra note 110,
134, In general, the reliance on a market-maker also hastens
the market permit price to-.'ards its equilibrium by fteilitating a suf-
fident number of early transactions. 'su & Nou.. ?.1..Cr Drc,.
supra note 39; H Taylor. ErFirnnf . Eccr:2r _s Pufir4 Marts un er
If.e Lrrae;z. In B~sRv-erz 15 (1933)
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reduce transaction costs by serving as a clearing-
house for information on trading opportunities and
terms, by maintaining a periodic schedule for com-
pliance review, and by providing a clear definition of
the basis for determining violations and penalties
for non-compliance.
Permits also should be freely tradable, both
through purchases and leases. Under the proposed
trading program, permit leases may be easier to
negotiate and therefore result in lower transaction
costs than purchase transactions. This is likely to be
the case for two reasons. First, the permit holders
(i.e., the districts) do not generate or directly control
the pollution that is discharged. As a result, the dis-
tricts would be more likely to negotiate short-term
leasing arrangements than commit to the perma-
nent transfers of farmers' pollution allocations.
Second, the variability in the allowable pollution
load and the likely reliance on short-term manage-
ment practices to control pollution would tend to
increase the number of short-term transactions.' 35
From the regulator's perspective, the major
transaction cost of a trading program is the admin-
istrative cost of approving individual trades. In the
Grasslands, however, there is little need for
approval of individual trades, because discharges
are well-mixed during conveyance in regional drains
and are indistinguishable at the point of discharge
to the San Joaquin River. Thus, the rules for trading
should limit disapproval of trades to instances
where the temporal restrictions in the permit have
been violated.
2. Market Size
In theory, if a market has too few players (what
economists call a "thin" market), transactions may
be few and infrequent, leading to higher and more
variable permit prices. 13 6 In a thin market, adverse
market behavior by one or more districts also can
result in fewer trades and higher transaction costs
for each trade.
A trading program among water districts in the
Grasslands would involve a minimum of seven par-
ticipants-the water districts that currently dis-
charge to the San Joaquin River via Mud Slough and
135. TIETENBERG, supra note 39.
136. HAHN & NOLL, MARKET DESIGN. supra note 39.
137. Personal Communication with L. Goulder. Professor,
Department of Economics, Stanford University (1992); Personal
Communication with I. Merrifield, Professor. Division of
Economics, University of Texas, San Antonio (1993); Personal
Communication with D. Mussatti. Economist, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, RTP NC (1993) See also YANDLE, supra note 39
(suggesting that market size is less important to market success
than the scarcity and security of the tradable permits).
Salt Slough. While a market of this size generally is
considered thin, seven participants probably is a
sufficient number to achieve a cost-effective distrib-
ution of pollution control. 37 Moreover, because
transactions at the district level would be a function
of the actions of a far greater number of farmers, the
potential for adverse market behavior would be
minimized. 3 8
3. Market Competitiveness
Price competitiveness is the sine qua non of a
functioning market. To be efficient, the market rules
and the value of permits traded in it must be well-
established. Uncertainty about allowable pollution
loads, for example, would erode the value of the
permits traded and undermine credibility in the
market. In the Grasslands, however, the variations
in river flows and effluent flows are taken into
account in the regional loading analysis and would
be reflected in the terms of each permit, thus mini-
mizing insecurity over the value of allocated per-
mits.
There are several ways to preserve the value of
permits yet let the permit market reflect changes in
the allowable pollution loads according to water-
year type and irrigation seasons. First, yearly
adjustments in the total allowable load (and hence
the total number of permits) could be accomplished
through the annual participation of the RWQCB in
the market. The Board could sell pollution
allowances during non-critical water-years to
increase the total number of permits to conform
with the increased allowable load. Revenues could
be rebated to the market participants to preserve
the cost-effectiveness of the trading system.
Alternatively, the permits could be allocated
according to three classifications-one that would
allow continuous uninterrupted discharges, and
two that allow discharges only during the appropri-
ate year-type. Priority 1 permits would correspond
to the critical-year allocation and would represent
discharges that could occur on an uninterrupted
basis during the appropriate month regardless of
the type of water year. Priority 2 and Priority 3 per-
mits would correspond to discharges that could
138. In general, the number of players in the market may be
larger than the number of permit holders if parties that do not par-
ticipate in the initial allocation nevertheless participate in the mar-
ket. A farm-level trading program-which would involve all farmers
within the boundaries of the Grasslands region or farmers within
individual districts-would result in a substantially larger market,
with potentially more than 1000 participants In the case of the
Grasslands region, the market could be expanded to include addi.
tional players, such as the Grasslands Water District (a water sup-
plier to private wetlands), unincorporated agricultural lands, por-
tions of the Westlands water District, or other entities
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take place during more favorable hydrologic condi-
tions.i39 Districts would decide their relative
demands for these classes of permits based on their
respective capability to adjust discharges to meet
changed loading conditions. The determination and
announcement of the annual allowable load should
be timed to coincide as closely as possible with the
farmers' crop planning and investment schedule, as
well as with district operations.
The competitiveness of the market also is
affected by the distribution of power within it. If one
or a small number of participants controls the
majority of permits, as either buyers or sellers, there
is- an incentive to behave non-competitively, there-
by driving up the permit price. The ability of market
participants to influence the market is principally a
function of the method of the initial permit alloca-
tion. While no single method of allocation is rec-
ommended, a distribution rule could be selected
that would be acceptable to the participating dis-
tricts and thus minimize the potential for adverse
market behavior. If these concerns are accounted
fof in its design, a tradable permit market among
water districts in the Grasslands would be feasible,
effective, and less costly than a more traditional
regulatory approach.
In past projects related to drainage treatment
and disposal and in their participation in an infor-
mal water market, the districts in the Grasslands
have shown themselves capable of the level of
cooperation a new market would require.
V. THE REGIONAL DRAINAGE DISTRICT
A Regional Drainage District would be the best
means of implementing a tradable permit system
for the discharge of drainage in the Grasslands
region. Although such a system could be directly
imposed on the existing water supply and drainage
districts by the RVOCB. the creation of a new,
regional drainage agency would offer the twin
advantages of local autonomy and greater adminis-
trative accountability.
Any nonpoint source pollution control pro-
gram-whether based on technology standards,
performance standards, or economic incentives-
must have the institutional capacity to make indi-
vidual sources accountable for the pollution they
generate. The presumption that nonpoint sources
cannot be held individually accountable for specif-
ic pollution control requirements lies behind the
exemption in the federal C1VA for agricultural
drainage and other nonpoint sources from direct
regulation and has contributed to the lack of insti-
tutional mechanisms to bring about this account-
ability. This presumption also is at the heart of the
present regulatory stalemate in the Grasslands,
where individual sources of agricultural pollution
have not been regulated despite clear authority in
California law to do s0.14
The regulatory challenge therefore must be
redefined. Legal authority must be adequate to
allow each of these sources to be regulated directly
when necessary, and the regulatory agency must
have an effective mechanism for doing so. From the
regulator's perspective, the system should be effi-
cient, with as few regulated entities to administer
and monitor as possible. From the perspective of
the regulated agricultural community, the program
should ensure maximum flexibility to take account
of farm-level conditions affecting pollution control.
As a practical matter, accountability also will be
enhanced if the regulatory system contains an
incentive structure that encourages compliance.
and if it is implemented through institutions over
which the farmers have substantial influence-viz.
water and drainage districts. Finally. the regulatory
structure should be consistent with the regional
nature of the pollution problem to be solved,
because subsurface drainage flows are not neces-
sarily confined to the boundaries of a given farm or
water district.
These requirements suggest the need for a reg-
ulatory framework that includes an intermediate
entity (or entities) to provide a link between numer-
ous individual pollution sources and the responsi-
ble regulatory agency. The intermediate entity
should be directly accountable to the regulatory
agency and have clear enforcement authority over
the regulated community. At the same time, this
entity should be controlled by (or otherwise respon-
sive to) the regulated community. In this way, the
need for centralized authority at the state or region-
al level to ensure compliance is balanced with the
efficacy of decentralized, site-specific planning and
management.
In the Grasslands region, a Regional Drainage
District should be created to serve as such an inter-
mediate entity. The Regional Drainage District
would function essentially as a consortium of exist-
ing water agencies and drainage districts. The
Regional District would have the authority to repre-
sent the Grasslands water agencies and farmers
139. See TIEnNBEG. supra note 39. Contractual terms for water
delivenes at the wholesale and retail levels in some districts (eg.
Westlands Water District) include similar permit classifications for
water supplies-
140 Stz discusston irnra Section A of this part
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before the RWQCB and to administer the programs
needed to achieve compliance with the environ-
mental oblectives for the San Joaquin River. With
this arrangement, the Board would not be required
to attempt the Herculean task of enforcing effluent
limits for hundreds of individual sources. Rather,
the Regional Drainage District (in concert with
water agencies and drainage districts) would bridge
the regulatory "gap" between the RWQCB and farm-
ers.
Figure 7 depicts the institutional roles pro-
'posed for the existing regulatory agency (the
I:
i.- Regional Drainage Distict
Grasslands Water and
r m Drainage Distrcts
Figure 7.
Creating Farm-Level Accountability
RWOCB), the Regional Drainage District, the exist-
ing water and drainage districts, and the individual
farmers in the proposed system. The bold lines rep-
resent the primary and expected paths of superviso-
rial and enforcement power. The light lines repre-
sent the fallback means of supervision and enforce-
ment. For example, if an existing water or drainage
district or individual farmer should fail to imple-
ment the required effluent reductions, the Regional
Drainage District (or, if necessary, the RWQCB)
could impose appropriate sanctions on the agency
141, A regulatory program also could be implemented either
without direct regulatory involvement by the Grasslands water and
drainage agencies (e.g., if adequate legal authority were lacking) or
without a regional drainage district (e.g.. if a new district is not
formed). in any case, it is essential that clear legal authority for
implementation and enforcement of pollution control require-
ments exist between the pollution control agency and the regional
and local agencies, as well as each of these and the farmers. See
GREG A. THOMAS & MICHELLE T. LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE
SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY. DESIGNING A FUTURE (1990); A. Randall, Alternative
Institutional Arrangements for Controlling Drainage Pollutionz, in THE
ECONOMICS AND MANAGMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN AGRICULTURE (A.
Dinar etal. eds., 1991).
142. If a Regional Drainage District is not formed, the RWQCB
itself could assign discharge allocations to each of the local dis-
or on the individual farmer. 141
The advantages of this institutional approach
are significant. First, the RWQCB would have a bet-
ter chance of bringing the agricultural sources in the
aggregate into compliance with water quality stan-
dards because it could concentrate its regulatory
efforts on a single entity. The Regional Drainage
District would be responsible for complying with
the load limits set by the RWOCB to achieve the
ambient water quality standards. Second, farmers
would remain accountable to the same district
managers with whom they work on a daily basis, as
well as to one another. In a sense, the Regional
Drainage District would be analogous to municipal,
publicly owned wastewater treatment works, except
that farmers would be both accountable to the
Regional District and in control of it through their
membership in participating water districts. This
arrangement would enhance the incentive for the
farm community to cooperate with the regional pol-
lution-reduction program. Moreover, the Regional
Drainage District would provide a forum in which
the water districts could buy and sell discharge
allowances if a tradable discharge permit system
were adopted.142
A. The Legal Basis for Regulation of Agricultural
Pollution
Since the enactment of the modern CWA in
1972, the principal focus of the nation's water pol-
lution control efforts has been on the regulation of
"point sources" through an elaborate and expensive
set of technology-based effluent limitations. 43 The
"centerpiece" of these effluent controls is the
NPDES system, pursuant to which the EPA or state
water quality boards may issue permits to discharg-
ers of pollutants into the surface waters of the
United States. 144 In California, the SWRCB has been
granted authority to administer the NPDES permit
system through the nine regional water quality con-
trol boards.145
tricts in the Grasslands region. As described earlier, the contribu-
tion of each district that provides drainage service to the farms is
already monitored. Since most of the selenium-laden drainage Is
discharged by seven districts, and there are only fourteen drainage
agencies in the region, it should be administratively feasible for the
RWQCB to hold the districts individually responsible for meeting
the allowed pollution loads. This option would require the RWQCB
to establish separate effluent limitations for each district, to moni-
tor each districts point(s) of discharge, and to enforce the limita-
tions against each district.
143. See 2 WLLIAIM H. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND
WATER 372 (1986).
144. Clean Water Act § 402.
145. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13160 & 13370-13389 (West 1992). The
NPDES permits issued by the regional boards are known as 'waste
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The NPDES program covers all "point sources"
of water pollution, which Congress has defined
broadly as "any discernible, confined, and discrete
conveyancelsl."'4 Thus, the term "point source"
includes discharges through pipes, ditches, and
channels, and "embracels] the broadest possible
definition of any identifiable conveyance from
which pollutants might enter the waters of the
United States."147 The NPDES permit program does
not apply to "nonpoint sources," which (for lack of a
better definition) are all sources of water pollution
other than point sources.14 8
The exemption of nonpoint source pollution
from the NPDES permit system traditionally has
been justified on the theory that it is "diffuse"---i.e.,
it does not enter the surface water system at a dis-
crete and discernible location. This in turn creates
two problems. First, the scattered nature of the pol-
lution renders it impractical to establish effluent
limitations. Second, it is difficult, perhaps impossi-
ble, to trace the pollution back to its numerous
sources. Accordingly, it would be unduly expensive
to attempt to regulate each source through a per-
mit-based, effluent control system. 149
Neither of these explanations for the exemp-
tion of nonpoint sources is applicable to the
Grasslands region. Virtually all of the return flow
from irrgated lands in the region enters the San
loaquin River through an elaborate system of tile
drains, pipes, canals, and sloughs that easily quali-
fy as "discernible, confined, and discrete con-
veyancels]" of the pollution. 150 Although thousands
of individual farms generate this tailwater, there are
but fourteen local agencies that provide drainage
services to these farmers. With almost all irrigation
return flow captured in identifiable conveyance
facilities before discharge, it would not be difficult
to impose effluent limitations on each source at the
"point" at which it discharges into the San Joaquin
River system. Moreover, with only fourteen agencies
with which to deal, it would not be prohibitively
expensive to impose WDRs on each agency that
provides drainage services. The RV1QCB has
exempted irrigation return flows in the Grasslands
region from the NPDES program and instead has
elected to control drainage indirectly through its
water quality planning authority.isi
In its 1989 'Iater Quality Control Plan for the
Central Valley Basin, the Regional Board estab-
lished ambient water quality objectives for a variety
of pollutants, including selenium 152  and
announced an array of actions that it and other
agencies may take to achieve those objectives. 53
Among the proposals included in the Basin Plan
were:
I. A "favored option" of exporting agricultural
drainage out of the basin through comple-
tion of the San Luis Drain or another "val-
leywide drain."154
2. Imposition of BMPs, which the RWQCB
identified as "principally water conserva-
tion measures.. .applicable to the control
of agricultural subsurface drainage."55
3. "Annual submittal and approval of
drainage operation plans.. .from all those
discharging or contributing to the genera-
tion of agricultural subsurface drainage
from 1989 through. 1993 " 56
4. "As a last resort and where the withholding
of irrigation water is the only means of
achieving significant improvements in
water quality," a request to the SWRCB "to
use its water rights authority to preclude
the supplying of water to specific lands."5 7
The RWGCB also stated that it would consider
establishment of 'waste discharge requirements ...
to control agricultural subsurface drainage dis-
charges containing toxic trace elements, if water
quality objectives are not achieved" by certain
dates.'53 Moreover, the Regional Board observed
discharge requirementsf CAL WATER CODE 13374 (West 1992).
146. Clean Water Act § 502(14).
147. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th
Cir. 1979).
148. See RoGE.Rs. supra note 143. at 147. The California Court of
Appeal has stated that "nonpoint sources are defined by obverse
inference from the definition of point sources.' Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. State Water Resources Control Board. 210
Cal. App. 1421. 1425 n.2 (1989).
149. See ROGERS, supra note 143. at 147; Davldsonsupra note
141.
150. Clean Water Act § 502(14).
151. See CAL WATER CODE §§ 13240-13247 (WI/est 1995).
152. CEmRAL VA.LEY REGIONAL VATER OuALT" COX ROL BoARo,
WATER Ouznm Co=cw .c PL.Ai 1l1-2 to i1-9 (1939) (hereinafter "B.s
153 L. at IV-5 to IV-22.
154 LL at IV-8
155. LL at V-18
156 L
157. U at V-15
158 L at IV-18 The dates were lanuary 1939formolbdenumn;
October 1990 for selenium in the water supply channels for the
Grasslands Water District and for state and federal wildlife refugesi
October 1991 for selenium and boron in the San Joaquin River
betveen its confluence with the Merced River to Vemalis; and
October 1993 for selenium and boron in Salt Slough. Mud Slough.
and the remainder of the San Joaquin River. L
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that "lilf fragmentation of the parties that generate,
handle and discharge agricultural subsurface
drainage jeopardizes the achievement of water
quality objectives," it would consider petitioning
the Legislature "for the formation of a regional
drainage district."" 9 Although .the Regional Board
has not yet acted on these pronouncements, they
mark a significant first step toward resolution of the
drainage problem in the Grasslands region. For the
Regional Board has signaled its willingness to move
beyond traditional ambient water quality and non-
point source regulation, and to use the tools of the
NPDES program to create a workable system to con-
trol irrigation runoff.
The SWRCB approved the Basin Plan in 1990,160
and one year later incorporated the Regional
Board's suggestion that WDRs be considered as
regulatory option to address the drainage problem.
In the "Inland Surface Waters Plan," the State Board
established numerical ambient water quality objec-
tives for a variety of pollutants to protect both
human health and freshwater aquatic life. 1 1 Then,
pursuant to its authority under both the CWA and
the Porter-Cologne Act, the State Board directed
the Regional Boards to devise "water quality-based"
effluent standards for those waters for which the
existing WDRs are inadequate to achieve the new
water quality standards 62 The purposes of the lat-
ter are to determine the TMDL of each regulated
pollutant that may be discharged into the water-
course without impairing the ambient standards
and to limit discharge of pollutants by each source
so that aggregate discharges do not cause a viola-
tion of the ambient standards. 63
Of the three categories of watercourses for
which the SWRCB ordered the establishment of
water quality-based effluent standards, two are pre-
sent in the Grasslands region. The first is Category
B watercourses, which the SWRCB defined as
"Inlatural water bodies, or segments thereof,
that.. .are dominated by agricultural drainage." 164
The second, designated Category C watercourses,
includes "[wlater bodies, or segments thereof,
that.. .have been constructed for the primary pur-
pose of conveying or holding agricultural drainage
and were not natural water bodies which supported
aquatic habitat beneficial uses."165 For point source
dischargers into Category B watercourses, the State
Board ordered the Regional Boards to incorporate
the numerical ambient water quality objectives Into
their existing WDRs. Thus, each permit will be
amended to ensure that the aggregate TMDLs for
each watercourse are not exceeded.166 For nonpoint
sources, however, the SWRCB took a different
approach. Instead of creating a permit system for
agricultural drainage and other nonpoint source
discharges, it directed the Regional Boards to
implement the ambient water quality standards
through the use of "performance goals." The State
Board then defined performance goals for nonpoint
sources by reference to its existing plan for non-
point source management that it adopted in accor-
dance with section 319 of the CWA. 167
The "Nonpoint Source Management Plan" is a
three-step process for regulating agricultural
drainage. First, farmers and other sources are given
the opportunity to devise and to adopt BMPs to
reduce the amount of irrigation return flow. Second,
if these "voluntary" practices do not achieve the
TMDLs necessary to comply with the ambient water
quality standards, or if there is insufficient
response, the Regional Boards shall "encourage"
the adoption of BMPs by threatening to impose
WDRs on individual sources. Third, if drainage Is
still not reduced to the levels required to achieve
the ambient water quality standards, the Regional
Boards have authority to issue WDRs that "establish
effluent limitations or discharge prohibitions " 168
The SWRCB also set out a timetable for implemen-
tation of this nonpoint source management pro-
gram.i69
The authority of the State and Regional Boards
159. Id. at IV-16.
160. RESOLUTION 90-28. supra note 44. Pursuant to its authority
under section 303(c) of the CwA, the EPA has disapproved portions
of the Basin Plan-vz, the critical year water quality standards and
the ambient standards for Mud and Salt Sloughs.
161. INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN. supra note 44.
162. Clean Water Act § 303(d); CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(a)
(West 1992).
163. See Clean Water Act § 303(d)(i)(C) & (4).
164. INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN. supra note 44. at 6.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 7.
167. Clean Water Act § 319.
168. INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN, supra note 44. at 22,
169. Id. at 22-23. EPA has disapproved portions of the Inland
Surface Waters Plan. The vetoed portions Include. (1) the State
Board's deferral of immediate protection under the numerical
ambient water quality standards for water bodies In all three cate-
gories established by the Plan; and (2) Its decision to exempt all
watercourses in Category C from the numerical water quality stan-
dards. EPA acknowledged that
Iflor those constructed drains that are not'waters of the
United States' land therefore not governed by the Clean
Water Act], we can appreciate the State Board's desire
to exempt them from Clean Water Act regulations
Nevertheless, the State Board's exemption from catego-
ry (c) water bodies is drafted so broadly and imprecise-
ly that it could be interpreted as applying to certain con-
structed drains that are clearly conveying waters of the
Voltm 2, Nw& 3
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to impose WDRs on dischargers of irrigation return
flows-that is, to treat nonpoint sources as though
they are point sources-was confirmed by the land-
mark decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
State Water Resources Control Board.'70 In that case, the
Court of Appeal upheld the Lake Tahoe Basin Water
Quality Plan, which requires the use of MDRs to reg-
ulate nonpoint source pollution from residential
and commercial development around the lake. The
SWRCB adopted this permit-based pollution con-
trol strategy after concluding that the conventional
methods of addressing nonpoint source pollu-
tion-in this case through ambient water quality
standards promulgated by the Lahontan Regional
Water Quality Control Board and land use regula-
tions issued by the United States Forest Service and
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency-had failed to
prevent erosion of the surrounding land and sedi-
mentation of the lake.i71 As the Court explained,
"surface runoff of water carrying soils into the lake is
the principal source of pollutants which induce the
growth of algae in the lake."i72 In turn, the algae
impairs both the quality and the exceptional clarity
of Lake Tahoe. "If the trend continues, the lake's
translucent blue color will be altered."i3
In sustaining the Plan, the Court of Appeal
denied the claims of developers (who were made
subject to the WDRs) that the State Board exceeded
its statutory authority to regulate nonpoint sources.
The plaintiffs contended that two provisions of the
Porter-Cologne Act required the Board to adhere to
the federal law of nonpoint source pollution con-
trol, which would preclude the imposition of permit
requirements on the developers' land use activities
and the consequent surface water runoff. First, sec-
tion 13373 of the Water Code states that "'point
sources' as used in this chapter shall have the same
meaning as in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary
thereto."7 4 Second, section 13374 defines "waste
discharge requirements" as "the equivalent of the
term 'permits' as used in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended." 75 In turn, the
CWA categorically excludes "return flows from irri-
gated agriculture" from the definition of point
sources 76 and prohibits EPA from requiring an
NPDES permit "for discharges composed entirely
from irrigated agnculture."'" The plaintiffs argued
that, since erosion caused by development is treat-
ed as nonpoint source pollution under federal law,
and because -under the federal act federal permits
are not used for regulation of nonpoint sources of
pollution," California may not require WDRs "by
resort to its own authority."'78
The Court rejected this argument on grounds
that now support the imposition of WDRs on all
nonpoint sources of water pollution, including agri-
cultural dischargers. It held that the Porter-Cologne
Act requires equivalency with federal law "only for
purposes of state compliance with the rinirmu
requirements of the federal mandate. The federal
law does not preclude the state from utilizing its
broader authority to regulate nonpoint sources of
pollution by means of its waste discharge permit
system."!79 Indeed. the Court concluded, federal law
mandates state regulation of nonpoint sources by
means of the state's choosing."IEO Thus, the exemp-
tion of nonpoint sources from the NPDES system as
directed by federal law does not preclude permit-
based regulation of nonpoint sources under
California law. The federal definition of point
sources-including its categorical exclusion of
return flows from irrigated agriculture-is simply
irrelevant to the administration of California's water
quality laws.
In light of the successful defense of WDRs for
nonpoint sources in Tahoz-Sierra Preservation Council,
it is surprising that the SWRCB chose to back away
from permit-based regulation of agricultural dis-
chargers in the Inland Surface Waters Plan and to
continue to rely primarily on the use of "voluntary"
and "encouraged" BMPs to meet ambient water
quality goals for California's other streams, rivers,
and lakes. This "preferred" approach has failed in
the Grasslands region and other parts of the San
Joaquin Valley for several reasons. First, BMPs (vol-
United States. Accordingly. we disapprove the blanket
exemption for category(c) water bodies contained In the
Plans.
Letter from Daniel W. McGovern. Regional Administrator of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to W. Don Maughn.
Chairman of the California State Water Resources Control Board 5-
6 (Nov. 6. 1991).
170. 210 Cal. App. 1421 (1989) (hereinafter 'Sierra
Preservation Council').
171. Id. at 1427-29.
172. Id. at 1427.
173, tl
174 CA.L WAI Ccz. § 13373 (West 1992).
175. CAL VIATim Ccz - § 13374 (West 1992).
176. Clean Water Act § 502(14).
177. Id. § 402(l) (Section 402(l] also states that the
Administrator may not 'directly or indirectly require any State to
require such a permit').
178. Sierra Preservation Council. 210 CaL App. 3d at 1430.
179. U at 1431 (emphasis in onginal).
180. . (emphasis in anginal).
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untary or otherwise) can be expensive and general-
ly do not afford farmers any flexibility to comply in
a least-cost manner or in an alternative way that is
better tailored to individual circumstances. Second,
without certain economic or regulatory induce-
ments, farmers are unlikely to make the invest-
ments in water conservation and drainage reduc-
tion necessary to comply with the BMPs. Third, the
requisite regulatory certainty is lacking in a setting
in which a single administrative agency must deal
with thousands of individual sources. The Regional
Board simply does not have the resources to
enforce the BMPs against all of the farmers who
contribute to the drainage problem in the
Grasslands region and other parts of the San
Joaquin Valley. Nor will it be able to set effluent lim-
itations in the form of WDRs for the thousands of
individual sources of irrigation return flow.
In short, the "preferred" regulatory approach
established by the SWRCB is unlikely to succeed
both because the sources of pollution are not indi-
vidually responsible for their actions and because it
will be difficult (if not impossible) for the RWQCB to
ensure that collectively they do not exceed the
TMDL for selenium that is established for the
region. What is needed in place of the Inland
Surface Waters Plan strategy is a regulatory regime
that addresses the drainage problem on a regional
level, holds the sources of the drainage accountable
for the external costs of their practices, and gives
the sources a modicum of economic and farm man-
agement flexibility to comply with their legal duties
in ways that minimize the costs of moving from an
unregulated environment to a managed drainage
basin.
B. Establishment of a Regional Drainage District
The vexing problem of nonpoint source pollu-
tion in the San Joaquin Valley is attributable in large
measure to institutional distance-specifically, the
regulatory gap between the ambient water quality
standards for selenium and other pollutants in the
San Joaquin River system and the individual
sources of those pollutants at the farm level. In the
Grasslands region, however, it is not necessary to
attempt the Herculean task of translating an ambi-
ent water quality standard (or an aggregate TMDL)
into BMPs or WDRs for thousands of individual
sources. Rather, in the Grasslands region (and,
indeed, throughout the San Joaquin Valley), the
water agencies and drainage districts that serve the
farmers could play a significant role in bridging the
regulatory that gap. As described in Part III,
although it is prohibitively expensive today to mea-
sure the irrigation tailwater generated by each indi-
vidual farm in the Grasslands region, the contribu-
tion of each agency that provides drainage service
to the farms can be calculated. And, because there
are only fourteen drainage agencies in the region, it
would not be administratively impracticable for the
Regional Board to hold the agencies individually
responsible for meeting the collective TMDL for dis-
charges from the Grasslands region into the San
Joaquin River.
Once the decision was made to regulate at the
agency level, the RWOCB would have two options. It
could simply assign TMDLs to each of the individual
agencies. This option would require the Regional
Board to establish separate effluent limitations for
each agency or for each location at which the agen-
cy's drainage enters a conduit in which it could be
accurately measured. The Board then would be
responsible for monitoring and enforcing these lim-
itations against each agency. Alternatively, the
RWQCB could focus its standard-setting, monitor-
ing, and enforcement efforts on the resource it is
charged with protecting. Under this approach, the
Board would set a single TMDL for selenium enter-
ing the San Joaquin River system from the com-
bined points of discharge within the Grasslands
region. The Board would then defer to the local
agencies' determination of how to apportion the
limitation on drainage required by the TMDL among
themselves and their members. The Regional Board
would be responsible for monitoring and enforcing
the aggregate TMDL for the Grasslands region, but
would (initially, at least) look to the local agencies
to enforce the individual drainage limitations
among themselves and their members.
Either option would offer an improvement over
the current situation in which the water quality
standards for the San Joaquin River are effectively
unenforceable because of the vast number of
sources of subsurface drainage. The RWQCB would
have a better chance of implementing the standards
simply because it would have a manageable num-
ber of entities to regulate. From the perspective of
the Board, the second option offers the advantage
of enabling it to focus on a single entity-the col-
lective of Grasslands area water suppy and
drainage agencies-that would be responsible for
complying with the TMDLs set by the Board to
achieve the ambient water quality standards.
Under both options, the farmers and other
water users within the region who are required to
reduce their generation of pollution to meet the
TMDLs would be accountable to the same water
managers with whom they work on a daily basis, as
well as to one another, through the local agencies
regulated by the Regional Board. From the water
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users' vantage point, the second option affords an
additional, significant benefit: By designating a sin-
gle entity to be responsible to the RWQCB for the
Grasslands region's aggregate discharge of drainage
water into the San Joaquin River system, there
would exist a forum in which the producers of the
drainage could buy and sell discharge allowances as
a means of meeting their individual regulatory
obligations in a flexible, least-cost manner.
The best means of creating a single regional
entity that would be responsible to the RWQCB for
-the aggregate discharge of pollution from the
Grasslands region would be through the formation
of a Regional Drainage District. Indeed, both the
Basin Plan and the Inland Surface Waters Plan iden-
tify the formation of a Regional Drainage District as
one means of coming to gnps with the problem of
nonpoint source pollution in the San Joaquin
Valley.' 8' Moreover, the creation of a Regional
Drainage D.istrict is a condition for the proposed
plan by the Grasslands water districts to collect and
convey drainage from the region in the San Luis
Drain for discharge into the San Joaquin River
downstream of the Merced, 182 and it is stipulated as
a criterion for implementation of federal water con-
servation requirements. 83
I. The Role.and Authority of a Regional Drainage
District
In the regulatory framework proposed here, the
Regional Drainage District would provide the insti-
tutional capacity to address the drainage problem
on a regional level. This entity would hold the
sources of the drainage discharges (districts and
the farmers within each district) accountable for the
environmental costs of their practices, while at the
same time giving them flexibility to decide how to
comply with load reduction requirements in ways
that minimize the costs of moving from an unregu-
lated environment to a regulated one.
To this end, the Regional Drainage District
would have three essential duties. First, it would be
responsible to the RWOCB for compliance with the
ambient water quality standards and pollution load
limits for the San Joaquin River. The RWQCB would
assign to the Regional Drainage District a single
WDR for the drainage discharged from all of the dis-
tricts (and therefore farms) in the Grasslands region
that currently discharge into the river.i& 4 This
drainage permit would be similar to WDRs for point
sources and would specify permissible pollutant
loads for different water-year types and different
seasonal flow conditions.' 8s The RWQCB would
retain its existing authority to monitor all effluent
discharges from the Grasslands region and to
enforce the terms of the WDR against the Regional
Drainage District through cease and desist orders.
fines, civil penalties, injunctive relief, and other
remedies.i 5 The RWQCB also would retain the.
option of issuing permits to individual districts and
farmers.
Second. the Regional Drainage District would
have authority to allocate the regional allowable
pollution load among its member districts and to
ensure that each district complies with its assigned
load allocation. The Regional Drainage District
would have primary responsibility for monitoring
and enforcement vis-a-vis the member agencies. 87
As a default, the RWGCB would retain its existing
power to take action against the districts (or, if nec-
essary, against individual farmers) to enforce the
water discharge requirements for the Grasslands
region.
Third. the Regional Drainage District would be
charged with administering the system of tradable
discharge permits or another district-level regulato-
ry program approved by the RWOCB. If a program of
tradable permits were chosen, the Regional
Drainage District would supervise and facilitate
trades to ensure that, following the transactions,
the parties did not exceed their respective discharge
entitlements. The Regional District also could serve
as a clearinghouse for relevant information about
the market, such as the names of sellers and poten-
tial purchasers, prices, quantities of the offers and
the requests, and predicted variations in the aggre-
gate WDR applicable to the Grasslands region as a
whole.183
181. BASIN PLAN. supra note 152, at IV-16; INLAND SURFACE
WATERS PLAN. supra note 44. at 22.
182. U.S. BUREAU OF REC-.'.ATiON. MID-PACU:C REGION. FNDuw. OF
No SIGNIFICANT IMPACr AND PROPOSED USE AGRE.muENT Aaouzx USE CF
THE SAN Luis DRAIN FOR CONVEYANCE OF AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE WATER
TRHOUGH THE GRASSLANDS WATER DisLCr AND ADLncENT GRASSLAND
CHANNELS (1991).
183. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLA.iAIiON. MID-PACIFIC REGION.
GUIDEBOOK FOR PREPARING WATER CONSERVAlION PLANS (1993).
184. Unincorporated imgated lands that are not within the
boundaries of a water district would be included within the juris-
dictional boundaries of the Regional Drainage District
185, Set discussion supra Part III
186. S CAL..WA T Con: §§ 13303-13351 (West 1992 & 1995
Supp,),
187. The owners or operators of farms on unincorporated
lands that are not within the boundaries of a water district would
be assigned Individual load allocations or permits.
188, If a different regulatory approach were chosen, the
Regional Drainage District would perform a comparable admins-
trative role. For instance, It would set. collect, and adjust effluent
and Input fees, monitor implementation of BMPS; or monitor com-
pliance with traditional discharge permits. Similarly, if the chosen
regulatory approach were to invoive farm-level regulation based on
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To accomplish these duties, a Regional
Drainage District would need the following powers:
* jurisdiction over all of the land and over
the local agencies that supply water and
provide drainage services to the
Grasslands area;
* authority to represent the agencies and the
farmers and other users in the Grasslands
region to the RWQCB, the State Board, the
EPA, and other relevant state and federal
regulatory agencies, as well as in court;
* power to assign drainage discharge alloca-
tions to each member agency;
" authority to monitor and to evaluate irriga-
tion practices and drainage management
and discharges in all conveyance facilities
in the Grasslands region and to monitor
discharges from each member agency;
" authority to construct and operate regional
drainage collection, storage, treatment, or
disposal facilities based on fees collected
from member agencies;
* enforcement power (including power to
levy fees or assessments) over member
agencies and individual farmers to ensure
compliance with effluent limits set forth in
their drainage discharge allocations;
* responsibility for administering require-
ments of a given regulatory program at the
district or farm levels;
* ability to provide technical and financial
assistance to member agencies and to
individual farmers to assist them in meet-
ing the drainage reduction requirements
set forth in their drainage discharge alloca-
tions; and
* contracting authority with other entities
including neighboring water districts,
2. Implementation Options
There are two ways to establish a new regional
entity with these powers. Either the array of existing
local agencies could establish the Regional Drainage
District through a joint powers agreement, or a new
entity could be established by legislation. Fourteen
local agencies currently provide drainage services
within the Grasslands region, and twelve agencies
supply water to Grasslands area farmers and other
water users. Six of these agencies engage in both
water supply and drainage. These entities are listed
Table 11
Water and Drainage Districts
Water District Drainage Districts
Broadview Water District Broadview Water District
Camp 13 Study Area
Charleston Drainage District
Firebaugh Canal Water District Dos Palos Dranaige District
Gustine Drainage District
Newman Drainage District
Poso Canal Company
Firebaugh Canal Water District
Panoche Water District
Eagle Field Water Station Panoche Drainage District
Mercy Springs Water District
Oro Loma Water District
- Grassland Water District Grassland Water District
Pacheco Water District Pacheco Drainage District
San Luis Canal Company San Luis Canal Company
San Luis Water District San Luis Water District
Charleston Drainage District
Widren Water District Widren Water District
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in Table 11189 and are shown in Figure 1.
As Table 11 indicates, an organizational analy-
sis of the Grasslands region is a complex task. Not
only do several water districts provide both water
and drainage services to their members, but a num-
ber of agencies also have overlapping jurisdictions.
For example, the Central California Irrigation
District (hereinafter "CCID") is divided into several
subareas within the Grasslands region, and the
lands to which it delivers water are drained by six
different drainage districts. The Charleston
Drainage District serves both CCID and the San Luis
Water District. And the Panoche Drainage District
includes four water districts. Moreover, the pres-
ence of four different types of water agencies-
California water districts, irrigation districts,
drainage districts, and mutual water companies-
means that water supply to and drainage from the
Grasslands area is governed by the four separate
statutes that authorize the creation and operation
of these separate agencies.
This complex array of local water agencies has
little relation to hydrology or efficient resource
management. Rather, the existence of twenty agen-
cies to serve the Grasslands region can be explained
only by history. 90 Much of the organizational com-
plexity of the Grasslands region may be put aside,
however, in favor of one essential point: All of the
agencies have the existing authority to take the
actions needed to manage drainage and water sup-
plies on a regional, collective basis to ensure that
aggregate discharges to the San Joaquin River do
not violate either the ambient water quality stan-
dards or the load allocations established by the
RWQCB. Consequently, the Grasslands agencies
may enter into a.joint powers agreement to form a
Regional Drainage District.'9
a. Joint Powers Agreement
The twenty agencies that comprise the
Grasslands region individually have the authorities
necessary for an effective regional drainage institu-
tion. Each is authorized to enter into contracts with
other agencies to carry out its functions, including
the provision of drainage services to its members. t92
While the concept of assigning load allocations and
administering regulatory programs for drainage
reduction may be new, each agency has the power
to perform all acts necessary to fulfill its other
statutory duties. 93 This broad functional authority
should enable the agencies to devise innovative
means of providing drainage services in a manner
that complies with applicable state and federal
water quality laws. Inasmuch as economic incen-
tives generally, and tradable discharge permits
specifically, are reasonable means of fulfilling this
objective, all of the Grasslands agencies that pro-
vide drainage services to their members have the
authority to implement such programs.
The agencies currently measure and monitor
the drainage generated by farmers within their ser-
vice areas and report those data to the R\VQCB.194
They also have the power to promulgate rules and
regulations governing water distribution and use
(including subsurface drainage and surface return
flows). 19 Pursuant to this authority, some of the
a farm-level allocation of the allowable regional pollution load. sUe
supra Part IlI, the Regional Drainage District would work with mem-
ber agencies to establish load limits, oversee compliance with reg-
ulatory requirements, and monitor discharges. Direct farm-level
monitoring of drainage discharges could be achieved through
installation of additional drains. flow-meters. etc. Alternatively, a
calculation based on water inputs could be used as a surrogate for
individual farm discharge levels.
189. Omitted from this list is the Westlands Water District. a
portion of which is located in the Grasslands region.
190. The drainage districts were formed originally to drain wet-
lands in the area to enable the land to be farmed. Later. these same
districts began to provide drainage services to their members, cany-
ing excess irrigation water off the farmlands and into the drainage
systems. The irgation and water districts were created to distribute
water that previously had been controlled by the Miller and Lux
Corporation and to bring additional water supplies Into the
Grasslands area. Later. a number of these agencies contracted with
the CVP to purchase water from the Delta-Mendota Canal and San
Luis Reservoir. and some began to provide drainage alongwith water
service. See N.D. Coomz, AGRIcuLTuRAL DRAiNwATER MANA Es.tEm
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DRAINAGE PROBLEM AREA OF THE SA lOAUIN V.'tr
(1989) (giving a detailed description and history of the local water
supply and drainage agencies in the Grasslands area).
191. Public agencies are permitted to "Jointly exercise any
power common to the contracting parties' (CAL. Govr. CODE § 6502
(West Supp. 1995)). The joint powers agreement may create a new
entity. 'which Is separate from the parties to the agreement and
iwhichi Is responsible for the administration of the agreement'
CAL Govr. CODE § 6503.5 (,est 193)} The joint powers agency may
exercise the authonty conferred upon it by the parties over the geo-
graphical area that represents their common interests. CAL GoCr.
CODE § 6502 (West Supp. 1995), Thus, although each participating
agency may not expand the types of po;ers be-ond those that it
shares with the other contracting agencies, It may expand the geo-
graphic scope of those pz'wers beiond Its indhidual service area to
Include the area in which the common interests of the parties are
affected. In this case., the joint po.ers agreement would apply to
the entire Grasslands regton.
192- r. C VALsm Cozz §§ 35850 & 35850.5 (West 1934)
(California Water Districts); CAL VATr Coos § 22230 (West 1934)
(Irrigation Districts); CA.L VT Cco-App. § 8-14 (VestSupp. 1995)
(Drainage Districts); CAL. Pua Urn. Coos § 2725 (West 1975) (Mutual
Water Companies).
193, 0±. CA Vn Coo:- § 354C0 Vest 1934) (Califormia Water
Districts); CAL WATER, Co-" § 22225 (West 1934) (Irrgation Districts);
CAL WATER Co= A;. § 8-14 (West Supp, 1995) (Drainage Districts);
CAL PuB. OnL Cozs § 2725 (West 1975) (Mutual Water Companies).
194. See GRp_ sJs;o 1939 REo-r. supra note 120, GRASSI.AD
190 REsRor. supra note 120.
195. CAL. V/An Coz § 35423 (West 1934) (California Water
Districts); CAL VITR COoE § 22035 (West 1934) (lmgation
Districts); CAL VAms Ca z , § 8-14 lWest Supp 19951 (Drainage
Districts).
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agencies in the Grasslands region have adopted
tiered water pricing as an incentive to increase
water conservation by their members. Others have
adopted drainage fees as well. 196
The enforcement authority of the agencies is
limited, however. The authorizing legislation for
existing districts does not explicitly grant them
authority to enforce compliance with water quality
standards and implementation measures.
California water districts and irrigation districts may
levy nominal fines for violations of agency by-
laws, 97 and they have some authority to withhold
water or drainage services for failure to pay service
charges or for inadequate maintenance of irrigation
and conveyance facilities. 198 The enforcement pow-
ers of the drainage districts are less certain, howev-
er. Although these agencies do not have express
statutory authority to penalize members for viola-
tions of bylaws or regulations, they do have the
ability to include in those rules limited sanctions
for abuse.'9 For mutual water companies, the
statutes are silent on the subject of enforcement
powers.200
While existing agencies lack a full range of
enforcement powers, collectively they have a variety
of authorities that would be sufficient for effectively
implementing regional water quality standards and
,individual pollution discharge allocations. As
described above, water and irrigation districts may
condition water and drainage service upon payment
of charges or other requirements. They also might
condition such services on the farmers' implemen-
tation of drainage reduction measures necessary for
achieving compliance with district-level load limits.
The requisite authority to enforce water pollution
control measures therefore could be articulated in
district-level rules and regulations and incorporat-
ed into the authority of the joint powers agreement.
The efficacy of this approach ultimately
depends on the districts' interpretation of their
authority and on the cooperation of districts and
farmers. Water agencies are effectively "pass
through" agencies, created to serve member farmers
who elect the governing board. As public agencies,
all of their costs are passed along to member farm-
ers. Thus, in practice, the final measure of an agen-
cy's authority depends in large part on its board's
interpretation of its mandate as articulated through
district policy and regulations. To the extent that
the elected board does not perceive its authority to
include powers of enforcement, it is unlikely that
those powers would be exercised, even where they
legitimately could be. By the same token, the mem-
ber farmers and the other districts included in the
joint powers agreement must concur and cooperate
with such an interpretation of district authority.
Disagreement about the limits of district authority
to enforce regulatory requirements against individ-
ual farmers would undermine the effectiveness and
the potential authority of the joint powers agree-
ment.
b. Legislation
Because joint powers authorities can exercise
only those powers that are common to all parties to
the agreement, and because a joint powers agree-
ment cannot be used to expand the members' indi-
vidual powers, it might be desirable to create the
new Regional Drainage District by legislation. Such
legislation not only could vest in the Regional
District enforcement authority that some of the par-
ticipating agencies currently lack, it also could con-
fer on the Regional District the full panoply of
enforcement powers required to accomplish the
task of providing integrated drainage management
to the Grasslands region.
Moreover, a legislative mandate for a Regional
Drainage District would be consistent with the
statutory basis for existing districts. The language of
the implementing legislation can be written as a
blueprint for the authorization of other reCional
entities with similar regulatory and administrative
responsibilities. A model statute for creation of a
Regional Drainage District is provided in the
Appendix to this Article.
C. Operation of the Regional Drainage District
As set forth either in a joint powers agreement
or in legislation, the Regional Drainage District
would include all water supply and drainage agen-
cies in the Grasslands region that contribute to the
aggregate pollution load in the San Joaquin River.
Farmers would be members of the Regional
Drainage District by virtue of their membership in
their respective water agencies.
The Grasslands Regional Drainage District
would be administered by a board of directors,
which would exercise the powers described above.
196. See, e.g., SAN Luis CANAL COMPANY, DRAINAGE OPERATION PLAN
OF 1991 (1990); CENTRAL CALIFORNIA IRRIGATION DISTRIcr, DRAINAGE
OPERATION PLAN OF 1992 (1991); BROADVIEW WATER DISTRICT, supra note
85.
197. CAL. WATER CODE § 35304 (West 1984) (California Water
Districts); CAL. WATER CODE § 22089 (West 1984) (Irrigation
Districts).
198. CAL. WATER CODE § 35423 (West 1984) (California Water
Districts); CAL. WATER CODE § 22083 5 & 22282Ai (West 1984)
(irrigation Districts).
199. See CAL. WATER CODE APP, § 8-14 (West Supp 1995)
200. See CAL. PUB, UTIL CODE §§ 2725-2729 (West 1975 & Supp
1995).
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Directors would be elected by the member agen-
cies. An important issue is how to structure the vot-
ing rights of the various agencies. One option would
be simply to assign one vote to each agency. In view
of the differences in the size of the Grasslands agen-
cies, however, a system of "one agency, one vote"
might not fairly represent the interests of the water
users within the region. Thus, an alternative would
be to weight each agency's voting power to reflect
its relative size.20' As with the allocation of the total
allowable pollution load for the region, this alloca-
tion of voting power by size could be based on the
amount of drainage generated by each agency as a
percentage of the aggregate drainage produced in
the Grasslands region, or on the amount of irrigat-
ed or drained land within each agency as a percent-
age of the total irrigated or drained land in the
region. To ensure a diversity of views on the board,
it would be appropriate to stipulate that no more
than one director may come from a single agency.
The board of directors should be of a manage-
able size. Five directors would meet this criterion
and would provide one director for every four of the
participating agencies. Directors should be elected
on staggered terms and should serve for no longer
than four years. Once elected, the board would
appoint a chairman or chairwoman, an executive
officer, a financial officer, a chief counsel, and other
necessary officers and employees. The executive
officer would be principally responsible for the day-
to-day administration of the Regional District, for
ensuring that the district complies with its drainage
discharge requirements, for monitoring and enforc-
ing the individual discharge allocations held by the
member agencies, and for overseeing and facilitat-
ing regulatory measures taken by member agencies
and, as necessary, by individual farmers. These, and
other organizational issues, would be spelled out in
the governing by-laws for the district.20 2
In carrying out its duties, the Regional Drainage
District would have different responsibilities in rela-
tion to member water and drainage districts and to
entities outside of the Regional District. Under a
tradable permit program, for example, where all
permit holders are members of the Regional
Drainage District, the Regional District would serve
as the primary regulatory link betveen the regulat-
ed community (i.e.. districts and farmers receiving
an initial allocation) and the RWOCB. If permit
trades involve other entities that are not members
of the Regional Drainage District, the enforcement
authority of the Regional District tis-a-ts non-mem-
ber agencies would be limited. This problem could
be addressed by having the RWQCB issue a sepa-
rate discharge permit to any non-member agency
whose drainage flows into the Grasslands area. In
that case, the Regional Drainage District and its
individual members would have the opportunity to
participate in the hearings conducted by the
RWQCB on these discharge permits. If a non-mem-
ber agency exceeded the discharge allowance set
forth in its permit, the Regional Drainage District
would be able to petition the RWQCB to take
enforcement action against the non-member
agency.203
The success of any program to regulate agricul-
tural drainage requires unambiguous lines of
authority between the responsible regulatory
agency and the individual dischargers. Existing or
new institutions can be employed to this end. In the
Grasslands, however, the need for accountability
would best be satisfied at the regional level through
a regional entity such as a Regional Drainage
District. Such an intermediate entity would serve
the critical function of closing the regulatory "gap"
between regulators and a large number of small,
variable pollution sources that comprise the non-
point source pollution problem. The Regional
201. The constitutionality of deviating from the general prin-
aple of "one person, one vote" and of weighting voting power over
the administration of local water agencies is now well-established.
in Ball v. lames, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld an
Arizona state statute that (1) limits the right to vote In the election
of the board of directors of a water reclamation district to the own-
ers of the land within the district, and (2) apportions voting power
according to the amount of land held by each voter. Earlier, In
Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 4 10 U.S.
719 (1973), the Court ruled that a California law that limits the fran-
chise to landowners and which apportions voting power according
to the assessed valuation of the property does not violate the equal
protection rights of district residents who do not own land. Under
the California Constitution. however, a restriction that makes only
land owners eligible to serve as members of the board of directors
would be unconstitutional. Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal. 3d 660 (1976).
202. An example of how such organizational Issties might be
articulated is provided by The San Luis-Delta Mendota Water
Authority. a Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement among the water
agencies which receive water supplies from and are otherwise
served by the facilities of the federal CVP. The Agreement spells out
the purposes, powers. organization, financing, accounting. proper-
ty rights, liability, and terms of termination for the Agreement. S.o,
Lu-s A.;D DLA MEm;oTA WAT i Amzini. Ammw :;D o R-ATsm
I a:-r Exrac7 o Powarus zAcp.rmomr (1i592)
203 Su' CAL. WATE Ccz- §11330-3351 (West 1992 & Supp.
15). If no Regional Drainage District is formed, a sistem of trad-
able permits (or other regulatory program) could be implemented
by the RWCCB The R\VO CB could issue individual permits to dis-
tricts and to individual farmers or Groups of farmers in unincorpo-
rated areas, as necessary. The distrcts would retain primary
responsibility for implementing programs to effect farm-lerel
drainage reduction sufficient to comply with permit limits.
Although the enforcement authority of some districts is limited, all
of the existing water supply and drainage districts in the Grasslands
region have authority to control aggregate drainage discharges
through price incentives such as tiered water rates and drainage
service.
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Drainage District also would enable an integrated,
basin-wide approach to pollution control, consis-
tent with the environmental and operational
boundaries of the pollution problem.
Vl. A PROPOSED REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR
THE GRASSLANDS
The proposed regulatory program for the
Grasslands region is a two-tiered system that com-
bines tradable discharge permits at the district level
with tiered water pricing within districts.
Combination of the two incentive-based approach-
es establishes accountability for pollution control
at the farm level, where most drainage reduction
must occur, and optimally satisfies the criteria for
an effective pollution control program. As a result,
the system responds to the principal concerns of
the major affected interests while meeting the envi-
ronmental objective.
A. The Role of the Regulatory Agency
Under the proposed system, the RWOCB would
initiate the program by specifying the TMDL for
selenium in the San Joaquin River. The screening-
level TMDL presented in Part Ill can be used for this
purpose. The allowable monthly loads for different
types of water years and for different irrigation sea-
sons presented in Part II underscore the undisput-
ed need for significant reductions in pollution loads
compared to historical discharge levels. While the
allowable loads might be refined in the future
(using improved predictions of river flow changes
and water diversions), any substantial increases in
calculated allowable loads will depend on informa-
tion that is not available in the short term. In any
case, the TMDL calculations provide a reliable basis
for establishing pollution reduction goals. To
implement the proposed program, however, the
RWOCB might adopt interim drainage reduction
goals based on a more lenient excursion rate as part
of a compliance schedule. The TMDL model used
for the San Joaquin River is designed to allow cal-
culations for such alternative scenarios.
With the pollution load objectives determined,
the RWQCB would issue one waste discharge
requirement for the agricultural community's share
of the allowable load. This area permit would be
assigned to a Regional Drainage District. In the
absence of a Regional Drainage District, the RWOCB
would assign individual permits to each of the water
districts in the region under the same authority.
The RWOCB would retain the authority to
establish water quality goals. At the same time, its
administrative and enforcement requirements
would be streamlined by reducing the number of
permitted dischargers to one. Limitation of the
number of individual sources that must be directly
monitored and enforced also would minimize the
potential for litigation or implementation delays
and increase the likelihood that environmental
goals will be achieved.
B. The Role of the Regional Drainage District
The Regional Drainage District would assume
responsibility for meeting the discharge limits spec-
ified by the waste discharge requirement and for
implementing the measures and programs necessary
to do so. One task would be to administer the trad-
able discharge permit program. In this capacity, the
Regional Drainage District would determine the ini-
tial allocation of the total allowable pollution load
among the contributing water and drainage districts.
Leaving this allocation to a locally controlled entity
would ensure that equity concerns among neighbor-
ing districts are addressed. Options for allocating the
total allowable pollution load among the districts
include an allocation based on historical discharge
levels, irngated acreage, drained acreage, or some
weighted average of these factors. The equity impli-
cations of alternative allocation methods for the
individual districts are significant, as demonstrated
in Tables 4 through 7
The trading program would provide an addi-
tional opportunity to adjust load allocations.
Through permit trades, districts could achieve a
cost-effective distribution of pollution control
responsibility, which may change from year to year,
and resolve remaining equity disparities. The
Regional Drainage District would assist member
districts by identifying potential trades, recording
transactions, and enforcing permit limits.
The district-level allocation, formalized by per-
mits assigned to individual districts, would stipu-
late allowable discharge levels for different months
and water-year types, consistent with the TMDL and
the waste discharge requirement issued to the
Regional Drainage District. To meet the needs of
the agricultural community for predictability in
planning irrigation improvements and negotiating
permit transactions, the allocations could be imple-
mented using an "episode" permit system which
assigns priorities to discharge permits. Priority I
permits would correspond to the critical-year allo-
cation and represent discharges that could occur on
an uninterrupted basis during the appropriate
month, regardless of year-type changes. Priority 2
and 3 permits would correspond to additional dis-
charges that could occur only during more favorable
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hydrologic conditions--i.e., dry/below-normal years
and above-normal/wet years, respectively.
The rules for trading would conform to the tem-
poral limits on discharges. Given the monthly and
yearly variations in the dilution capacity in the San
Joaquin River, trades across months and years
would be prohibited. For example, an April alloca-
tion could not be traded and used for a July dis-
charge; nor could an allocation for July of one year
be saved or traded to allow additional discharges in
July of a later year.204 If the total allowable load for
different year types and seasons is known well in
advance, this restriction on banking or storing per-
mits should not inhibit market activity.
Allocations could be traded either for a limited
period, after which the allocation would revert to
the original holder (a permit lease) or could be trad-
ed in perpetuity (a fee simple purchase). The pro-
portion of leasing transactions relative to fee pur-
chases would likely be higher in the Grasslands
region than in areas where the allocations remain
constant over time.
C. The Role of Water Districts and Farmers
Under the system of tradable permits, each dis-
trict would secure the appropriate number of per-
mits of each priority designation necessary to
accommodate its discharges. The highest priority
permits (Priority 1) would have a greater market
value since they would provide for reliable, baseline
discharges. The quantity of lower priority permits
would be determined by the district's ability to
make short-term adjustments to changes in the
total allowable load through improved manage-
ment of existing irrigation systems by farmers or
through short-term land fallowing.
To comply with the final discharge allocations,
water districts in the Grasslands would adopt pro-
grams to encourage or to require farmers to
improve irrigation efficiency and thereby to reduce
drainage generation. Water districts in the region
currently have the authority to implement such pro-
grams as a function of their powers to manage water
supply as well as drainage. To minimize the costs
and the administrative burden to the districts (and,
by extension, to their member farmers), districts
could employ an incentive-based program for
improving farm-level irrigation efficiency-and one
that is consistent with the district's existing moni-
tonng and administrative activities.
Based on these considerations, water districts
might elect to adopt a system of tiered water prices
(block rates in which unit prices for water increase
with the volume of water purchased) to encourage
more efficient use of irrigation water supplies and
decreased drainage generation by farmers. Tiered
water pricing would be consistent with existing dis-
trict practices. Moreover, the water management
provisions of the Central Valley Project Improve-
ment Act require tiered water pricing as a condition
of water contract renewals for districts receiving
federal water supplies, including those in the
Grasslands region.2a
Theoretically, water rates could be calculated to
reflect estimated avoided drainage costs. In prac-
tice, because of the limited number of drainage
management options other than on-farm irrigation
efficiency improvements, this would equate to a fee
that encourages water use consistent with the aver-
age per acre drainage output necessary for the dis-
trict to meet its pollution load allocation.c 6
Because water districts are legally prohibited from
making a profit on the water they sell to farmers,
excess revenues might be rebated to farmers on a
per acre basis.207
Alternatively, districts could adopt effluent fees
or tradable discharge permit programs for farm-
level source reduction. Because of the current limit-
ed extent of subsurface drainage monitoring at the
farm level, however, water inputs probably would be
used as surrogates for discharges under these pro-
grams.
Tiered'water prices encourage drainage reduc-
tion, but do not assure achievement of a specific
district pollution load limit. As a consequence,
water districts probably would use recirculation sys-
tems to assure that discharges comply with actual
permit limits. Over the past several years, manydis-
tricts have constructed systems to capture, blend,
and recirculate surface (and in some cases, subsur-
face) drainage to augment irrigation water supplies.
This capability would be particularly useful on a
short-term basis and in critical or dry year condi-
tions, when it would allow farmers to produce more
than the target level of subsurface drainage yet still
comply with overall pollution load limits.
Finally, to enhance source control measures,
districts and farmers might employ other drainage
management techniques for reducing pollution lev-
els. The options for improving drainage manage-
204. Many advocates of tradable permit systems argue that
the ability to 'bank' permits for future use Is a necessary condition
for an efficient permit market SeA e.g.. HAHN & Nou. YEAR 200D.
supra note 39. In the case of the San Joaquin River and other West-
em rivers, the preservation of water quality cannot be ensured
where discharge permits can be "banked* for future use.
205 CVPIA § 3405(d).
206. The importance of farm-ie-,el drainage targets is dis-
cussed In Part IlL.
207. S eTo As & Lz:H5to.Scr,.A=. supra notee 141.
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ment in the Grasslands region, as in other areas
where irrigation drainage poses water quality prob-
lems, include selective land retirement, treatment
and reuse, and water transfers.208 All of these
options could be implemented within the frame-
work recommended by this study.
D. Putting Economic Incentives to Work
The incentive-based system proposed for the
Grasslands optimally satisfies the concerns of both
regulators and the regulated farm community, while
still achieving environmental goals. Specifically,-the
program is designed to:
* meet the pre-determined allowable pollu-
tion load or cap;
* minimize the costs of pollution control to
the regulated community;
* accommodate the preference of farmers for
flexibility and independence through a
decentralized program;
* address equity concerns of farmers and
districts by allowing a locally-controlled
entity to perform the initial allocation of
the allowable pollution load, by allowing
subsequent adjustments to the alloca-
tions, and by promoting cost-sharing;
* enable verification of compliance with little
change in existing monitoring systems,
and
* impose few new enforcement or general
administrative tasks on existing agencies
and further minimize these by creating a
Regional Drainage District.
The proposed program responds to the two pri-
mary constraints imposed by the TMDL, or pollu-
tion load limit. First, the significance of potential
pollution control costs, combined with the proper-
ties of the pollutant in question, argue for a pro-
gram that neither exceeds nor falls short of the pol-
lution goals by any significant margin. In other
words, conditions defined by the pollution load lim-
its clarify the need for a program design which
incorporates a predetermined pollution cap while
maximizing cost-effectiveness. Both are features of
a tradable permit program. Second, the program
208. DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, supra note 32: SWRCB
REPORT. supra note 31; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. supra note 94;
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE OF CONSULTANTS ON DRAINAGE
WATER REDUCTION, OPPORTUNmES FOR DRAINAGE WATER REDUCTION
(1988); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE OF CONSULTANTS ON
must be amenable to changes in the allowable pol-
lution loads and other modifications that arise over
the long term (as TMDL calculations are revised),
without requiring a fundamental restructuring of
the program design. Again, the tradable permit sys-
tem, combined with farm-level price incentives,
meets this need.
The two-tiered incentive system also accommo-
dates the technical difficulty of determining accu-
rate farm-level pollution load allocations. A system
that makes districts responsible for achieving spe-
cific load limits, combined with farm-level financial
incentives that do not require calculation of precise
individual load allocations, is preferable. The regu-
latory approach also tends to ameliorate inequities
attributed to ground water migration and other
physical factors by using input fees and by provid-
ing a mechanism to adjust discharge allocations.
Most importantly, the proposed program
establishes accountability for pollution control at
the farm level, where the vast malority of pollution
reductions must take place, yet does not "tell farm-
ers how to farm." The two-tiered program relies on
strict district-level accountability in exchange for
greater flexibility at the farm level. Tiered water
prices make farmers responsible for the pollution
they generate, but do not deprive them of the
opportunity to determine the most cost-effective
methods of pollution control. This arrangement
also is consistent with the established roles and
responsibilities of water districts and their farmers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The incentive-based, tradable discharge permit
system developed in this Article provides an oppor-
tunity to address the agricultural drainage problem
that has plagued the Grasslands region and other
areas that suffer from essentially unregulated non-
point source pollution. In the first step, the pollu-
tion reduction goal and an initial allocation of pol-
lution control responsibilities are defined. The sec-
ond step uses this information to analyze various
types of programs according to criteria representing
the concerns of the principal stakeholders, the reg-
ulated community, the administrative agencies, and
the environment. Determination of the advantages
and disadvantages of each type of program from
these perspectives not only helps to clarify the most
acceptable approach; it also provides insights
DRAINAGE WATER REDUCTION, ASSOCIATED COSTS OF DRAINAGE WATER
REDUCTION (1988); UNIvERSrrY OF CALFORNIA COMMfTEE OF CONSULTANTS
ON DRAINAGE WATER REDUCTION, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AGRICULTURE AND
RIVER WATER QUAIy ( 1988).
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about the hybrid systems that might be constructed
to take maximum advantage of different program
characteristics. The final step defines any institu-
tional adjustments required to implement the pre-
ferred program.
The results of this study also suggest that much
of the conventional wisdom that has pretermitted
consideration of economic incentives for addressing
nonpoint source pollution problems can be chal-
lenged. Establishment of accountability-by making
dischargers individually responsible for the pollu-
tion they generate-is central to the success of any
pollution control program. The first step is to rede-
fine agricultural drainage more accurately as "a large
collection of independent, monitorable and control-
lable" discharges. This characterization, in turn, pro-
vides a point of departure for developing an effective
regulatory system. Redefinition of the pollution
problem also underscores the advantages of eco-
nomic incentive programs-vz, flexibility in meeting
pollution reduction requirements, enhanced
accountability for individual sources, and increased
likelihood of compliance and enforcement.
Two environmental concerns have inhibited
consideration of incentive programs and tradable
permits in the context of nonpoint source pollution
control. First is the belief that the use of tradable
discharge permits will result in less environmental
protection than more traditional forms of regula-
-tion. This presumption is based primarily on pro-
posals that would involve trades between point
sources (which are subject to specific effluent load
limitations) and nonpoint sources (which would be
subject to BMPs). In this case study, the proposed
trading system is premised on specific, enforceable
load limitations for nonpoint sources-viz, the
Grasslands water and drainage districts. As a result,
the trading program results in a higher degree of
environmental protection than a traditional BMP
program, without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. To
the extent that similar programs can be used in
other regions, environmental protection can be
enhanced by the use of tradable permit programs.
The other environmental concern commonly
raised against tradable discharge permit programs
is that toxic substances should not be traded. There
are cases where the program boundaries easily can
be defined, however, so that "toxic hot spots" do not
occur, and the ecological effects of the total region-
al pollution load are unaffected by trades within the
region. The Grasslands example demonstrates that
programs can be designed safely to trade toxic dis-
charges, provided that appropriate boundaries are
drawn and upstream-downstream trades are
weighted correctly.
Similarly, economic incentives often have been
overlooked as a viable option where there is a sin-
gle regulated industry, on the assumption that sim-
ilarity in marginal costs precludes opportunities for
significant cost savings compared to traditional
programs. Although economic data for individual
farm sources generally are limited, the Grasslands
case suggests that cost savings can be realized
when small marginal cost differences among a large
number of sources are aggregated.
The technical difficulty of deriving a defensible
regional pollution load limit (or TMDL) also has
inhibited consideration of alternatives to the tradi-
tional BMP approach. As pointed out in this Article,
however, an estimate of the regional pollution load
allocation (or screening-level TMDL) is a prerequi-
site for designing any effective program. For the San
Joaquin River, the TMDL provides a simple, afford-
able, and reliable method by which to calculate an
initial load allocation among contributing mem-
bers, and to initiate an appropriate nonpoint source
control program.
Economic incentives thus are an important
option for controlling nonpoint source pollution,
particularly in agricultural areas such as the
Grasslands region. While incentive-based approach-
es and tradable permit systems will not be optimal in
every situation, increased knowledge and experience
with incentive programs will enhance the overall
capacity of policy makers, regulators, and discharg-
ers to improve and protect water quality.
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APPENDIX
THE GRASSLANDS REGIONAL DRAINAGE
DISTRICT: A MODEL STATUTE
Section 1: Policy Declarations and Findings
The Legislature finds and declares as follows:
a. The Grasslands Region of the San Joaquin
Valley is a productive and valuable component
of California's agricultural economy and is
home to some of the last and most important
wetlands in the state. The Grasslands Region
also is a principal source of water supply for the
lower reaches of the San Joaquin River.
b. There exists in the Grasslands Region a serious
problem of irrigation drainage. These problems
include:
(1) high levels of groundwater, which can satu-
rate the root zone of the crops grown in the
region;
(2) contaminated irrigation runoff and
drainage from farms in the region, which
has caused harm to crops, fish and wildlife,
waterfowl, and public health, and which
has degraded the quality of water in both
the San Joaquin River and the aquifer that
underlies the region; and
(3) the absence of a safe and effective means
of disposing of the agriculture drainage
water that is produced by farms in the
region.
c. The pollutants in the drainage water that pose
the greatest risk to crops, public health and
welfare, fish and wildlife, waterfowl, and water
quality are arsenic, boron, molybdenum, sele-
nium, and other salts.
d. The continued discharge of contaminated
drainage water at present concentrations of
pollutants is unacceptable; and past reliance
on nonpoint source pollution controls and
ambient water quality standards to address the
problems caused by excessive drainage from
the Grasslands Region are inadequate.
e. Solution of these problems requires:
(1) integrated, regional management of water
use and drainage in the Grasslands Region;
(2) greater individual accountability among
existing water supply and drainage agen-
cies for their members' irrigation and
drainage practices; and
(3) creation of a system of tradable discharge
permits for the drainage and pollution gen-
erated by irrigation within the region.
Section 2: Membership
a. The Grasslands Regional Drainage District is
comprised of the following members:
(1) Broadview Water District;
(2) Camp 13 Study Area;
(3) Central California Irrigation District;
(4) Charleston Drainage District;
(5) Dos Palos Drainage District;
(6) Eagle Field Water District;
(7) Firebaugh Canal Water District;
(8) Grasslands Water District;
(9) Gustine Drainage District;
(10) Mercy Springs Water District,
(11) Newman Drainage District;
(12) Oro Loma Water District;
(13) Panoche Drainage District;
(14) Panoche Water District;
(15) Pacheco Drainage District;
(16) Pacheco Water District;
(17) Poso Canal Company;
(18) San Luis Canal Company;
(19) San Luis Water District; and
(20) Widren Water District.
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b. With the unanimous consent of the member
agencies, other local water or drainage service
agencies may be added to the Grasslands
Regional Drainage District.
Section 3: Board of Directors
a. The Grasslands Regional Drainage District shall
be administered by a Board of Directors com-
pnsed of five representatives of the member
agencies. Each director shall serve for a term of
four years, except that in the first election of
directors, the terms shall be staggered as set
forth in section 4.
b. The Board of Directors shall administer the
Grasslands Regional Drainage District and shall
have all powers granted to it under this statute.
c. The Board of Directors shall act on the basis of
a majority vote of the directors present and vot-
ing at each meeting. Three directors shall con-
stitute a quorum.
d. The Board of Directors shall elect a Chair, who
shall serve for no longer than one year.
e. The Board of Directors shall appoint an
Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer, a
General Counsel, a Chief Engineer, and other
employees. The Board also may retain non-
employee consultants to assist the District with
its responsibilities under this statute.
f. The Board of Directors shall meet at least once
each quarter. All meetings shall be conducted
in public, except for discussions concerning
personnel and matters protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.
Section 4: Election of Board of Directors
a. Elections for the Board of Directors shall be
held once every two years.
b. In the first election, two directors shall be elect-
ed for terms of two years, the other three direc-
tors shall be elected for terms of four years. In
all subsequent elections, directors shall be
elected for terms of four years.
c. If a vacancy should occur before the end of a
term, the remaining directors shall elect a
replacement, who shall serve for the balance of
the term.
d. Each member agency may nominate one candi-
date for election to the Board of Directors.
e. In the election of directors, each member
agency shall vote for one candidate for each
open position on the Board of Directors. The
number of votes cast by each member agency
shall be proportionate to the percentage of irri-
gated land within the Grasslands Region served
by the agency. For purposes of this section,
"irrgated land' includes land served by irriga-
tion water or drainage for wetlands purposes.
e. No director may serve for a term longer than
four years. and no member agency may have
more than one representative on the Board of
Directors at any time.
Section 5: Powers and Responsibilities
a. The Regional Drainage District shall be respon-
sible to the Central Valley Regional Water
Quality Control Board, the California State
Water Resources Control Board, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, and all
other federal and state agencies with authority
over water quality and natural resources in
the San loaquin Valley for complying with all
laws governing the discharge of drainage and
other effluent into the San loaquin River and its
surface and subsurface tributaries.
b. The Regional Drainage District shall have
authority over its member agencies, and over
all uses of water and discharges of drainage
that occur within its member agencies, to
ensure that the District and its member agen-
cies comply with all applicable laws regarding
water quality, pollution control, and natural
resources management. This authority shall
include the following:
(I) Based on waste discharge requirements,
effluent limitations, or other water quality
standards established under state or feder-
al law, the District shall determine the
aggregate pollution load for each pollutant
governed by such law. This aggregate pol-
lution load is the maximum amount of
each regulated pollutant that may be dis-
charged from all sources located within the
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District into the San Joaquin River and its
tributaries. The aggregate pollution load
may be established for any period up to
one year.
(2) The District shall ensure that the aggregate
discharge of pollution from all sources
within the District does not exceed the
aggregate pollution load.
(3) The District shall apportion the aggregate
pollution load among its member agencies
according to fair and equitable criteria
established by the Board of Directors. In
establishing these criteria, the Board of
Directors shall consider:
(a) the total irrigated acreage within each
member agency;
(b) the average quantity of drainage pro-
duced by each member agency in the
form of surface runoff, return flow, and
percolation following irrigation during
the ten years immediately preceding
the apportionment;
(c) the average quantity of water applied
for the purpose of irrigating crops
within each member agency during the
ten years immediately preceding the
apportionment; and
(d) drainage reduction and management
methods that are applied by, or are
potentially applicable to, water supply,
distribution, irrigation, drainage, and
other water uses within each member
agency.
For purposes of this section, "irrigation"
and "irrigated land" include land served by
irrigation water or drainage for wetlands
purposes.
(4) The District shall quantify each member
agency's apportionment of the aggregate
pollution load and issue a discharge per-
mit to each agency based on that appor-
tionment.
(a) The discharge permit for each member
agency shall define the quantity of
drainage water that each agency is
entitled to discharge from all sources
into the San Joaquin River and its trib-
utaries, into the groundwater basin, or
into any drain or other conveyance
facility that flows into the San Joaquin
River or its tributaries or into the
groundwater basin.
(b) The Board of Directors shall issue dis-
charge permits that define the quanti-
ty of drainage water and the quantity
of pollutants that each member agency
may discharge over any period up to
one year.
(c) The allowances to discharge drainage
water and pollution established by
the discharge permits may be trans-
ferred among member agencies and
individual sources of drainage water
and pollution.
(d) The allowances to discharge drainage
water and pollution established by
the discharge permits do not consti-
tute property protected under the
California Constitution, the United
States Constitution, or any other law,
(5) The District shall supervise and manage
the transfer of discharge allowances. No
member agency may transfer a discharge
allowance without the prior approval of
the Board of Directors. The Board shall
establish criteria to define acceptable
trades and to govern its review transfer
proposals.
(6) The District shall monitor and evaluate
water supply, irrigation, and drainage prac-
tices within each member agency to ensure
that each agency complies with the terms
of its discharge permit.
(7) The District shall collect from each mem-
ber agency a reasonable fee to pay for the
District's costs of implementing this
statute, including but not limited to the
payment of all salaries, administrative
expenses, rent, capital and improvement
costs, attorneys' and consultants' fees, and
monitoring and enforcement costs.
(8) The District shall levy fines and other penal-
ties for the violation of the discharge per-
mits. The Board of Directors shall establish
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a hearing procedure to govern the admins-"
tration of such fines and penalties and shall
promulgate a schedule of fines and penal-
ties applicable to violation of the discharge
permits. The amount of the fine and the
severity of any other penalty shall double
with each successive violation.
(9) The District shall provide technical and
financial assistance to member agencies
and to individual water users within the
member agencies to assist them in meet-
ing the drainage reduction requirements
set forth in their discharge permits.
c. The District shall represent its member agen-
cies, and the interests of water users within the
member agencies, before the Central Valley
Regional Water Quality Control Board, the
State Water Resources Control Board, the
United States Environmental Protection
Agency, and other relevant state and federal
regulatory agencies, as well as in court.
d. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
statute, the District shall comply with all waste
discharge requirements, effluent limitations,
and other water quality standards established
under state or federal law.
Section 6: Other Authority
a. The Board of Directors shall have the authority
to promulgate regulations as it deems appro-
priate to carry out its responsibilities under this
statute.
b. The Board of Directors shall have the authority
to enter into contracts as needed to carry out
its responsibilities under this statute.

